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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
We• 11 know the Alaska t'ecession is over when we can open a 
newspaper' and see no mention of layoffs Ot' banks on the bt"ink of 
failut"e; when we can go to a stot"e we haven't been to in six months 
and f lnd it still in business; when we can dt'ive around and find no 
notices for garage sales that say: Everything Must Go--Leaving the 
State. 
No one is mot'e eager fot' the recession to end than the 
homeowners, mot"tgage lender's, insut'ers, and t'ealtors who have 
watched sales plummet, prices slide, and fot'eclosures t'ise in the 
Alaska housing mat'ket ovet' the past year and a half. The Alaska 
Housing Finance Corpot"ation (AHFC) is by far the biggest residential 
mortgage holder. in Alaska: in mid-1987 it held more than 60 percent 
of the outstanding residential mortgages in the state, with a value 
of $4. 3 billion. Most AHFC mortgages were wdtten after' 1980. The 
large number' and t'elative newness of AHFC mot'tgages mean that AHFC 
has been pat'ticularly hat'd hit by the effects on the housing market 
of the current Alaska t'ecession. In June 1987 AHFC was holding 
neat'ly 3,000 houses, condominiums, and mobile homes in its inventory 
of foreclosed propet"ties. 
Given its large pt'operty holdings and its prominence in Alaska's 
residential housing market, the col:"poration may be able to help 
stabilize the market and has compelling reasons to try. Not only 
does AHFC have its balance sheets to consider; it is also a public 
corporation with a big stake in the health and future of Alaska's 
housing market. 1 AHFC hopes to m1n1m1ze future defaults and 
foreclosures and stabilize the market as soon as possible. It asked 
the Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER) to pt'ovide 
information it needs to plan future policies. 
'I'his repot't provides a wide range of relevant infot'mation: 
descriptions of cut'rent economlc and housing market conditions; 
forecasts of economic t'ecovery between now and 1995; and 
descriptions and analyses of housing policy options available to 
AHFC. 
1As a public corporation of the State of Alaska, AHFC is a 
quasi-state agency but has mot'e independence than traditional state 
agencies. It is a secondat'y mortgage lender: it does not write 
mortgages directly but rather buys them from banks and other primary 
Alaska lenders, using mostly money raised through bond sales but 




Information on some aspects of the Alaska economy and housing 
market is incomplete or lacking. We collected available information 
from a wide variety of sources referenced in notes to tables and 
other appropriate points in the text and appendixes. The economic 
forecasts and analyses of housing market policies were made through 
the use of computer models developed by ISER. 
The accuracy of the economic forecasts of course depends on the 
information and assumptions that go into the model. Because of the 
difficulties of forecasting in an economy as volatile as Alaska• s, 
we made sets of forecasts that cover the likely range of future 
economic change rather than single forecasts. These low, medium, and 
high forecasts are based on different assumptions about the future 
price of oil, levels of state revenues, and other factors that will 
strongly influence Alaska's economy through the mid-l 990s. Appen-
dixes A and B of this report provide documentation of the economic 
model. 
The housing market model used to analyze potential housing 
policies is linked to· the economic model; it is described in the 
text of Chapter IV and model documentation is in Appendixes C and D. 
Together the models provide a reliable picture of likely 
economic change in the coming years and of the effects of various 
housing policies. 
Organization of the Report 
The rest of this chapter sets the stage for Chapter II by 
describing Alaska's economy in general and outlining the causes of 
the current recession. 
Chapter II provides economic forecasts for Alaska from now 
through 1995. It first describes current economic conditions and the 
effects of the recession on various regions of the state. Then, 
through three scenarios that involve different assumptions about the 
future price of oil and other factors important to Alaska's economy, 
it traces the probable range of economic change between now and 
1995. We place most emphasis on projections from the base case, 
which we consider the most likely representation of future growth. 
Chapt.er III describes recent conditions in the Alaska housing 
market and contrasts them with conditions during the economic boom 
of the early 1980s. It reports numbers of new mortgages writ ten in 
Alaska in recent years; market shares of AHFC and other secondary 
lenders; mortgages holdings of the big lenders in 1987; liabilities 
of various lenders and insurers in the flvent of foreclosures; and 
numbers of Alaska properties in forP.closure as of June 1987. 
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Chapter IV analyzes how various AHFC policies might influence 
prices, foreclosures, and other aspects of the Anchorage housing 
market through 1992, given the economic forecasts in Chapter II. 
Appendixes A through D document the economic forecast and 
housing market models. 
In Alaska in recent years, ta] k about the economy has mostly 
meant talk about oi.1. High oil prices in 1:he early 1980s brought 
Alaska hi 11 ions of do 11 ars and hms of thousands of new jobs. 
Collapsing oil prices pitched the state into the current recession. 
And oil prices will play a key part in determining how fast Alaska's 
economy recovers over the next several years, al though growth in 
other basic industries will also be important. 
Why has oil had such a pervasive influence on Alaska• s economy 
in recent. times? Before the huge Prudhoe Bay oil field was 
developed, Alaska was a state of t'clatively modest means. Military 
and other government spending and a handful of resource 
indust.L'les--fishing, mining, logging, and some oil production in 
Cook Inlet form0.d the economic base. Alaska's cold climate, rugged 
terrain, and isolation historically made it. an expensive and 
difficult place to do business; high costs and other factors 
rest.rlcl.ed economic development. In recent years, improved 
transportation and communications have begun to alter those 
historical limitations, but many kinds of economic activities can 
still be carried out for less in other places. 
Alaska's rnaln draw--asi de from i 1:s strategic military location--
has bec~n and continues to be its many natural resources. But in a 
number of past resource developments, little of the income from 
dev0.lopment actually made its way into Alaska's economy: entrepre-
neurs came in, harvested the resources, and left. with most of their 
profits. 
Unlike some earlier developments, Prudhoe Bay oil has becin a 
bonanza for the state government and for Alaska's economy. A lucky 
set of circumstances made this development different. First, the 
state government owns the Prudhoe Bay field--which means it not only 
collects taxes on but also royalties from production. Second, the 
Prudhoe Bay field and adjacent fields produce very large amounts of 
oil- currently about 1.9 million barrels per day. Finally, in 1979--
soon after oil began flowing from Prudhoe Bay--the world price of 
oil tripled and stayed high for several years. 
All these cit·cmnstances taken together meant that the state of 
Alaska came into billions of do 11 ars in petroleum revenueH in the 
1980s. But at tl1e same time, the state became extremely vulnerable 
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to changes in the price of oil: throughout this decade petroleum 
revenues have made up 80 to 90 percent of the general revenues of 
the State of Alaska. 
The Boom 
The state government spent most of its huge petroleum revenues 
in ways that reached throughout the economy in the first half of the 
1980s-··bui new roads, community centers, harbors, and hundi'.'eds 
of other capital projects; subsidizing loans for homebuyers, 
students, and others; and boosting aid to local govet'nments, among 
many other things. As a t'esult, Alaska experienced five years of 
unpt'ecedented economic gt'owth. 
Stimulated by the surge in oil prices that began in 1979 and 
took prices above $30 a barrel by 1981, the value of oil pt'oduction 
from Alaska grew from $5.3 billion in 1979 to a peak of $14 billion 
in 1981. The number of Alaska jobs in the petroleum industry itself 
inct'eased 60 percent during t.hat time, and the oil companies 
operating on the North Slope increased their exploration and 
development budgets several fold. Continuing development of the 
Prudhoe Bay field and the opening of smaller adjacent fields 
increased North Slope oil production from 1. 4 million barrels pet' 
day in 1979 to 1.9 million bart'els per day in 1986. 
State revenues from oil production quadrupled between 1979 and 
1982, growing from $825 million to nearly $4 billion. After 1982 the 
pt'ice of oil began to drop, and so did state petroleum revenues-·-but 
through 1985 those revenues remained high enough to support mu! ti-
bil Hon dollar state spending. That spending tripled in the early 
1980s, and both operating and capital expenditures continued to grow 
through 1985. 
state spending averaged about $4 billion annually during the 
peak years of 1981 through 1983, and was the impetus for most of the 
growth in employment, income, and population in the state between 
1980 and 1985. During that short period, the number of wage jobs in 
Alaska increased 36 percent, growing from 167,000 to 227,000; total 
personal income in the state grew 70 percent, from $5. 6 billion to 
$9. 5 billion; per capita incomes of Alaskans went from $13,830 to 
$18,4/ilt. Alaska's booming economy attracted tens of thousands of new 
residents: in just five years Alaska's population jumped 30 percent, 
increasing from 414,000 to 539,000. 
The Recession 
The t'ecession currently gripping Alaska actually began in the 
last quarter of 1985. It was precipitated by the softening of oil 
prices that had begun as early as 1982 and the consequent slowdown 
in government spending. The 1986 peice crash- which brought prices 
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down l:o $10 · a bat't'el--exacerbated the economic slowdown that had 
alt'eady begun. 
The pett'oleum industry cut back on spending fot' both operations 
and capital pt'oj ec ts on the Not'th Slope. The state govet'nment lost 
mot'e than $1 billion in anticipated revenues in just six months, and 
was forced to make lat'ger budget cuts eat'lier than anyone had 
expected. Those cuts in spending not only cost the economy jobs and 
income but also made businesses and individuals lose confidence. And 
that. loss of confidencP. cost. the economy more jobs and income: 
businesses and individuals began spending and investing less because 
they were worried about economic conditions. 
We will look in detail in Chap tel'.' II at jobs, population, and 
income lost so fat' in the recession, how much more loss there is 
likely to be, and how and when the economy will turn around. Here we 
will just say that we expect the economy to begin recovering in 
1988. Alaska will not lose all the employment and income gains made 
in the early 1980s. For example, when employment is at its projected 
low point in 1988, Alaska will still have in the neighborhood of 
20 percent more jobs than it had in 1980. We project that in 1988 
per capita income of Alaskans will still be 25 percent above the 
national average. 
The reccwsion Alaska is going through is certainly severe--but 
in part it has been so severe because economic growth in the 
immediately preceding years was so extraordinary. By no means will 
the economy come down as much in the late 1980s as it went up at the 
start of the decade. 
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CHAPTER II. ECONOMIC FORECAST FOR ALASKA, 1987-1995 
Source of Forecasts 
This chapter forecasts economic change in Alaska from now 
through 1995. We made these economic forecasts with a computer model 
developed by ISER. Documentation of the model is included in 
A and B. The forecasts cover what we consider the 
potential range of economic change in the state in the coming years 
through three economic scenarios; the scenarios include different 
assumptions about the future price of oil and other factors that 
will influence economic change. Tables and figures throughout the 
chapter show the projected range of change under the low, medium, 
and high scenarios. In all cases we assume that there will be no 
major governmental initiative to try to further stimulate the 
economy---for example, no extraordinary use of undistributed 
Permanent Fund earnings or floating of public works bonds to finance 
large capital projects. 
We use the medium scenario as our base case----the case we 
consider most likely. That case assumes an oil price close to $18 a 
barrel; we consider this the most likely average real price of oil 
in the next few years. We mainly discuss the base case projections, 
but at the end of the chapter we analyze what would likely happen if 
oil prices rose much higher or fell much further than we anticipate. 
The low case represents a "worst-case" scenario that we consider 
extremely unlikely; it is included to illustrate what could happen 
if there were a prolonged collapse of oil prices. 
The accuracy of the forecasts of course depends on the accuracy 
of our assumptions. Those assumptions are reasonable, given what we 
know now. But we all know the Alaska economy can be volatile. Big 
unexpected changes that promote or impair growth could make the 
future economic picture significantly different from what we foresee 
in our base case. 
Sununary of Findings 
We expect the current Alaska recession to end and the economy to 
begin growing again in the second half of 1988. The worst of the 
recession--as measured by job loss---is now behind us. Under our base 
case projections, the number of jobs in the state will grow by an 
average 1.4 percent annually through 1995, driven by continued 
strength in fishing, timber, tourism, mining, and federal government 
employment as well as by recovery of the petroleum industry 
(Table 2.1). Growth in infrastructure, support, and state and local 
government employment, which has accounted for most of the increase 
in jobs in the past two decades, will be below historical averages. 
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TABLE 2.1. GROWTH RATES UNDER THREE SCENARIOS: 1988-1995 
(average annual percentages) 





INTERIOR . 7 
EMP = Employment 
POP= Population 




.3 . 7 
EMP POP HH EMP POP 
1.4% .8% 1.2% 2.3% 1.5% 
1.2 .6 . 9 2.2 1.6 
1.8 1.1 1.5 2.5 1. 7 
NOTE: Assumptions and other documentation of scenarios are in 





The world price of oil will continue to be important to Alaska's 
economy, influencing when the recession ends and how fast the 
economy recovers. Moderate fluctuations in oil prices during the 
next two years would have relatively little effect on when the 
recession ends. If the price of oil were to fall below $15 a barrel 
(official OPEC price) for the next two years and then return to its 
current level, the negative impact on the petroleum industry, state 
and local government spending, and business and consumer confidence 
would extend the recession for another year but increase its 
severity only modestly. On the other hand, a significantly higher 
oil price would improve business and consumer confidence in the 
short run but would not end the recession much sooner. 
The rate of economic recovery between now and 1995 is also 
linked to petroleum prices. Within a band $2 above or below the 
current official OPEC price of $18 a barrel, the projected timing 
and rate of recovery would vary little. However, if the price were 
to fall immediately and remain at $15 a barrel (in 
inflation-adjusted dollars) throughout the next decade, the 
combination of continued decline in petroleum development and 
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state-local government activities would slow the subsequent 
recovery. Under prolonged lower oil prices, the number of Alaska 
jobs would be no higher in 1995 than in 1988. If oil prices jumped 
to and remained at $26 a barrel, significant increases in petroleum 
exploration and government spending would speed economic recovery. 
Employment growth in that case would average 2. 3 percent annually 
through 1995. 
Regions where basic industries are expanding will recover most 
In , the Fairbanks economy will benefit from the 
thousands of additional soldiers the military plans to station at 
Ft. Wainwright over the next several years. Anchorage will share 
only indirectly in most basic industry growth, and its recovery will 
consequently lag behind recovery in much of the rest of the state. 
Alaska's population and numbers of households have declined as 
the recession forced some people to leave the state. We estimate the 
total decline from the peak in 1985 to the trough in 1988 will be 
16 thousand. The population loss has been less severe than the job 
loss, because a number of factors offset population loss--including 
a reduction in the labor force participation rate, rise in the 
unemployment rate, reduction in the proportion of the population of 
working age ( those 16 to 64) , and a reduction in the nonresident 
proportion of the labor force. We expect that the historical trend 
toward decreasing average household size will mean that numbers of 
households will decline proportionately less than population 
declines. 
During the recovery, employment will grow faster than population 
or households as the unemployment rate falls and the labor force 
participation rate increases. Our base case projects population 
growth to average slightly less than 1 percent annually and 
household growth slightly more over the forecast period. If economic 
growth is faster than we expect, population could grow by as much as 
1.5 percent annually; if conditions are significantly worse, 
population could continue to decline slightly (. 3 percent annual 
average). Under worse or better economic conditions than we expect, 
numbers of households could remain virtually unchanged or increase 
by 2 percent a year over the next several years. 
Current Economic Situation: The State Economy 
The Alaska Employment Index (Figure 2 .1) stood at 125 in June 
1987. On this index the level of employment in January 1980 is the 
base (1980=100). So the June 1987 figure represented a 25 percent 
gain over the January 1980 level of wage and salary employment, but 
a decline from the peak of 38 percent above in September 1985. 
Between early 1980 and the peak of the "Petrodollar Boom," 
60 thousand jobs were created in Alaska. In the 21 months since the 
start of the recession, we've lost 21 thousand jobs--a loss of 
1 thousand jobs per month, but still a net gain of nearly 
40 thousand jobs since early 1980. 
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Figure 2.1 
ALASKA EMPLOYMENT INDEX--PART I. 
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Job loss has been concentrated in the construction and support--
trade, service, and finance--industries (Table 2. 2). Construction 
has experienced the largest absolute and relative declines in 
jobs--12 thousand and 55 percent, respectively. There are currently 
10 thousand construction jobs in Alaska--about the same number as in 
early 1980 when the cycle began . 1 The combined loss of 
10 thousand jobs in trade and service industries accounts for the 
bulk of the rest of the job loss in the economy. Transportation/ 
communications/public utilities and finance industries together have 
lost about 3 thousand jobs. The petl:'.'oleum industry (mining) has 
lost about one thousand. Finally, the combined losses in employment 
in state and local government have, until now, been less than 
3 thousand. Employment in other industries has remained constant or 
has increased. 
The construction industry began losing jobs in early 1984, about 
18 months before the start of the recession. The recession began 
when the economy as a whole began losing jobs; that happened when 
the numbers of jobs being created in support industries could no 
longer offset the large losses of construction jobs--so the overall 
number of jobs in the state began to shrink. 
This pattern reflects the causes of the recession. The 
recession was initiated by (1) the contraction of construction 
activity following its very rapid expansion in the early 1980s; and 
(2) the overextension of business in anticipation of continued 
stimulus to the economy from increases in state and local government 
spending. These factors explain the general deterioration in the 
annual employment growth rate from its peak of 12 percent in early 
1981 (Figure 2.2). 
The recession clearly began before the precipitous drop in the 
price of oil beginning in December 1985 and continuing through the 
first six months of 1986. But the crash in oil prices made the 
recession longer and more severe. First, it led to a dramatic 
reduction of petroleum industry spending for exploration and 
development activities as well as a modest reduction of jobs in the 
industry itself. Second, it led to significant reductions in state 
and local government budgets--particularly capital budgets--and a 
lowering of expectations about the ability of government to maintain 
current levels of real expenditures. Finally, it significantly 
undermined business and consumer confidence in the economy. 
1AU employment figures used in this study are annual 
averages. Monthly figures have been seasonally adjusted and smoothed 
to facilitate comparisons with annual figures. 
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TABLE 2.2. JOB LOSS FROM THE CYCLICAL PEAK 




Sept. June Loss June Further 
1985 1987 from Peak 1988 Loss 
Total Wage and Salary 230 209 21 202 7 
Mining 9.8 8.8 1 9 
Manufacturinga 14.8 14 1 
Federal Civiliana 18 18 
Transportation, 
Communications, 
Public Utilities 19 17 2 17 
Constructionb 22 10.2 11.8 8 2 
Finance 11.8 11.2 .6 11 
Trade 45.9 39.9 6 39 1 
Services 45.6 41.4 4.2 40 1 
State Government 20.7 19.3 1.4 18 1 
Local Government 29.5 28.2 1.3 27 1 
aNo significant loss from peak to date. These lndustt'ies at'e 
expet'iencing a cyclical peak. 
bpeak month--January 1984. 
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Figure 2.2 
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But in spite of the loss of jobs, Alaska still had 25 percent 
more jobs in mid-1987 than it had in 1980. The increase has been 
concentrated in petroleum, the support industries, and state-local 
government. Petroleum employment is 50 percent higher than it was in 
1980; trade, service, and finance employment at least 40 percent 
higher; and state and local government employment about 30 percent 
higher. Basic industries other than petroleum are within 10 percent 
of their 1980 employment levels. 
Alaska has lost about 1 thousand jobs per' month since the 
recession began, but job loss is now slowing (F'igure 2. 2.) About 
75 percent of the projected decline from the 1985 peak has already 
occurred. It is typical during a recession that job loss is rapid at 
first and then gradually slows down until employment becomes static. 
The annual rate of job loss is now 4 percent, as compared with 
8 percent in early 1986. So the trend is clearly positive. 
Our base case projects some job 
of 1988 and reach bottom at a 
losses, as shown in Table 2.2, 
construction, trade, service, and 
There are several reasons why we 
sectors. 
loss to continue into the middle 
level of 202 thousand 2 . Those 
will be concentrated in the 
state-local government sectors. 
expect more job loss in these 
Construction employment is normally the most volatile over the 
business cycle. Employment in this industry has already fallen 
55 percent from its peak, but it is still at a level equal to that 
of early 1980, when the economy was beginning to expand. Al though 
the current number of construction jobs would not be inconsistent if 
Alaska's economy were experiencing normal growth, further contraction 
is likely because demand for construction services in the near term 
will be relatively low. 
There are four sources of demand for construction services in 
Alaska--state and local government, the petroleum industry, other 
basic industries, and private capital formation (primarily real 
estate). Among these, basic industries other than petroleum are the 
only strong sources of demand right now, with expansion of military 
operations the most significant. Construction of residential and 
commercial real estate has come to a virtual halt because we have 
more housing and office space than we need right now. Petroleum 
industry demand has declined since 1986, which was a strong year in 
spite of the low oil price; final-phase construction of a number of 
large North Slope development projects took place that year. Next 
year will likely see less petroleum industry activity than this 
year. No major development projects have been announced to take up 
the slack that will be left this year when development of the 
2Annual employment will average 205 thousand for the year 
because of higher employment levels at the beginning and end of the 
year. 
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Endicott Field--the first offshore field developed on the Not'th 
Slope--is complete. State-local govet'nment demand is also still 
contt'acting. A numbet' of pt'ojects authodzed in yeat's past when 
capital appt'opt'iations were at all-time highs are nearing 
completion, with no projects of comparable size to replace them. As 
a consequence, the level of employment in the constt'uction industry 
will continue to dt'op until next yeat', when it will bottom out at 
8 thousand. 
There are also reasons numbers of trade and service jobs 
will likely continue to decline until next year. The latter phase of 
the rapid expansion in Alaska• s trade and service sector was based 
on the expectation that the market would continue to grow. 
Consequently, some of the job loss in these sectot's so far has been 
the result not of a shrinking market but t'ather of a market that 
stopped growing. The trade and service mat'ket grew in the early 
1980s not only because of fast population growth but also because of 
growth in real per capita disposable income. Furthet'more, direct 
government purchases of materials and contractual services were 
important sources of demand for local businesses. Those sources of 
market expansion are gone. 
Part of the decline in these sectors is the result of a loss of 
business and consumer confidence in the economy. That loss of 
confidence will continue to hurt the trade and service sectors 
through this winter and into the spring of next year; continuing 
losses of construction and government jobs will reinforce the 
perception of businesses and households that the economy has not yet 
started to recover. As in any period of economic restructuring, 
adjustments in the trade and service sectors will lag behind changes 
in the basic sectors. For example, in the early 1980s growth in 
petroleum and construction employment led the economy, and it was 
only later that the support sectors responded. 
State and local government employment will also continue to 
contract during the next twelve months as governments continue to 
adjustment to permanently lower revenues and the elimination of 
certain functions. The decline in state and local government jobs so 
far has been relatively modest in relation to the decline in 
expected petroleum revenues. Expenditure cutbacks to date have been 
concentrated in capital budgets and other areas not involving loss 
of state and local government jobs. 
The recent pattern of employment growth by industry suppol'.'ts our 
base case projections of job loss. Basic employment growth has been 
strong through most of the recession and has recently stabilized 
(Figure 2.3, page 2-7). Infrastructure employment, with the 
exception of construction employment, has trended modestly downward 
(Figure 2.4). Support employment is still contl'.'acting, particulat'ly 
in the tl'.'ade sector (Figure 2.5). 
2-9 
Figure 2.4 
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Real personal income (income adjusted for inflation) grew faster 
during the expansion than did either population or employment, and 
as a consequence real per capita personal income increased. That 
growth in income reflects relatively rapid growth in high-wage 
industries, as well as increases in transfer payments such as the 
Permanent Fund Dividend. Significantly, that income growth occurred 
early in the expansion: we reached the approximate current level of 
real income in the final quarter of 1982, with fluctuations within 
5 percent since that time. 
According to official income statistics published by the federal 
government, Alaska personal income and disposable personal income 
have contracted much more slowly than wage and salary employment 
has. Real personal income (in 1986 dollars) in Alaska in the first 
quarter of 1987 was $9.2 billion--only 5 percent less than its peak 
of $9.7 billion in the third quarter of 1985. Two factors may have 
limited income loss among Alaskans: a disproportionate share of job 
loss in industries--particularly construction--with many nonresident 
workers, and less contraction in nonwage sources of income than in 
wages and salaries. Al though these other sources of 
income--transfers and inter-est/dividends/rent---contribute a 
r-elati vely small pr-opor-tion to total Alaska personal income, their 
strength may have helped buoy up personal income. 
But the federal figures showing such a modest decline in 
personal income during the recession are misleading for at least two 
reasons. First, the statistics are probably not adequately picking 
up the severity of the decline in either dividend/intet'est/rent or 
proprietor income, since accut'ate data on these sources of income is 
available only after a considerable delay. Second, the concept of 
personal income does not measure the capital gains and losses 
associated with fluctuating property values and is thus an 
incomplete measure of both consumer put'chasing powet' and economic 
well-being, particularly in times of rapid economic change. 
Real per capita income (in 1986 dollat's) gt'ew rapidly in the 
eat'ly part of the cycle, peaking at over $19.5 thousand in 1983 and 
falling close to its 1980 level by 1986---$17. 7 thousand. We expect 
the decline in real income to continue at least tht'ough 1988 as the 
average real wage rate falls, the unemployment rate increases, the 
labot' force participation rate falls, and the adult propol'.'tion of 
the population falls. The fall in the average wage rate will be 
partially offset by a projected moderate rate of local inflation at 
least through 1987. The pattern of growth in disposable income is 
expected to follow closely that of pel'.'sonal income. 
Total population and the number of households in Alaska grew 
through 1985 and at'e now declining as job opportunities decline. We 
anticipate a dt'op in population ft'om 540 thousand in 1985 to 
524 thousand in 1988, and a decline in the number of households 
2-11 
from 183 thousand to 179 thousand over the same period. 3 The 
percent decline in population and households will be much smaller 
than that of employment for several reasons. 
First, as we noted earlier, a large share of job loss has been 
in those industries--like construction--with many nonresident 
workers. Second, although many workers who have lost their jobs have 
left the state, some have remained--ei ther continuing to look for 
jobs or d out of the labor market to pursue other 
activities. Third, natural increase among Alaskans and the 
composition of the families who have left the state are tending to 
decrease the proportion of wot'king-age adults ( those 16 to 64) in 
the population as a whole. Finally, some Alaskans--particularly 
those ovet' 65 and Alaska Natives--do not base their decisions about 
staying in Alaska on job opportunities. 
Cut'rent Economic Situation: Regional Economies 
Neither the CUt't'ent recession nor the boom that preceded it have 
affected all Alaska's t'egions equally. Both have been concentrated 
in those regional economies where petroleum, support industries, and 
government are most important. 
Anchorage's economy is the largest in the state, and it has 
experienced most of the growth and most of the decline in the 1980s. 
Employment expanded more rapidly in Anchorage between 1980 and 
1985--about 43 percent--than in any other major area of the state 
(Figure 2. 6) . The growth was led by expansion in the petroleum and 
construction industries in direct response to the increase in the 
price of oil. About half of Alaska's petroleum industry jobs are in 
Anchorage, and a large share of construction and petroleum industry 
employees who work on the North Slope live in Anchorage and commute. 
Growth in state government and the support sectors followed 
growth in construction and petroleum. State government employment 
in the Anchorage area increased by nearly 50 percent, since half the 
new state government jobs created since 1980 were located in 
Anchorage and the nearby Mat-Su region. By 1985, 39 percent of state 
government jobs were in Anchorage and the Mat-Su Borough, an 
increase from 35 percent in 1980. In contrast, the propot'tion of 
government employment in Southeast Alaska fell from 30 to 27 percent 
and in Interior from 23 to 22 percent. Clearly a significant shift 
toward Anchot'age and away from these other centet's occut'red 
(Table 2.3). 
3This decline appears small in relation to decline in 
employment. However, if there were no net migration ovet' this 
three-year period, natural increase would add about 30 thousand to 
the population of the state. 
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Figure 2.6 
ANCHORAGE EMPLOYMENT INDEX--PART I. 
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TABLE 2.3. REGION DISTRIBUTION OF 
STATE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES: 
LEVELS AND PROPORTIONS 
Anchorage/ Gulf 
Mat-Su Southeast Coast Interior Southwest North state 
1980 5,368 4,669 1,228 3,469 349 278 15,361 
1985 7,994 5,519 1,631 4,415 490 374 20,423 
1980 34.9% 30.4% 08.0% 22.6% 02.3% 01.8% 100% 
1985 39.1% 27.0% 08.0% 21.6% 02.4% 01. 8o/o lOOo/o 
In contrast, local government employment in Anchorage grew only 
20 percent between 1980 and 1985, lagging growth in other areas of 
the state. During this period, the share of local employment in 
Anchorage and the Mat-Su Borough fell from 37. 7 percent to 
34. 5 percent. The greatest increases in local government jobs were 
in the rural parts of the state, which increased their share from 
29 to 32 percent. 
A large portion of the employment growth in Anchorage in the 
first half of the 1980s is attributable to expansion of the trade, 
finance, and service sectors. Trade employment in particular grew 
during that period--by about 60 percent between 1980 and 1985. 
The smallest labor market area of the state is in the extreme 
north, where the North Slope oil fields are. That area also grew 
rapidly in the early 1980s in response to petroleum development 
activities and the availability of state government revenues. 
Employment in Southeast Alaska grew little more than 10 percent 
between 1980 and 1985, even though the state capital is in that 
labor market area. As noted above, Southeast's share of the growth 
in government employment--a disproportionately important element of 
that regional economy--was quite small. Employment growth in the 
other regions--Interior (Fairbanks), Gulf Coast, and southwest--fell 
between the extremes of Anchorage and Southeast. 
Anchorage/Mat-Su and the North Slope have been hardest hit by 
job loss d¼ring the recession--although all regions have seen job 
opportunities shrink, personal income decline, and unemployment 
increase. The employment level in Anchorage in 1987 has fallen to 
that of early 1983--or a loss of about 14 thousand jobs, two-thirds 
of all the job loss in the state. Since Anchorage has a 
disproportionate share of the jobs in petroleum, construction, and 
the trade, finance, and service industries, we would expect a large 
2-14 
share of the job loss to be in Anchorage. During the worst phase of 
the recession, Anchorage was losing jobs at a rate of 1 percent per 
month (Figure 2.7). Basic industry employment in Anchorage is 
dominated by strength in federal government employment (Figure 2.8). 
Construction employment has shown recent strength but can be 
expected to contract further through this sununer and fall 
(Figure 2.9). Numbers of support jobs in Anchorage are continuing to 
drop, but rates of decline are beginning to moderate (Figure 2.10). 
less than on and statewide 
support activities and more dependent on other basic industries have 
been less severely impacted by the downturn in the economy. 
Economic Projection: The State 
Our base case projects the loss of jobs to continue until the 
middle of 1988 and then a slow recovery to begin. statewide wage 
and salary employment at that time will be 202 thousand, a loss of 
28 thousand jobs from peak 1985 levels. That loss will put 
employment at the level of the last quarter of 1982 and 20 percent 
above the level of early 1980. Alaska's population will be 
524 thousand, representing a loss of 16 thousand from the peak but 
an increase of 25 percent over 1980. Real personal income for 1988 
will be down $800 million for a loss of 8 percent from 1985, but 
about 35 percent above the 1980 level. 
Growth during the recovery will be slow by Alaska's historical 
standards. Our base case projects employment growth to average 
1.4 percent annually between 1988 and 1995, household growth to 
average 1. 2 percent, and population growth to average . 8 percent. 
Employment will grow faster than either the number of households or 
the total population because the recession has created excess 
capacity in the labor force. 
Job loss will end when the excess capacity in the construction, 
state-local government, and support sectors has been eliminated. 
Numbers of Alaska jobs will then begin to grow in response to growth 
in the basic sectors of the economy, including petroleum, as well as 
a stabilization in the level of state and local government activity. 
Petroleum is the dominant basic industry in the state, as 
measured by its contribution to gross state product and its 
potential for expanding rapidly and stimulating the economy. The 
recovery of the petroleum industry in Alaska ls at least two years 
away because of the long lead time required for developing major 
fields on the North Slope and because the world oil price has not 
yet stabilized at a level that justifies significant new North Slope 
development. We expect oil prices over the next four years to 
fluctuate within a band of about $2 on either side of the current 
world price of $18 a barrel (the current official OPEC posted 
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Figure 2.7 
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price). Within that range, the industry will begin a slow recovery 
and will cautiously undertake carefully selected development 
activities. 4 
After 1990 the price of oil will firm and more exploration and 
development will take place. Any petroleum leasing allowed within 
the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) will not have an 
appreciable effect on industry employment or industry demand for 
construction services for a number of years because of the time 
needed to carry out dr-ill activi wH:h much less 
economic impact than field development. 
We assume that the initial thrust for- economic recovery will 
come from gr-owth in Alaska's other- basic industr-ies, all of which 
are r-elatively healthy and have opportunities for expansion. 5 
During the recession, these industries have been str-ong and have 
helped moderate the overall economic decline (Figur-e 2.11 and 
Table 2.4). Mining, fishing, timber, tour-ism, and federal 
government combined do not generate as much gross state product as 
does the petroleum industry--but they directly contribute about 
70 thousand jobs to the economy, and growth in the number of these 
jobs will clearly benefit the economy. 
The expansion of the mining industr-y will, in the short run, be 
based primarily on development of the Red Dog Mine in Northwest 
Alaska and the Greens Creek Mine in the Southeast. A number- of 
smaller mines are currently in the early stages of development in 
the Southeast and Interior. 
The fishing industry is benefiting fr-om strong demand for fish 
products and recent legislation restricting mor-e fisheries to U.S. 
I 
fishing boats. Opportunities for expansion exist in maricul tur-e, 
bottomfishing, and specialty markets. This is a dynamic and highly 
competitive industry, and Alaska producers and processors will have 
to adapt to changing technologies and market conditions to remain 
competitive. We assume that the number of jobs in this industry 
will grow moderately. 
4As a rule of thumb, the OPEC posted pr-ice is roughly 
equivalent to a West Texas intermediate crude price. The price of 
North Slope crude delivered to the Gulf Coast will be $1 to $1. 50 
per barrel below these often-quoted prices. When the Persian Gulf 
and U.S. Gulf prices are not in equilibrium, this relationship will 
not hold. For example, in the summer of 1987, the West Texas spot 
price rose to $22 while the OPEC posted price remained at $18. 
5The assumptions used in the 
chapter al'.'e listed in Appendix A. 
values are presented in Appendix B. 
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projections pt'esented in this 
Detailed tables of projection 
The timber industry has been enjoying a boom in Alaska recently, 
particularly in the Southeast, because Native corporations are 
harvesting more timber from their lands. We anticipate that 
increased harvesting will continue into the early 1990s and that 
employment in the industry will then stabilize. No additional 
processing of timber--beyond what is already being done--is likely 
to take place in Alaska. 
We expect tourism to continue to grow. Among the large projects 
under discussion are construction of new visitor facilities at 
Denali National Park and development of a large winter resort in the 
Eagle River valley just north of Anchorage. Anchorage is also making 
a bid to host the 1994 Winter Olympics. More efforts are being made 
to market Alaska to foreign tourists--a prospect made easier by the 
fall in the value of the dollar. We expect the trend in the number 
of tourist visitors to Alaska to continue its historical pattern. 
Civilian federal government employment has historically been the 
most stable component of basic sector employment in the state, and 
we project that it will continue to provide a stable base for the 
economy. Numbers of federal civilian jobs in Alaska have increased 
slightly over the last 18 months, even though the Alaska Railroad 
was transferred from fedet'al to state ownership, and the 
Gramm-Rudman initiative limiting federal expenditures has been in 
effect. We expect federal employment to remain stable until 1990 and 
then resume its slow historical growth pattern. 
Militat'y employment in Alaska is expected to grow rapidly 
tht'ough 1989, with the assignment of a new light infantry division 
to the state; most of that division will be in Fairbanks. That 
division will add nearly 4,000 militat:y and federal civilian jobs 
directly to the economy. 
That military expansion accounts for most of the basic industry 
employment gt'owth we expect over the next 3 to 4 years. Figure 2.11 
shows the pattern of growth in basic sector employment historically 
from 1980 and projected to 1995. We expect seven thousand new jobs 
to be added to Alaska's basic sector between 1987 and 1995--an 
increase of 9 percent that will be concentrated in military, mining 
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TABLE 2.4. INDICATORS OFBASIC INDUSTRY ACTIVITY 
(values in nominal dollars) 
P E T R O L E U M 
Volume 
Value of Pipeline Industry 
Production Oil Gas Elll) l oyment Elll)loyrnent 
($ mi 11 ion) (mi 11 ion bbl s) (bi 11 cubic ft) (thousands) (thousands) 
1960 $1 0.6 0.2 0 
1965 36 11. 1 7.3 0 . 7 
1970 279 83.6 111.6 0 2.6 
1975 369 69.8 160.3 0 3.4 
1980 9,825 591.6 174.5 0.9 6.2 
1981 14,023 587.8 190.4 0.9 8.1 
1982 12,576 618.5 201.8 0.9 8.1 
1983 11,367 628.9 212.7 0.9 7.4 
1984 11,440 626.9 212.7 0.9 8.0 
1985 11,467 665.6 223.9 0.9 8.9 
1986 681.3 0.9 8.0 
TIMBER HARVESTING FISH TIMBER PETROLEUM 
PROCESSING** PROCESSING PROCESSING 
Volume 
(million* Elll)loyment Elll)loyment Elll)loyment Elll)loyment 
board feet) (thousands) (thousands) (thousands) (thousands) 
1960 367.2 
1965 440.0 1. 1 3.0 1.2 0.0 
1970 628.0 1. 7 3.7 1.0 0. l 
1975 468.4 2.2 4.3 1.2 0. 1 
1980 589. l 2.5 7.8 1.0 0.2 
1981 564.3 2.2 8.1 1.0 0.2 
1982 593.2 2.1 6.9 0.8 0.2 
1983 525.7 1.8 6.3 0.8 0.2 
1984 491.6 l. 7 5.8 0.6 0.2 
1985 543.0 l. 7 6.4 0.6 0.2 
1986 6.6 0.6 0.2 
*Harvest on public lands only. 
**Includes some other food processing. 
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TABLE 2.4 (continued) 
FEDERAL TOURISM 
MILITARY CIVILIAN AGRICULTURE 
-~,-_, ___ No. of 
Employment Employment Tourists Employment Value of Production 
(thousands) (thousands) (thous.) (thousands) ($ mi 11 ions) 
1960 32.7 
1965 33.0 17 .4 70 . 7 $5.6 
1970 31.4 17. l 129 1.3 5.3 
1975 25.3 18.3 285 2.9 5.2 
1980 22.0 17.7 439 4.4 9.2 
1981 22.5 17.5 447 4.5 9. 7 
1982 22.1 17 .6 467 4.7 12.2 
1983 22.3 17. 7 485 4.9 12.6 
1984 22.6 18. 1 519 5.2 15.4 
1985 23. 1 17 .6 555 5.5 16.2 
1986 18.0 590 5.8 15. l 
FISH HARVESTING MINING 
Value Volume Employment Coal Volume Total Value* Employment 
($ mi 11 ion) (mi 11 ion lbs.) ( thousands) (million tons) ($ mi 11 ion) (thousands) 
1960 0. 7 $19.8 
1965 4.6 0.7 46.8 0.4 
1970 4.7 0.8 54.3 0.6 
1975 $127.8 444.3 4.4 0.8 146.6 0.4 
1980 562.8 994.4 7.6 0.8 152.6 0.5 
1981 646. l 1,001.9 7 .8 0.8 188.6 0.8 
1982 578.5 907 .3 8.3 0.8 196.3 0.8 
1983 549.8 990.2 7.9 0.8 212.2 0.8 
1984 510.8 1,004. l 8.2 0.8 199.4 0.7 
1985 604.8 l, 105.4 1.4 226.6 0.6 
1986 1.5 198.5 
*Including all minerals and sand/gravel. 
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State and local government spending was the primary driver 
behind Alaska's economic expansion of the early 1980s. Reduced 
revenues have necessitated significant spending cutbacks at all 
levels in all regions of the state. State and local governments have 
been reluctant--understandably--to lay off workers, and most of the 
cuts so far have been in capital expenditures, loan programs, 
procurement, and wage rates. Because of the unprecedented economic 
contrac t.lon the state has experienced, we believe state and local 
governments will be under tremendous political pressure to maintain 
ture levels while at the same time holding the line on 
household and business taxes. Evidence of this pressure al:'e the 
modest cuts the 1987 Alaska Legislature made in the state operating 
budget, even though deficits of several hundred million dollars were 
at the time projected for fiscal 1987 and beyond (Figure 2.12, 
page 2-20). 
At a world oil price of approximately $18 a barrel (the current 
official OPEC posted price), state petroleum revenues augmented by a 
quarter of the earnings of the Permanent Fund and one-time 
settlements of oil price and ownership disputes with the federal 
government and the oil companies will be sufHcient to support the 
current level of state government spending through 1990 
(Figures 2 .13 and 2 .14). 6 After 1990, reimposition of the 
personal income tax could provide sufficient funds to keep state 
spending at $2 billion (in 1986 dollars) until 1994--when it would 
be necessary to eliminate the Permanent Fund Dividend. Other 
combinations of the timing for these revenue-enhancing measures 
could produce the same levels of new revenues with slightly 
different economic impacts. Either reimposing the income tax or 
eliminating the dividend would cause the economy to contract because 
private purchasing power would be reduced. But these measures would 
also stimulate economic expansion because of the increase in public 
sector purchasing power they would produce. 
Slightly higher or lower oil prices will not significantly 
affect the level of petroleum production in Alaska in the next few 
years but will be reflected in state petroleum revenues as changes 
in revenue per barrel of production. Within this range of slightly 
higher or slightly lower oil prices, the state government could 
maintain its current level of spending with some combination of use 
of Permanent Fund earnings, reimposition of the personal income tax, 
reduction of the Permanent Fund Dividend, or increase i.n petroleum 
tax rates. 
6we assume the state will receive these settlements incrementally; 
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We assume there will continue to be downward pressure on state 
and local government wage rates so that more people can have 
jobs--sparticularly at the local level. As a consequence of lower 
wage rates, numbers of government jobs will slowly recover and begin 
to grow over the forecast period. 
The infrastructure and support sectors will be the slowest to 
recover because of excess capacity, lower real income, and less 
government spending for capital goods, services, and procurement 
( 2.15 and 2.16). The construction indus will remain below 
its equilibrium level until excess capacity in residential and 
commercial real estate has been absorbed. Slow recovery in these 
sectors will keep wage and salary employment below the 1985 peak 
until 1994 (Figure 2.17). 7 
Personal income will increase with employment (Figure 2.18), but 
per capita disposable personal income will change little between now 
and 1995 if pet:'sonal income taxes at:'e t:'eimposed Ot:' Pet:'manent F'und 
Dividends are eliminated. Those kinds of measut:'es would keep t:'eal 
per capita disposable personal income at least $1,000 below the peak 
1983 figut:'e of $16 thousand (Figure 2.19). 
Slow gt:'owth in population will keep income and othet:' per capita 
variables from falling further. Our base case projects population 
growth to average slightly less than 1 percent annually between 1988 
and 1995 (Figure 2.20). As new jobs become available in the economy, 
they will be taken by those currently unemployed or not in the work 
force. More people will likely leave Alaska than come in from other 
states through 1995, because the number of jobs created will be 
smaller than the number of new entrants into the labor market. 
(Population gt:'owth in the state in the next few years will be 
primarily through natural increase rather than immigration. ) 
Nonresident employment will continue to fall as a percentage of 
total employment because of an abundant supply of local labor and 
less attractive wage rates. 
The number of households will increase slightly more than 
1 percent annually--faster than the population will grow because the 
average household size will continue to decline. By 1991, the 
number of households will exceed the previous high in 1985 
(Figure 2.21). The composition of Alaska households will change as 
the number and proportion of Native and military households increase 
relative to civilian non-Native households. The number of civilian 
non-Native households will likely decline into 1989 and regain its 
1985 level only in 1993. 
These patterns of economic recovery and growth as projected in 
the base case are summarized in four figures showing important 
economic and demographic variables relative to their peak 1985 
7Military employment is not a component of wage and salary 
employment. 
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levels. Of the aggregate variables, employment contracts most 
sharply--10 percent--and takes the longest to recover 
(Figure 2.22). Households and population decline much 
less--2 percent to 3 percent--and recover more quickly. Real 
disposable personal income per capita contracts 5 percent. 
Household composition will be changed by increases in Native and 
military households relative to total households (Figure 2.23). 
Because of both decreasing nonresident employment and falling 
unemployment after 1988, job openings will be filled without 
immigt'ation of wot'kers from other states ( 2. 24). , we 
see that economic recovery will be led by basic sector growth and 
held back by excess capacity in the infrastructure and support 
sectors (Figure 2.25). 
Economic Projection: Regional Economies 
The rate of economic recovery as projected in the base case will 
be most rapid in those regional economies---primadly the Interior 
(Fairbanks) and the Southeast--where we expect expansion in the 
basic sectors. In contrast, the Anchorage area and the North Slope 
will be the slowest to return to previous highs because of their 
dependence on the petroleum industry and state revenues. Excess 
capacity in the support sectors will also slow Anchorage•s recovery, 
since it is the support center for the state; it will take time for 
the market to absorb the excess (Figure 2.26). 
Population growth will follow employment growth (Figure 2. 27). 
Anchorage will be slow to recover the population it lost during the 
recession because there will be excess capacity in the local labor 
market and job opportunities will recover slowly.(Figure 2.28). 
Fairbanks will enjoy a strong recovery due to military expansion 
(Figure 2. 29). Other regions of the state will either remain at 
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AHFC BASE CASE INDICES:SUMMARY 
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AHFC BASE CASE INDICES:HOUSEHOLDS 
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Figure 2.24 
AHFC BASE CASE INDICES:WORK FORCE 
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Figure 2.25 
AHFC BASE CASE INDICES:EMPLOYMENT 
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A Rapid Recovery 
Moderately higher petroleum prices than we assumed in the base 
case will not have a significant impact on the pace of economic 
recovery. If prices were higher, the petroleum industry would be 
less cautious about undertaking new exploration and development, 
and that increased optimism would be reflected in some employment 
growth in Anchorage and on the North Slope. The somewhat higher 
petroleum revenues state and local governments would collect lf oil 
prices were higher would likely be spent for tal 
and for holding down personal and business taxes. These actions 
would have a small impact on economic growth. 
Alaska's regional economies rely on various basic industries 
that can grow at different rates, depending on the health of the 
resource industries in the region. Many regional economies are 
small, and single events such as the development of a large mine or 
a change in federal regulations could affect the health of a region 
while having little impact on statewide economic statistics, which 
are dominated by Anchorage and Fairbanks. We can be certain that 
unanticipated events will affect the fortunes of regional economies 
in unexpected ways. However, the sheer magnitude of exogenous events 
necessary to significantly alter the pattern of growth for the state 
economy as a whole suggests that only big changes in the petroleum 
industry could make a substantial difference in the next few years. 
A dramatic and sustained jump in the price of oil into the 
mid-$20 per barrel range is the single event that would do the most 
to get the economy growing rapidly in the near future. Although the 
economy has a history of serendipitious surprises and such an event 
other than in the petroleum industry could conceivably stimulate 
rapid growth, the most likely impetus would be oil. There are at 
least two reasons why. First, the value-added contribution of 
petroleum to the economy dominates that of every other basic 
industry. Because of the excess capacity we now have in many support 
industries, it will take very significant growth to stimulate 
renewed growth in the support sec tor. Second, growth in Alaska's 
economy since statehood has been led by petroleum; because of the 
continuing potential for new discoveries and production, it is 
primarily to the petroleum industry that we must look for serendipi-
tous surprises in the coming years. 
If the price of oil quickly rose to $26 a barrel (in 1986 
dollars) and stayed at that level, this higher price would result in 
more rapid recovery from the low point of the economy in 1988. 
Employment growth would average 2. 3 percent annually between 1988 
and 1995, population growth would average 1.5 percent, and household 
growth would average 1. 9 percent. Employment would regain its 1985 
level by 1991, led by a strongly rebounding infrastructure 
sector--pr.i.marily construction driven by petroleum development and 
public spending. Support employment would also recover rapidly. 
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The higher petroleum price would both stimulate development in the 
oil patch and significantly increase state and local revenues so 
that public employment could return to its 1985 level by the eal'.'ly 
1990s. 
A Worst-Case Scenario 
A number of factors will prevent further contraction of the 
economy beyond 1988. Most, of the excess capacity will have been 
eliminated from the economy through the loss of 28 thousand jobs. 
The support sector will be in a much stronger position to withstand 
fluctuations in basic sector activity. Second, state government 
spending could be augmented by more complete use of the Permanent 
Fund earnings, if the price of oil were to fall for an extended 
period. Third, the petroleum industry is currently at a relatively 
low level of operations and further reductions in staffing or 
production levels would not be likely if the price of oil fell by 
just a few dollars. 
Still, the possibility of a sustained collapse in the price of 
oil must be considered as a "worst-case" scenario (our low case 
scenario). We consider the collapse of oil prices to rept'esent a 
worst-case scenario for our economy because of the importance of 
petroleum to state gross product and because simultaneous collapse 
of the markets for all the state's other natural resources is quite 
unlikely. 
The case we consider is one in which the price of oil falls to 
$15 and remains at that level for the foreseeable future. The 
likelihood of this scenario's coming to pass is extremely small, 
because it assumes that the petroleum industry would undertake no 
new activities in the state and that nothing would occur over the 
next 15 years to reverse that trend. There will probably be periods 
during the next 15 years when the petroleum industry will be 
cautious about expanding operations in Alaska. But it is difficult 
to conceive of a situation in which the availability of a domestic 
supply of petroleum would not be a high priority of this country--or 
that Alaska would not remain the most likely source for a large 
portion of that supply. 
If, however, such a calamitous price collapse did occur, 
petroleum industry employment would gradually decline and the level 
of state petroleum revenues would fall deamatically--requiring 
immediate reimposition of the personal income tax, repeal of the 
Permanent Fund Dividend, and use of the earnings of the Permanent 
Fund to bolster government spending. These conditions would result 
in a flat economy for the state. The current contraction would 
continue through 1989 and be more severe. Recovery would be 
extremely slow. Employment would not grow between 1988 and 1995. 
Population would decline at an annual rate of .3 percent. Numbers of 
households would increase very slightly--.1 percent annually. 
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The economy would enter a protracted period of adjustment as its 
major basic industry contracted, and that process of restructut'ing 
would extend into the late 1990s. Petroleum employment would 
gradually decline with declining production from existing fields. 
Construction associated with new development would cease. The growth 
of employment in other basic industries would more than offset this 
gradual phasing out of petroleum jobs, but the smaller value-added 
contribution per employee in these other industries could not 
compensate for the loss in contributions from petroleum. State and 
local government employment would continue to contract through the 
decade of the 1990s as government revenues from petroleum and new 
sources proved insufficient to maintain current staffing levels. 
Eventually the petroleum industry would become small enough and the 
public sector contraction would cease so that other basic industry 
growth could dominate, and slow growth would then resume. 
In conclusion we want to reiterate that we consider this 
scenario extremely unlikely; we present it to illustrate the worst 
that could happen to the economy. 
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CHAPTER III. ALASKA MORTGAGES AND FORECLOSURES 
The grim effects of the recession on Alaska's housing market are 
reported daily in the newspapers: homes going unsold; local govern-
ments cutting appraised property values; homeowners owing more on 
their properties than they are worth; borrowers defaulting on their 
mortgages; lenders offering free trips and prizes to buyers who take 
foreclosed properties off their hands. 
The economic scenarios in Chapter II project the end of the 
recession and the beginning of a gradual recovery in 1988. But today 
depressed prices and large numbers of defaults are serious problems 
for all Alaska lenders and homeowners--but particulat'ly fol'.' AHFC, 
which holds more than 60 pel'.'cent of outstanding residential 
mortgages in Alaska. In this chapter we describe conditions in the 
Alaska housing market as of mid-1987, and contl'.'ast curl'.'ent 
conditions with those during the economic boom of the eat'ly 1980s. 
This description sets the stage for the next chapter, which analyzes 
policies AHFC might try fol'.' stabilizing the housing market. 
We look first at numbel'.'s of new residential mol'.'tgages Wl'.'itten in 
the state in recent years and at AHFC' s share of those mortgages. 
Then we discuss the mol'.'tgage holdings of Alaska's biggest lenders as 
of mid-1987, leading into a broad depiction of mortgage liability of 
those lenders. Next we show numbers of foreclosed propel'.'ties held by 
various lenders and insurers in June 1987, and additional properties 
foreclosed on and sold in the pl'.'eceding 18 months. 
Lenders and Insurer's 
The mortgage lending system, the big secondary lenders, and 
AHFC's history, programs, and methods of raising money are described 
in Chapter II of ISER's March 1986 report, The Effect of Changes in 
the. Alaska Housing Finance Coryorat:iqn Mortgage Programs, Int::ed!!!_ 
B~ort. We will not repeat those descriptions here, but before we 
discuss our findings we' 11 briefly charactel'.'ize the major lenders 
and insurers listed in Table 3.1. 
The Alaska Housing Finance Corporation (AHFC), the Federal 
National Mortgage Association (FNMA), and the Federal Home Loan 
Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC) are all secondary mortgage 
lenders--that is, they do not make loans directly but rather buy 
them from primary lenders like banks and mortgage companies. Almost 
all the mortgages originated by banks and other primary lenders are 
sold on the secondary market. Selling mortgages reduces the risks of 
long-term loans for banks and frees money for other uses--so it is 
in fact the secondary lenders who put up most of the mortgage money 
in the United States. FNMA and FHLMC are national secondary lenders 
created by the federal government, with FNMA by far the largest. 
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TABLE 3. 1. NEW RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE LOANS, 1979-1987a 
(in numbers and millions of dollars) 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Lenders Number Amount Number Amount Number Amount Number Amount Number Amount 
Alaska Housing Finance Corp.b 
New Sales 
Mobile Homes 0 $0 265 $6 892 $22 1,668 $48 1,896 $64 
Other 2,940 $190 5,025 $401 9,706 $856 7,532 $661 12,097 $1, 198 
Total 2,940 $190 5,290 $407 10,598 $878 9,200 $709 13,993 $1,262 
RefinancesC 
Mobile Homes 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0 
Other 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0 
Total 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0 
Total 2,940 $190 5,290 $407 10,598 $878 9,200 $709 13,993 $1,262 
Federal Nat'l Mortgage Assn.b,d 
New Sales 820 $70 100 $9 19 $2 NA NA 1,043 $126 
Refinances 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0 
Total 820 $70 100 $9 19 $2 NA NA 1,043 $126 
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp.b,e 
New Sales 432 $37 3 $0.2 2 $0.2 4 $0.3 82 $10 
Refinances 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0.0 0 $0.0 0 $0 
Total 432 $37 3 $0.2 2 $0.2 4 $0.3 82 $10 
Federal Housing Admin.-Insuredf 
New Sales 238 $18 138 $10 66 $6 40 $3.5 677 $79 
Refinances 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0.0 0 $0 
Total 238 $18 138 $10 66 $6 40 $3.5 677 $79 
Veterans' Admin.-Guaranteedg 
New Sales 515 $29 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0 
Refinances 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0 
Total 515 $29 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0 
Alaska Dept. of Conmunityh,i 
and Regional Affairs 0 $0 0 $0 74 $5 288 $21 445 $37 
Farmers' Home Admin.j 343 $24 244 $15 165 $8 171 $12 201 $15 
Alaska Permanent Fundh 0 $0 0 $0 69 $10 126 $22 67 $12 
Alaska Pension Fundh,k 180 $15 175 $15 170 $15 116 $20 125 $23 
SUMMARY 
New Sales 5,468 $359 5,950 $457 11, 163 $924.2 9,945 $788 16,633 $1,565 
Refinances 
TOTAL 5,468 $359 5,950 $457 11, 163 $924.2 9,945 $788 16,633 $1,565 
See pages 3-4 and 3-5 for notes. 
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TABLE 3. 1. NEW RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE LOANS 
(Continued) 
January - June 
1984 1985 1986 1987 
Lenders NU100er Amount Number Amount Number Amount Number Amount 
Alaska Housing Finance Corp.b 
New Sales 
Mobile Homes 1,116 $45 370 $15 143 $6 25 $1 
Other 9,741 $1,029 4,834 $510 2,327 $265 748 $82 
Total 10,857 $1,074 5,204 $525 2,470 $271 773 $83 
Refinancesc 
Mobile Homes 0 $0 0 $0 2 $0.1 0 $0 
Other 0 $0 0 $0 3,644 $429 830 $93 
Total 0 $0 0 $0 3,646 $429 830 $93 
Total 10,857 $1,074 5,204 $525 6,116 $100 1,603 $176 
Federal Nat'l Mortgage Assn.b,d 
New Sales 775 $78 378 $43 112 $16 34 $4 
Refinances 0 $0 252 $29 262 $38 80 $9 
Total 775 $78 630 $72 374 $54 114 $13 
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp.b,e 
New Sales 592 $56 395 $46 585 $74 137 $16 
Refinances 0 $0 263 $31 1,364 $173 319 $39 
Total 592 $56 658 $11 1,949 $247 456 $55 
Federal Housing Admin.-Insuredf 
New Sales 721 $84 1,495 $175 1,234 $148 376 $42 
Refinances 0 $0 1,304 $153 4,932 $592 1,504 $170 
Total 721 $84 2,799 $328 6,166 $740 1,880 $212 
Veterans' Adnin.-Guaranteedg 
New Sales 0 $0 0 $0 111 $12 186 $20 
Refinances 0 $0 0 $0 28 $3 46 $5 
Total 0 $0 0 $0 139 $15 232 $25 
Alaska Dept. of Coomunityh,i 
and Regional Affairs 450 $38 558 $47 301 $29 167 $17 
Farmers' Home Adnin.j 173 $13 212 $17 25 $2.3 10 $0.8 
Alaska Permanent Fundh 104 $17 57 $11 40 $8.6 11 $3 
Alaska Pension Fundh,k 185 $31 125 $24 78 $10.6 2 $0.2 
SUMMARY 
New Sales 13,857 $1,391 8,424 $888 4,956 $572 1,696 $186 
Refinances 1,819 $213 10,232 $1,235 2,779 $316 
TOTAL 13,857 $1,391 10,243 $1,101 15, 188 $1,807 4,475 $502 
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NOTES FOR TABLE 3.1 
aAs of June 1987, unless othel'.'Wise noted. Although there may have 
been a handful of refinances before 1985, we assume no 
refinances until 1985. 
bFigures by calendar years. 
cAHFC was not authorized to do refinanc until 1986. 
dExcludes AHF'C loans financed by FNMA; includes just loans FNMA 
purchased from Alaska banks and other primary lenders. Shares of 
FNMA loans that were refinances throughout this period are 
estimates. FNMA itself does not keep state by state records of 
which loans are refinances. The 1985 figure is based on FHLMC's 
estimate of shares of its loans nationwide that were refinances 
that year.The 1986 and 1987 estimates are based on estimates of 
Alaska primary lenders. 
eshares of FHLMC loans that were refinances throughout this period 
are estimates. FHLMC does not keep records of refinances by 
state. The 1985 figure is based on FHLMC's estimate of its loans 
nationwide that were refinances that year. The 1986 and 1987 
estimates are based on estimates of Alaska primary lenders. 
fFigures by federal fiscal year from 1979-1984; 1985-1987 figures 
are by calendar year. FHA-insured loans purchased by AHF'C are 
excluded. Although FHA is an insurer rather than a lender, it 
is a proxy for a lender in determining numbers of mortgages 
written in Alaska. Almost all FHA-insured loans in Alaska that 
are not purchased by AHFC go into mortgage-backed securities 
issued by the Govet"nment National Mortgage Association (GNMA) 
and put"chased by various investors. The shares of loans that 
were refinances in 1986 and early 1987 are estimates, based on 
estimates of Alaska primary lenders. Dollar values of 
FHA-insut"ed mortgages are estimates, based on average loan sizes 
in specific years. There can be a lag of sevet"al months between 
the time a loan is closed and the FHA insurance is processed. 
gExcluding VA-guaranteed loans purchased by AHFC. Although the VA 
does not make loans but rather guarantees a portion of them, the 
VA is (like FHA) a proxy for a lender in determining numbers of 
mortgage loans in Alaska because almost all VA-guaranteed loans 
that are not purchased by AHFC go into mortgage-backed securities 
issued by GNMA and purchased by various investors. VA represen-
tatives estimate that virtually all VA-guaranteed mortgages 
written in Alaska from 1981 to 1985 were purchased by AHFC. 
Share of loans that were refinances are based on VA estimates. 
Figures for 1987 are as of March 31, 1987. Numbers of 
VA-guaranteed loans actually closed in the first quarter of 1987 
are probably overstated because it can take several months after 
a loan is closed for the VA guarantee to be processed. 
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hFigures by state fiscal year, July 1 - June 30. 
iAfter fiscal 1985 includes just loans under DCRA's rural 
owner-occupied loan program. Before that, DCRA also 
administered the nonconforming loan program; the state 
legislature transferred that program to AHFC in fiscal 1986. 
jFigures by federal fiscal year, October 1 - September 30. 
krncludes residential mortgage loans purchased by the Alaska 
Public Employees Retirement System and the Teachers Retirement 
System. Numbers of loans and dollar values in all years are 
estimates. The pension funds purchase both commercial and 
residential loans inside and outside Alaska; separate figures on 
just residential mortgages in Alaska are not available. 
SOURCES: Alaska Housing Finance Corporation; Federal National 
Mortgage Association; Federal Home Loan Mortgage 
Corporation; Federal Housing Administration; Veterans' 
Administration; Alaska Department of Community and 
Regional Affairs; Farmers' Home Administration; Alaska 
Permanent Fund managers; Alaska Department of Revenue. 
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AHFC is a public corporation created by the state government; it 
buys morlgages under a variety of programs only in Alaska. The 
corporation raises most of its loan money through bond sales. 
The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and the Veterans 
Administration (VA) are federal agencies that do not actually buy 
mortgage loans but rather insure or guarantee them. The secondary 
lenders listed above buy some of these government-insured mortgages, 
but most go onto the secondary market through mortgage--backed 
ties that are issued by the Government National 
Association (GNMA)--yet another entity of the federal government--
and sold to val'.'ious investol'.'s. So in this table FHA and VA al'.'e 
proxies for lenders. 
The Alaska Department of Community and Regional Affairs is a 
state agency that also acts as a secondary mortgage lendel'.', but it 
buys loans only in the most remote areas of Alaska. Its operations 
al'.'e small as compared with AHFC • s, and it gets its loan money 
thr·ough state appropriations. 
The Farmers• Home Administration is a federal agency that makes 
loans in farm country and to low-income Americans living in certain 
rural areas; it holds its own mortgages. 
The managers of the Alaska Permanent Fund and the state pension 
funds ( the Public Employees Retirement System and Uii:i Teacher's 
Retirement System) also buy some residential mortgage loans, 
frequently 1 oans that exceed the limits of other lenders. Neither 
agency has ever bought many loans, as compared with purchases of 
othEH'.' lenders listed in Table 3 .1, and in recent times the pension 
fund managers in part i cul at' ha11f, bought very fe1,, n~n idential 
mortgage loans. 
There are a variety of others who ho] d some Alaska mortgage 
loans. For exar11ple, some individuals finance the sale of their homes 
thernselv<-H", and credit uni ems hold some mortgages. But the number of 
such mortgages are small and precise figures---ot" even good 
estimates--are not available. 
Ne~ Alaska Residential Mortgages, 19}9-1987. 
Table 3 . .1 tel ls us how many new residential mortgages were 
written in Alaska each year from 1979 tht"ough June 1987, how much 
they were worth, how mortgage activity was divided among the big 
lenders, and how many mortgages were for sales of homes and how many 
were fot" refinances by existing owners. Some mortgages written 
during t:he early 1980s were probably for ref lnanc ing by existlng 
homeowners, but figures fol'.' t"ef i nances during that pHr·1 od aee vary 
cH f Heu lt to get. By and large, interest rates through 1984 were 
sti.11 too high to make refinancing attractive, and we have assumed 
t.hat vlrl:ually all Alaska mortgages written during the early 1980s 
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were for home sales. Lenders other than AHFC do not keep 
complete--and in some cases no--records of which mortgages are for 
home sales and which for refinances. We have estimated refinancing 
by other lenders from 1985 through June 1987, based on figures from 
and estimates of a number of banks, mortgage companies, and 
government agencies. 
Mortgage activity in Alaska in 1979 was slow as compared with 
what was to come: the economic boom created by construction of the 
trans-"Alaska pipeline was over; some people were leaving the state; 
and mortgage interest rates were on their way up. About 5,400 new 
mortgages worth $383 million were written in Alaska in 1979. 
In 1980 mortgage activity was just somewhat higher-"-nearly 6,000 
mortgages worth $457 million were created--but in that year the 
stage was set for the boom years to follow. A huge jump in the price 
of oil meant that the state government's income from the Prudhoe Bay 
oil field was moving into the billions of dollars. The state began 
spending that money in many ways that reached throughout the 
economy. One of these ways was making subsidized mortgage interest 
rates available to almost all Alaska home buyers. 
Before 1980, AHFC' s programs were open only to Alaskans with 
incomes below a specified level, and AHFC raised virtually all its 
mortgage money by selling bonds. But in 1980 market interest rates 
were up to 15 percent and still r1s1ng. The Alaska Legislature 
directed AHFC to begin subsiding interest rates on the first $90,000 
of each loan--with the balance above $90,000 to be at the rate AHFC 
paid to borrow money on the bond market. At the same time, the 
legislature removed the income restrictions on AHFC programs. 
Over the next several years, the legislature appropriated about 
$1 billion to subsidize interest rates. (AHFC has not received any 
legislative subsidies since 1984; it has a revolving loan fund that 
allows it to use mortgage payments, bond proceeds, and other money 
to make new loans.) Figure 3.1 shows comparative interest rates from 
1981 through early 1987 for the same size loans under AHFC's taxable 
mortgage program, the Federal Housing Administration's insured loan 
program, and conventional mortgage programs. 
The economic boom brought on by high oil prices also drew tens 
of thousands of people into the state in the early 1980s. The 
combination of a burgeoning population and subsidized interest rates 
pushed housing sales up far and fast. From 1981 through 1984, 10,000 
or more new mortgages for home sales were written each year--and in 
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*Interest rates for a 30-year, $135,000 loan under AHFC's taxable mortgage program, 
FHA's insured-loan program, and FNMA's conventional program. 
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In 1985 the Alaska mortgage market began changing in two ways: 
the number of new mortgages began dropping sharply, and a 
significant share of those mortgages wer:P. now for refinances rather 
than for sales. Alaska• s economy was moving into recession by the 
end of 1985, as world oil prices and state government spending 
dropped. Also, market interest rates declined sharply in the last 
months of 1985--and Alaska homeowners began taking advantage of the 
lower rates hy taking out new mortgages. About 8,400 mortgages for 
homes sales were created in 1985--as compared with nearly 14,000 the 
previous year- -and roughly 1,800 fo1.~ refinances. 
By 1986 Alaska was in the full grip of the recession as oil 
prices plummeted and took state income down with them. As Alaska 
lost jobs, income, and resident.s, the number of new mortgages 
written for sales of homes dropped abruptly. Just 4,800 mortgages 
for home sales were written in 1986--about half the mortgages for 
sales the previous year and less than one-third the number written 
as recently as 1983. And the number of mortgag,~s for home sales in 
1986 was also more than 10 percent below the 1979 figure. 
Thousands of Alaska homeowners took advantage of still declining 
interest rates in 1986 and refinanced their homes at lower rates: an 
estimated 10,000 new mortgages for refinances were written that year. 
The pace at which new Alaska mortgages for home sales were 
created in the first half of 1987 was even slower than in 1986: only 
about 1,600 mortgages for sales were written during those six 
months. Interest rates in late 1986 and early 1987 reached their 
lowest point in this decade, keeping the pace of ref.i nancing much 
more brisk than the pace of home sales. Interest rates did climb 
again in the second quarter of the year. About 2,700 mortgages for 
refinances were crP-ated in the first half of 1987. 
The sharp rise and precipitous fall of new mortgages for Alaska 
home sales in the past seven years are graphed in Figure 3. 2. 
Figure 3.3 shows mortgages written for. refinances as a proportion of 
total nP.w mortgages in 1985, 1986, and the first half of 1987. 
3-9 
Figure 3.2 
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AHFC's Mat'ket Shat'e 
AHFC' s shat'e of the Alaska t'esidential mot'tgage mat'ket in the 
1980s has been influenced mainly by the dif fet'ence between AHFC' s 
!'.'ates and those of other lendet's, but also by loan terms and othet' 
factot's. Table 3. 2 and Figut'e 3. 4 show AHFC' s mat'ket shat'e since 
1979. That share has t'anged from a high of 95 pet'cent to a low of 36 
pet'cent. 
In 1979, when AHFC's programs were stlll closed to many 
Alaskans, AHFC nevet'theless had about half the residential mortgage 
market. Before 1980, AHFC t'aised almost all its loan money by 
selling tax-exempt bonds; it was able to offet' its botTowet's 
intet'est !'.'ates somewhat below mat'ket rates because rates on 
tax-exempt bonds wet'e lowet'. ( In 1980, mot'e or less coincident with 
the time AHFC began subsidizing intet'est rates, the fedet'al govet'n-
ment restricted the amount of tax-exempt bonds AHFC could sell and 
the COJ'.'POt'ation was forced to move into the more expensive taxable 
bond mat'ket.) FNMA and FHLMC togethet' bought about 23 percent of the 
new mot'tgages in Alaska in 1979. Federally insured Ot' guat'anteed 
loans made up anothet' 14 pet'cent of mot'tgage loans in Alaska that 
yea!'.', with the t'emaining loans scattet'ed among othet' lenders. 
Fol'.' the next five years, tht'ough 1984, AHFC had 80 percent or 
more of the mortgage market. Its shat'e was so high mainly because it 
was offet'ing bat'gain !'.'ates. In 1981, when AHFC's subsidized !'.'ate was 
as much as 5 pet'centage points below those of othet' lendet's fol'.' the 
same size loans--see Figut'e 3.1--AHFC had 95 pet'cent of the 
t'esidential mot'tgage mat'ket. The number of loans purchased by FNMA 
and FHLMC and insut'ed by FHA inct'eased somewhat by 1983 and 1984, 
but taken togethet' made up only 10 to 15 pet'cent of the mat'ket. 
AHFC' s share of the mot'tgage mat'ket has dt'opped steadily since 
1985. Evet'-declining intet'est !'.'ates from late 1985 through early 
1987 meant less and less difference between AHFC' s !'.'ates and those 
of other lenders. Without the interest rate bargain AHFC offered 
when rates wet'e at their peak, borrowers shop around for various 
terms and conditions offered by different lenders. For example, most 
AHFC mortgages since 1982 have included a provision that increases 
monthly payments five pet'cent a year from the fourth through the 
ninth yea!'.' of the mortgage; under this Alaska Building Equity (ABE) 
provision, the increased payment is applied to the loan principal, 
so borrowers build up equity faster and can pay off a 30-year loan 
in 17 years with a lot less cumulative intet'est. But few borrowers 
actually hold their mortgages that long, and weigh the advantages of 
having 30-year mortgages with constant monthly payments, as offered 
by other lenders. Terms of t'efinancing vary among the major 
lenders. FNMA and FHLMC offer adjustable rate mortgages, while AHFC 
does not. Terms of loan assumptions vary. And so on. 
3-12 
TABLE 3.2. AHFC MARKET SHARE, 1979-1987 
(in numbers of residential mortgages) 
Jan-June 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
NEW SALES 
Al 1 Lenders 5,468 5,950 11, 163 9,945 16,633 13,857 8,424 4,956 1,696 
AHFC 2,940 5,290 10,598 9,200 13,993 10,857 5,204 2,470 773 
AHFC Share 541, 891, 951, 931, 841, 78" 62" 501, 461, 
REFINANCES 
All Lenders 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,819 10,232 2,779 
AHFC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3,646 830 
AHFC Share O't O't O't O't O't O't O't 361, 301, 
TOTAL MORTGAGES 
All Lenders 5,468 5,950 11, 163 9,945 16,633 13,857 10,243 15,188 4,475 
AHFC 2,940 5,290 10,598 9,200 13,993 10,857 5,204 6 I 116 1,603 
AHFC Share 541, 89% 951, 931, 841, 78" 5 l't 401, 361, 
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Figure 3.4 
AHFC MARKET SHARE OF MORTGAGES 
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In 1985, AHFC bought 62 percent of the mortgages written for 
home sales, but its overa 11 share of new mortgages was 51 percent 
because it was not authorized to do refinancing until 1986. Its 
share of mortgages for home sales was 50 percent and its share of 
refinances 36 percent in 1986. In the first half of 1987, AHFC 
bought about 46 percent of the mortgages for home sales and 30 per-
cent of refinances, to make its overall share of new mortgages 
36 percent. 
FHA has i nsuced a share of Alaska since 1985, 
pat'ticularly mot'tgages for refinancing. In 1986 it had the lion• s 
share of the refinancing mat'ket, Wt'i ting an estimated 4,900 mort-
gages for refinancing, or nearly half of all such mortgages. And in 
the first half of 1987, it Wt'ote more than half the mot'tgages for 
t'efinances. FHLMC also did a substantial share of refinancing in 
Alaska in 1986, with an estimated 14 percent of that market. The 
Alaska Depat:'tment of Community and Regional Affait's and the Farmers' 
Home Administt'ation do not refinance loans. 
Mortgage Holdings of Majot' Alaska Lenders 
Table 3.3 shows residential mortgage holdings of big Alaska 
lenders as of June 198 7: 84, 200 mot'tgages with a balance of more 
than $7.1 billion. 
Alaska's state govet'nment, tht'ough the public corporation of 
AHFC and othet' state entities, is fat' and away the biggest residen-
tial rnortgage holder in Alaska: together' various state corporations 
and agencies held mot'e than 55,200 mortgages in mid-1987. Most of 
those wet'e AHFC loans. The corporation alone had 52,168 loans worth 
$4.3 billion in its pot'tfolio. That t:'epresented about 62 percent of 
total outstanding Alaska residential mortgage loans. 
We would expect AHFC' s share of mot'tgage holdings to be very 
large, since it bought about 8 out of 10 new mortgages written in 
Alaska during the first half of the 1980s. Of the loans in AHFC • s 
portfolio as of mid-1987, 4, 760--9 percent--were mobile home loans. 
Of the remaining 47,408 loans, about 10,700 were loans AHFC made 
between 1984 and 1986 with money it borrowed from FNMA through 
collateralized notes. AHFC is liable for principal and interest 
payments to FNMA on those notes, but FNMA takes any losses not 
covet'ed by private mortgage insurance if individual borrowers 
default. 
Among other state entities, the Alaska Industrial Development 
Authot'ity (AIDA) and the Division of Investments in the Alaska 
Depat'tment of Commerce and Economic Development together held 1,565 
mortgage loans with a balance of $68 million in mid-1987. These are 
loans that were made years ago under a state veterans' loan program 
that no longer exists. The Alaska Depat:'tment of Community and 
Regional Affairs held another 1,194 mortgages worth $123 million, 
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TABLE 3.3. RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE HOLDINGS OF MAJOR 
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Alaska Permanent Fund 
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AIDA and Div. of Invest.j 
Total 


































bThese are loans financed with FNMA money feom early 1984 through 
1986; AHFC makes principal and intet'est payments to FNMA on 
collateral i.zed nob-1s. Fl\TMA i.s, howevet', liable fol:' any losses 
not covet'ed by private mot'tgage insut'ance if bot't'OWet's default. 
cExcluding loans cited in note b; these at'e loans financed through 
banks and othet' primary Alaska lendet's. 
dFigut'es at'e fol:' FHLMC loans set'viced by Alaska lendet's as of June 
1987; they may include some loans on homes outside the state but 
set'vlced by Alaska lenders and exclude some loans on Alaska 
homes that at'e set'viced by lendet's outside the state. 
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eoutstanding loans as of December 31, 1986, excluding AHFC loans 
insured by FHA. The unpaid principal balance is an estimate, 
based on average size of outstanding loan. Although FHA is an 
insurer rather than a lender, FHA-insured loans are included 
here becaus~ most of those loans go to lenders other than those 
listed in this table. Most FHA-insured loans go into mortgage--
backed securities (MBSs) issued by the Government National 
Mortgage Association (GNMA) and sold to various investors. 
fFigures as of March 31, 1987, excluding VA-guaranteed loans held 
by AHFC. A very large share of new VA-guaranteed loans in 
Alaska in the first half of the 1980s were purchased by AHFC. 
Most VA-guaranteed loans not purchased by AHFC go into MBSs 
issued by GNMA and sold to various investors. 
gAs of March 1987. 
houtstanding loans as of May 1987. Unpaid principal balance is an 
estimate based on average size of outstanding loan. 
iGood estimates of cumulative Alaska residential mortgage holdings 
of the pension funds are not available because figures on such 
holdings are combined with figures on other mortgage holdings of 
the funds. 
jThese are mortgage loans made under a state veterans' loan pro-
gram that no longer exists; it was replaced in the early 1980s 
by the state veterans' program administered by AHF'C. Most of 
these loans are now held by the Alaska Industrial Development 
Authority (AIDA); the Division of Investments in the Alaska 
Department of Commerce and Economic Development holds a few and 
services those held by AIDA. 
SOURCES: See sources, Table 3.1, and Alaska Department of Commerce 
and Economic Development, Division of Investments. 
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and the Permanent Fund Corporation an additional 300 mortgages with 
a balance of $42 million. The state's pension funds also held some 
residential mortgages, but it is difficult to separate those 
particular holdings from the funds' cumulative residential and 
commercial mortgage holdings inside and outside Alaska. 
Numbers of outstanding federally insured or guaranteed mortgages 
in Alaska are also substantial. AHFC holds some of those mortgages, 
and to avoid double counting we have eliminated FHA-insured and 
VA-guaranteed loans from these figures; they are counted in AHFC's 
portfolio. FHA-insured loans outside AHFC totalled about 8,400 at 
the beginning of 1987 and had a balance of $844 million. 
VA-guaranteed loans not held by AHFC were around 8,600 with a 
balance of $763 million in March 1987. Together those federally 
backed loans made up about 20 percent of outstanding residential 
loans in Alaska in 1987. Another federal agency, the Farmers' Home 
Administration, held 1,322 loans worth $106 million. 
The two national secondary lenders held about 12 percent of 
outstanding mortgages in Alaska in mid-1987. FNMA held 5,400 
mortgages, with a principal balance of $400 million, that it had 
purchased from Alaska banks and other primary lenders. (These 
mortgages are in addition to AHFC loans financed by FNMA. ) FHLMC, 
the other big national secondary lender in Alaska, held roughly 
5,150 mortgages with a balance of $479 million. 
~age Liabilities 
In recent months Alaska's economic recession has led to 
thousands of foreclosures on houses, condominiums, and mobile homes. 
Before we look at foreclosed properties held by various Alaska 
lenders and insurers as of mid-1987, we will broadly outline 
liability on mortgage loans when borrowers default. Table 3.4 
summarizes insurance requirements and liabilities of Alaska lenders. 
Table 3.5 looks more specifically at AHFC's potential liability 
under different kinds of loans. 
We wanL Lo emphasize that when we say "mortgage liabilities" we 
are talking only about who Lakes any losses on individual loans when 
borrowers default. There are of course other liabilities--for 
example, AHFC is liable for payment of principal and interest on the 
billions of dollars worth of bonds it has sold to finance mortgage 
loans. We do not discuss that or other potential liabilities here. 
The first step mortgage lenders--whether private or government-
backed---take to protect themselves from losses in case borrowers 
default is to require down payments. Those down payments can vary; 
they are typically at least 10 percent but sometimes as little as 
5 percent of the purchase price. The chief exception is the 
VA-guarantee program, under which qualified veterans can borrow up 
to a specified amount with no money down because the federal 
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TABLE 3.4. LIABILITY* IN FORECLOSURES 
Insurance Requirements 
Borrowers required to carry 
private mortgage insurance 
on loan amounts above 80\ 
of the house price. 
Borrowers pay premium for 
government insurance, 
either in lump sum or as 
part of monthly payments. 
The federal Veterans Aanin-
istration guarantees up to 
$27,500 on mortgage loans 
to veterans as a benefit of 
military service; this guar-
antee takes the place of 
private mortgage insurance. 
This federal agency makes 
loans to low-income house-
holds in rural areas; no 
private mortgage insurance. 
Most borrowers required to 
carry private mortgage 
insurance on loan amounts 
above 75% to 80\ of the 
house price; on mobile home 
loans, borrowers must carry 
private credit insurance on 
40\ of the loan amount. 
Loans in rural areas; no 
private mortgage insurance 
required {because it is not 
available in many cases). 
Borrowers required to carry 
private mortgage insurance 
on loan amounts over 70\ 
of the house price. 
These loans were made to 
veterans before 1981 through 
the former Division of Vet-
erans Affairs; no private 
mortgage insurance required. 
llabi l ity 
of Borrower 
in Foreclosure 
Borrowers in all 
cases lose their 
down payments, 
which can be as 
low as 0-5% but 
are generally 10\ 
or more of the 
purchase price. 
Al so forfeited 
is any amount 
subsequently paid 
on the loan 
principal. And, 




in which they go 
to court to make 
borrowers who 
default liable 
for losses on 





Lender liable for any losses 
not covered by PMI. 
FHA liable for all losses. 
VA liable for losses up to 
$27,500 on each loan; addi-
tional liability falls on 
primary or secondary lender. 
Farmers' Home Aaninistration 
liable for all losses. 
Varies substantially among 
different types of loans; 
see Table 5. 
DCRA takes all losses. 
Permanent Fund bears any losses 
not covered by PMI. 
Losses accrue either to 
Veterans' Revolving Loan 
Fund or AIDA. 
*Includes just losses the various parties may be liable for when individual loans go into foreclosure. 
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TABLE 3.5. AHFC LIABILITY* IN FORECLOSURES 
Types of Loans by 
Insurance Coverage 
ALL LOANS EXCEPT 
MOBILE HOMES 
Loans with private mortgage 
insurance and pool insurance; 
include most loans made from 
1981 to early 1984. 
Loans with private mortgage 
insurance that were financed by 
FNMA, 1984-1986; include most 
loans made during that period. 
Loans with just private mortgage 
insurance; include some loans 
made throughout AHFC history and 
almost all loans made since 
January 1987. 
Loans with no insurance; include 
loans made under several special 
programs that no longer exist. 
Loans with federal government 
insurance or guarantee; include 
loans made throughout most of 
AHFC's history. 
MOBILE HOME LOANS 
Loans before 1983 with no 
insurance. 
Loans since 1983 with private 
credit insurance. 
*Includes just losses AHFC is liable for when individual borrowers default. 
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AHFC Liability 
None, until bonds carrying pool 
insurance provision are paid 
off; then AHFC liable for any 
losses not covered by PHI. 
None. FNMA is liable for any 
losses not covered by PHI on 
loans it financed for AHFC 
during this period. 
AHFC is liable for any losses 
not covered by PHI. 
AHFC liable for all losses. 
FHA takes all losses on FHA-
insured loans; VA takes 
liability only up to $27,500 
on each VA-guaranteed loan; 
AHFC liable for additional 
losses. 
AHFC liable for all losses. 
AHFC liable for losses not 
covered by PCI. 
The next line of protection for the lender is mortgage insurance. 
Conventional mortgage lenders--FNMA and FHLMC in Table 3. 4-·-require 
borrowers to carry private mortgage insurance on loan amounts above 
80 percent of the value of the property--with value most often 
defined as the purchase price of the property. AHFC also requires 
private mortgage insurance on loan amounts above 75 to 80 percent of 
the purchase price on most of its loans, with exceptions as noted in 
Table 3.5. The Permanent Fund managers require mortgage insurance on 
loan amounts above 70 percent of the purchase price. 
Borrowers who take out. FHA-·insured loans pay an insurance 
premium either in a lump sum or as part of their monthly payments. 
The Veterans' Administration guarantees up to $27,500 on loans to 
qualified veterans; that guarantee replaces mortgage insurance. 
The Farmers' Home Administrat.lon and the Alaska Department of 
Communll.y and Regional Affairs make loans in remote areas whel'.'e 
private mortgage insurance is generally not avai 1 able, so U1os1c1 
loam; c,nTy no irrnurirnce. Li kRwise, mortgage loans held by AIDA and 
the Division of Investments carry no mortgage insurance; none was 
required by the old state veterans program under which these loans 
were made. 
So- givlm the above--what happens when an Alaska borrower 
def au 1 t.s and t.he property goes i nt.o foreclosure? First, borrowers 
who defaul L lose their· down payments and any amount they may have 
subsequently paid on the loan principal. (Damage L.hat defaull:.lng on 
a loan does to the borrower's future ability to get credit is also 
certainly a loss, alt.hough a less direct OTHL) Also, if a lender 
be] ieves that a borrower who dRfaulted actually could have made his 
payments but. c.hose-· for one reason or another· not to, the lender 
can go to court in what is known as a judicial foreclosure and try 
to make the borrower liable for any losses when the property is 
re-sold. 
What losses insurers and lenders may face in foreclosures is a 
complicated question, influenced by many things, but. primarily by 
t.he condition of the housing market. 
When a property wit.h private mortgage insurance goes into 
foreclosure, the private insurer tries to keep his costs to a 
minimum. He can let the lender re-sell the property and simply pay a 
claim to the lender--for any losses up to the maximum covered by 
insurance. Or he can take title to t.he propP-rty and Bf: 11 l t. himself. 
In a heal thy housing market, where property values are rising Ot:' at 
least holding steady, t.he i.nsurer might elect to try to sell the 
property himself--because he could hope to sell the property for 
more (or at least as much) as the outstanding mortgage, accumulated 
lnteniGL payments, and any other costs associated with foreclosing. 
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But property values in Alaska today are not rising but falling; 
average assessed values in Anchorage in 1987, for instance, were 
down 20 percent. And values of mobile homes and some condominiums 
have dropped much more. When property values are sliding, insurers 
generally elect to pay claims and leave properties to lenders to 
re--sell--because they might sell for significantly less than the 
outstanding mortgage and foreclosure costs. This is particulat'ly 
true of mortgages that were Wr'i t ten in Uu~ early and mid-l 980s, when 
pt:'ices were at theit' peak. 
What costs do lenders then face when borrowers default? Again, 
i.n a market where propet:'ty values are rising, lenders who requit"e 
pt:'ivate mot:'tgage insurance genet"ally do not incur' losses. But in 
today's mat"ket lender's at:'e taking losses--because so many of the 
pt'opet:'t.les now in fot"eclosut:'e ot"iginally sold when pt:'ices wet'e so 
much higher than today. 
FNMA and FHLMC at:'e liable for' any losses on their loans not 
covered by private mortgage insurance. FHA takes possession of and 
re-sells FHA-insured properties, taking any losses. The VA has the 
option of either taking title to VA-guaranteed properties and 
re-selling them, or simply paying claims of up to $27,500 to 
lenders. In most cases recently, the VA has decided it could limit 
its liability by simply paying off the lenders. 
On mortgages with no insurance, the lenders take any losses. 
This means that of the lenders listed in Table 3.4, the Alaska 
Department of Community and Regional Affairs, AIDA, and the Fat'met's' 
Home Administration directly take any losses on loans they make. 
AHFC' s potential liabi 1i ty in case of def aul l.s varies 
substantially for loans it made at di.fff'!rEmt times and under 
different terms, as described in Table 3.5. Most AHFC loans made on 
houses and condominiums between 1981 and the present carry private 
mortgage insurance on amounts above 75 to 80 percent of the value of 
t.he property. 
In addition to pr:i vate insurancf'!, the bulk of loans AHFC made 
bet.ween 1981 and early 1984 also carry pool insurance--insurance 
that covers any losses beyond those covered by private :i.nsurance. 
This pool insurance was pr-ovided by Mortgage Guarantee Insurance 
Company (MGIC) as a provision of the bonds AHFC sold to finance 
these loans. So AHFC's liability for losses on these specific loans 
is virtually zero--·but. only until the bonds financing the loans are 
paid off; when the bonds are paid off, the pool insut'ance is no 
longer in effect. 
From early 1984 through 1986, the national secondary lender FNMA 
financed a large share of AHFC loans. If borrowers default on those 
loans, FNMA is liable for any losses not covered by private mortgage 
insurance. So AHFC has essentially no liability on default losses on 
those particular loans. (AHFC is, of course, liable for payment of 
principal and interest to FNMA on the notes that financed the loans.) 
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AHFC also holds several thousand VA--guaranteed loans and a few 
FHA-insured loans. On the VA-guaranteed loans, as we described 
earlier, the VA has the option of taking title to the properties and 
re-selling them, or paying claims up to a maximum of $27,500 for 
each loan. In cases where the VA judges that its l i ab:Ui ty would 
exceed $27,500 :if it took the property itself--and that includes 
many cases today--the VA simply pays the claim and leaves AHFC with 
the property and any additional losses. On FHA-insured loans that go 
into default, FHA takes possession and re-sells them itself. 
Some AHFC loans carry no insurance. These are by and large loans 
that were made under special programs that no longer exist. They 
include some loans made under the old state veterans program; the 
legislature directed AHFC to take on some of these loans when the 
Division of Veterans Affairs was abolished. They also include loans 
the Department of Community and Regional Affairs made under the 
nonconforming loan program, which the legislature transferred to 
AHFC in fiscal 1986. Also, AHF'C had a rural loan program ln the 
early Jg8os; loans made under that program carry no insurance. 
A large share of AHFC' s mobile home loans likewise carry no 
insurance: before 1983 AHFC did not require insurance on mobile home 
loans. AHFC takes all losses when such loans go into default. On 
mobile home loans since 1983, AHFC has required private credit 
insurance to cover 40 percent of the value of the loan; AHFC takes 
any losses not covered by that prlvate insurance. 
Ala.ska Properties in Foreclosure 
Having looked at mortgage holdings and liabilities of lenders 
and insurers, we now turn to the strongest evidence of the condition 
of Alaska's housing market today: properties in foreclosure. 
Table 3. 6 shows numbers of foreclosed properties held by major 
lenders and insurers as of June 1987, and numbers of properties they 
had sold from their. inventories in the previous year and a half. The 
table tells us that all lenders are being h:i t wi. th loan defaults. 
But as we would expect, given that AHFC holds more than 60 percent 
of the outstanding residenH al mortgages in the state, including 
most of those made in recent years, AHFC is taking the hardest hit. 
As of the end of June, the big lenders and insurers in Alaska 
were holding 4,254 foreclosed properties; 2,758 of those--65 per-
cent--were AHFC properties. FNMA, FHA, and VA were each holding 
close to 400 properties----or about 9 percent each--of the total 
inventory. Many of the properties in FNMA's inventory were financed 
with AHF'C loans that FNMA had backed. 
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TABLE 3.6. INVENTORY OF FORECLOSED PROPERTIES HELD BY 
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aProperties "held by" each lender or insurer include just those to 
which each already held title or was in the process of acquiring 
title to as of June 1987. 
bincludes both completed and nearly completed foreclosures. 
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Cincludes both properties the VA has already acquired title to and 
pending title acquisitions. Excluded are properties that the VA 
paid claims on but did not take possession of. Most such 
properties probably went into AHFC' s inventory of foreclosed 
properties; some ended up in the hands of mortgage companies, 
banks, or other primary lenders. 
dsome foreclosed properties are held by a wide range of Alaska 
banks, other primary lenders, and private mortgage insurance 
companies. Figures on such holdings are extl'."emely difficult to 
get, and the number's are small compal'."ed with the holdings of the 
secondary lenders and largest insurers. 
eProperties sold 1986 - May 1, 1987. 
fEstimated sales from November 1986 - June 1987. 
SOURCES: See Sources, Table 3.1. 
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MGIC, as we discussed earlier, provided pool insurance for 
thousands of AHFC loans in the early 1980s. Many of the properties 
in AHFC's inventory of foreclosures are covered by MGIC pool 
insurance; MGIC is working with AHFC to market those properties, but 
AHFC holds title to them. MGIC also provided private mortgage 
insurance for a large number of Alaska homeowners. The 105 proper-
ties MGIC had in June 1987--about 2 percent of total foreclosures--
wet'e lat'gely pt'opet'ties it had taken title to as a pdmat'y rather 
than a pool insurer'. 
The remaining mot'tgage holders in the table together held about 
250 foreclosed pt'opet'ties, Or' 6 pet'cent of the total inventory. 
The second column of Table 3.6 gives us another piece of 
information about the volume of fot'eclosut'es in Alaska: propet'ties 
that lenders took into foreclosut'e but t'e-sold from the start of 
1986 through the middle of 1987. Foreclosed properties that wel'e 
re-sold during that pedod totaled more than 1,600. Again the lion's 
share was AHFC •s: 1,218, or 7 5 percent of the total. were AHFC 
propel'ties. 
Taken together', the foreclosed pl'operties held in inventory and 
those sold during the previous 18 months totalled 5,872. That 
rP.presents 7 pel'cent of outstanding residential mol'tgages in Alaska 
in mld-1987. And there were no doubt other fol'eclosures that are 
not l'ecorded on this table--those held by banks and private mortgage 
insurance companies (other than MGIC), for' instance. Reliable 
figul'es on such foreclosut'es are very difficult to get. 
Table 3. 7 looks in more detail at AHFC foreclosures, showing 
numbel's of mobile homes and other propert.ltis taken in fol'eclosul'e 
each yeal' since 1984, numbers sold, and remaining inventory in June 
1987. What the table shows most clearly is the snowballing rate of 
foreclosures dudng that pedod. In 1984, AHFC foreclosed on 169 
properties; in 1985 on 630; in 1986 on 1,792; and in just the first 
six months of 1987 on 1, 6 76-··fot' a total of 4,267 foreclosure::: ln 
three and a half years. It re-sold 1,509 of those properties, mostly 
during 1986 and the first half of 1987. and in June was left with 
2,758 properties. Of those, 965 wel'e mobile homes and the rest were 
almost all condominiums and single-family houses. (AHFC does f inanc.e 
duplexes and triplexes, but the numbers are small.) 
The table also makes clear the difficulties of re-selling mobile 
homes; of the 1,153 AHFC foreclosed on during this period, it 
re-sold just. 188, or about 16 percent. By contrast, it re-sold about 
4?. pet'cent of the other kinds of properties it took under 
foreclosul'e. And foreclosures continue to climb: in the month after 
this table was compiled AHFC took in roughly 200 more pl'opertles. 
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TABLE 3.7. AHFC INVENTORY OF FORECLOSED PROPERTIES 
AND SALES, 1984 - JUNb: 1987 
June cumulative 
1984 1985 1986 1987 1984 - June 1987 
Total Properties Taken 
Under Foreclosures 
Each Year 
Mobile Homes 48 183 509 413 1,153 
Other 121 447 11283 1,263 :3, 114 
All 169 630 1,792 1,676 4,267 
Foreclosed Properties 
Sold Each Year 
Mobile Homes 10 35 85 58 188 
Oth1:ir --30 216 544 531 1,321 




Mobile Homes 38 186 610 965 965 
Other 91 322 11061 1,791 1,793 




Taken together, the tables and figures in this chapter tell much 
of the story of the rise and fall of Alaska•s housing market in the 
1980s, and of AHFc•s major role in that market in the past seven 
years. 
During Alaska• s economic boom of the early 1980s, houses were 
bought and sold at a record pace and at record prices. AHFC played 
an important part in boosting housing sales, because it was sub-· 
sidizing mortgage interest rates and offering special programs for 
lower income Alaskans. At the same time, the economic good times 
were drawing tens of thousands of new residents to the state. The 
combination of below-market interest rates and growing demand for 
housing pushed housing construction and sales up: in 1983, the peak 
year of activity, more than 16,500 new mortgages for homes sales 
were written. And in those boom years between 1981 and 1984, AHFC 
bought about eight out of ten new mortgages in the state. 
The pace of housing sales began dropping in 1985--coincident 
with the economic slowdown that that became a severe recession in 
1986. At the same time, market interest rates began dropping, and by 
the end of 1986 were at their lowest point in the 1980s. A combina--
tion of declining interest rates and different loan terms offered by 
various lenders brought AHFC's share of mortgages for home sales to 
about 60 percent in 1985; its inability to do refinancing in that 
year brought its overall share of mortgages for sales and refinances 
to around 50 percent. 
The recession began making itself felt in earnest in the housing 
market in 1986, when only about half as many mortgages for homes 
sales were written as in the previous year, and less than a third as 
many as had been written as recently as 1983. 
Two-thirds of the new mortgages written in 1986 were for 
refinances by existing owners rather than for sales. The state 
legislature gave AHFC authority to refinance mortgages in 1986, and 
its overall share of mortgages for sales and for refinances was 
about 40 percent that year. In the first half of 1987, home sales 
were even slower than in 1986, with only about 1, 700 mortgages for 
homes sales written. Refinancing continued brisk in early 1987, with 
about twice as many mortgages written for refinances as for sales. 
AHFC had about a third of the overall mortgage market through 
mid-1987. 
Another sign of the growing recession was the growing number of 
Alaska properties in foreclosure in 1986 and the first half of 1987. 
The big lenders and insurers were holding more than 4,200 foreclosed 
properties in June 1987, and had sold an additional 1,600 properties 
that had been taken in foreclosure in the preceding 18 months. Taken 
together, those sold and unsold properties represented 7 percent of 
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outstanding residential mortgages in Alaska in 1987. 
compares, for instance, with a national foreclosure 
FHLMC-financed properties of less than 1 percent. 
That rate 
rate for 
The lion•s share of foreclosed properties were AHFC•s--not 
surprising, given AHFc•s 60-percent share of outstanding residential 
mortgages and given that most of the loans were written when prlces 
were at thelr peak. With property values sliding, many AHFC mortgage 
holders flnd themselves unable to sell their homes for even as much 
as they st ill owe on the mortgage -let alone for the prices they 
pald for the properties. And the pace of foreclosures accelerated in 
1987, with AHFC taking in nearly as many properties in the first slx 
months of 1987 as it had in the entire previous year. 
We projected in Chapter II that the economic conditions that 
have forced down property values, slashed home sales, and put 
thousands of properties into foreclosure will begin to improve in 
1988. The next chapter looks at what AHFC and other lenders might do 
to help the housing market recover. 
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Chapter IV. THE HOUSING MARKET AND POLICY OPTIONS 
In earlier chapters we described the grim effects of the 
l'.'ecession on Alaska's economy and housing market. We believe that 
the recession will end in 1988 and a gl'.'adual l'.'ecovery begin. But 
some of the effects of the recession, including effects on the 
housing market, will not disappear ovel'.'night. A crucial question for 
AHFC and other major lenders is whether they can do anything that 
will speed the recovel'.'y of--or at least stabilize--the housing 
mal'.'ket. 
This chapter assesses how a number of different policies that 
AHFC might try would influence the Anchorage housing market over the 
next five years. We don't have enough information to make such 
assessments for housing markets in other areas of the state, but 
movements in the Anchorage market will reflect genel'.'al trends in 
housing markets throughout Alaska---with some obvious regional 
differences. 
To project the effects of diffel'.'ent policies we use a housing 
market model developed by ISER. These projections are of likely 
change in the Anchorage housing market, based on certain assumptions 
about future economic activity and specific housing policies. They 
are not "forecasts" of what is going to happen in the housing 
market. Chapter II assesses the likely range of economic activity in 
Alaska through the mid-1990s. The level of economic activity will of 
course be the most important influence on the housing market during 
the coming years. But the next most important influence on the 
housing market will be the housing policies that AHFC and other 
lenders choose. We could only forecast the path of the housing 
market if we knew for certain the state economic future and the 
policies lenders will choose. 
The crucial policy choice AHFC and other lenders must make is 
how fast and at what prices to sell the thousands of foreclosed 
properties they have acquired and continue to acquire. As Table 3.6 
in Chapter. III shows, AHFC and other lenders were holding more than 
4,000 houses, condominiums, and mobile homes as of June 1987, and in 
the pr.eceding 18 months they had sold an additional 1,600 fol'.'eclosed 
uni ts. Under what we consider the most likely level of economic 
activity, sales of foreclosed properties (particularly condominiums) 
will strongly influence the stability of the Anchorage housing 
market---including the numbel'.'s of future foreclosures--in the next 
few years. 
More than 60 percent of the foreclosed properties in Alaska in 
mid-1987 belonged to AHFC, and most were concentrated in Anchorage 
and nearby areas. Of the state's major mortgage lenders, AHFC will 
continue to be hardest hit by defaults until the recession ends, 
because it holds about eight out of ten new mortgages written in 
Alaska in the first half of the 1980s. Decisions of AHFC about how 
to handle its inventory of foreclosed properties will therefore be 
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critical to Anchorage's housing market in the next few years, as 
will decisions of other lenders whose foreclosure holdings are 
smaller but still substantial. 
Below we briefly explain why sales of foreclosed units will so 
strongly influence the condition of the Anchorage housing market 
over the next few years. Next we outline the structure of housing 
markets in general, discuss our model, and then assess the relative 
effects of selected housing policies. 
Sliding Prices and Rising Defaults: A Vicious Circle 
The faster AHFC and other lenders and insurers put foreclosed 
properties on the market--at the extreme, through auctions similar 
to one a major lender held in Anchorage last fall--the more prices 
will be depressed and the more defaults will persist, if not 
increase. The result will be that the lenders will end up holding 
more properties through foreclosures. 
Why selling large numbers of foreclosed properties in a short 
period results in more borrowers defaulting is easy to explain. 
Putting a great many foreclosed properties on the market quickly 
pushes prices down. As prices go down, more and more homeowners find 
themselves with negative equity--that is, their mortgages are larger 
than the market prices of their properties. When owners with 
negative equity are forced to sell, they wi 11 likely default because 
they are unable or unwilling to make up the sometimes substantial 
difference between what they owe and what the properties will sell 
for. 
Holding foreclosed properties off the market is of course also 
expensive for lenders and insurers: they pay in the neighborhood of 
$18 to $30 per day for each unit, depending on the size of the 
outstanding mortgage and the interest rate. What AHFC and others 
must weigh are the relative costs: what choices will turn out to be 
most costly and the most beneficial in the next few years and in the 
longer term? 
Sliding property values and rising defaults have already cost 
Alaska lenders, insurers, and borrowers tens of millions of 
dollars. In addition to the costs we've already noted, the 
foreclosure process that follows default can cost thousands of 
dollars in administrative and legal fees that are borne by 
borrowers, lenders, and taxpayers. Costs of judicial 
foreclosures--in which the lender goes to court to try to have the 
borrower declared liable for losses when the property is 
re-sold--are particularly high. And falling property values also 
have other social costs; for example, some homeowners who could find 
better jobs elsewhere don't move because they can't sell their 
houses for what they owe on them and they don't want to default. 
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A continuing cycle of dropping prices and growing defaults will 
also make national lenders and insurers and bond investors less 
willing to put money into the Alaska housing market in the future. 
That lack of confidence will translate into higher costs for AHFC 
and other lenders and therefore higher costs for Alaska homeowners 
in general--higher costs for insurance, for instance, or higher 
interest rates on bonds AHFC sells to finance mortgages. 
As a government entity, AHFC is also justified in intervening to 
limit the effects of falling prices on the quality of Alaska 
housing. When there is more housing than there is demand, some 
houses sit vacant or may be rented at rates that aren't adequate to 
pay maintenance costs. Deterioration sets in. If just the poorest 
quality stock deteriorated, government intervention might not be 
justified, because we could assume that the poorest stock was being 
eliminated and Alaskans in general were moving into better quality 
housing. 
But there are two reasons why deterioration might spread to 
better housing. First, when poor-quality houses deteriorate, that 
deterioration may reduce the value of nearby higher quality housing. 
Second, even though declining prices mean buyers can afford better 
quality housing, many potential buyers are also borrowers who 
already own lower quality housing with negative equity--and 
therefore they can't sell their current homes and buy better ones. 
So again, better housing might sit vacant and deteriorate. 
Nonetheless, refined AHF'C policies might be able to limit the extent 
of such deterioration. 
Given the situation we've just described, public policies that 
could stabilize prices and decrease both present and future defaults 
and foreclosures merit serious consideration. Below we describe 
housing markets in general and how we have modeled this market. 
structure of Housing Markets 
The housing market, like all markets, can be described in terms 
of supply and demand. In fact the housing market is not a single 
market but rather a number of markets with similar but not identical 
goods: housing varies in size, location, and construction type; it 
may be occupied by owners or renters. While at any given moment a 
person can live in only one type of housing--for instance, an owner 
living in a single-family house--the various markets are related and 
the price in one market affects demand in all the others. 
The market clearing process for housing--the process by which 
supply and demand come into balance--is complicated by imperfect 
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information, price floors imposed by mortgages, and costs associated 
with moving. These market imperfections make it hard to observe the 
housing market in equilibrium, where prices clear the market. Buyers 
and sellers have only limited information about what price houses 
will sell foi:-. They may know what specific houses sold for in the 
recent past, but they may know little of overall market adjustments 
since those sales. Also, because there are so many different types 
of houses, information about the selling price of one particular 
house may not be relevant to the selling price of others. Over time, 
as many buyers and sellers adjust their and of 
the market moves toward a market clearing price. 
Two other elements hinder movements toward a market clearing 
price, particularly in a market where prices are falling. Prices 
might not fall as low as they otherwise would because loan amounts 
limit how low they can go: a seller who accepts a price that is less 
than what he still owes on the property would have to make up the 
difference--so the mortgage amount may set a floor for the selling 
price. Also, there are other monetary and social costs involved in 
moving from one type of house to another. These moving and 
transaction costs may make families or individuals less willing to 
move to houses that might be better for them, even in the face of 
declining prices. 
These complexities notwithstanding, the housing market still 
operates like most other markets. The demand for housing in a given 
community depends mainly on how many households there are in the 
region. The demand for particular types of housing determines how 
households are distributed among the various types. The most 
important determinants of housing demand are household income, 
wealth, family size, mortgage rates and terms, and prices. 
At any given time there will be a supply of newly constructed 
houses and older houses up for sale. When builders can construct a 
house and sell it for more than the building and selling costs, they 
will build any type of house. Thus builders respond to the expected 
price of homes and the construction costs. They also consider how 
long it would take to sell or rent a new house. Another important 
element affecting the supply of housing is the number of sellers who 
are either leaving the state or moving into a different type of 
housing. Generally such changes are tied to changes in the economic 
positions or the demographic characteristics of households. Thus, 
the overall level of economic activity affects the supply of housing. 
Modeling the Housing Market 
our housing market model, and other housing models developed in 
the U.S. over the past 25 years, are described in detail in Chapters 
II and III of ISER's November 1986 report, The Effect_of 9hanges in 
the Alaska Housing Finance Corporation Mortgage Programs, Final 
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Report. Appendixes C and D of this t'eport provide model 
documentation. Below we briefly discuss some of the difficulties 
inherent in modeling the housing market. 
Housing markets are extremely complex. Our housing market model 
reflects this complexity; it is designed to take into account 
relationships between dozens of variables, and it is built on 
hundreds of assumptions about future economic activity and about how 
housing markets work. The three major economic variables we use in 
the housing market model are (1) the number of Alaska households; 
(2) the per capita income of Alaskans; and (3) the Alaska cost of 
living. The number of households and per capita incomes affect the 
demand for housing, while changes in the cost of living affect the 
costs of construction and the supply of housing. The housing model 
incorporates the economic assumptions and projections presented in 
Chapter II. 
Our model provides a good picture of how the Anchorage market 
may react to different policies. But it is after all a computer 
simulation model--not a crystal ball. It is impossible for a model 
to capture all aspects of a market as complicated and as subject to 
so many forces as the housing market. Furthermore, it is limited by 
lack of information about. some aspects of the economy and the 
housing market. We can not, for instance, project the effects of 
various policies on Alaska housing markets other than Anchorage. 
Pt'oj ections made with the model are of course only as accut'ate 
as what goes into the model. We believe our assumptions about likely 
economic activity between now and 1992 are good ones, but we all 
know the Alaska economy is volatile: no one can be entirely sure 
what will happen. To create a computer model, we have to build in 
relationships between many variables--and we have constructed those 
relationships by looking at what they have been historically. In the 
future those relationships could be different from what they have 
been in the past. The fact that most of our historical data is from 
a period when the Anchorage housing market was on the upswing posed 
a particular' difficulty--although we were able to incorporate some 
historical information from the early part of the decline. Another 
complexity is that computer models do not genet'ally reflect changes 
immediately; changes often show up only after some time lag. 
Finally, no computer model can ever precisely incorporate 
people's expectations. What Alaskans believe is going to happen to 
the economy will affect their spending and investment decisions and 
therefore influence what does happen in the economy. This is not to 
say that Alaskans can end the recession by spending and investing 
more, but rather that Alaskans' perceptions about the economy can 
have some effect on just when the economy begins turning around: 
Alaskans acting on their beliefs about the future might end the 
recession a bit sooner or somewhat later than we expect. 
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General Policy Options 
This section talks broadly about what options AHFC has for 
influencing the Anchorage housing market, and some of the ways those 
policies might be implemented. Any policy AHFC undertook that 
increased or decreased housing prices would have broad effects on 
other lenders, insurers, homeowners, renters, landlords, and others 
with interests in the Alaska housing market. Our computer model 
can't project specific effects of different policies on all those 
groups, but we can talk in general terms about how AHifC policy 
choices could affect others, and about some other broad policy 
considerations that the model can't capture. In the next section we 
use our housing market model to look more narrowly at how some 
specific policies would affect housing prices and other market 
variables. 
Policies can affect either the supply or demand side of the 
housing market. In addition, policies may improve the market 
adjustment process. Five possible strategies are: allowing prices to 
adjust to clear the market; increasing the demand for owner-occupied 
housing; reducing the stock of housing; using market power to 
maintain a floor price; and limiting mortgage liability. Each of 
these general strategies would be implemented differently, would 
have effects on several housing objectives, and would have various 
costs and benefits. 
Allow Prices to Adjust to Clear the Market 
Under this policy, AHFC would auction off its foreclosed units. 
If auctions were held regularly, AHFC could clear its inventory of 
foreclosed properties and the prices paid would provide information 
for the rest of the sellers in the market. An important 
consideration in this type of program would be the rate at which 
foreclosed properties were auctioned. If all properties were 
auctioned at one time, prices would drop sharply. To prevent that, 
AHFC could clear its accrued properties over a period of time. 
Such a program would lower the price of homes offered for sale 
and reduce the number of private (non-auctioned) homes sold. The 
price decline required to clear the foreclosures would depend on the 
relative elasticities of demand and supply for the various types of 
housing and the rate at which houses were auctioned. Since owner 
and rental housing are substitutes, this policy would also result in 
a decline in the price of rental housing. 
This policy would increase the default rate. Reducing the price 
of owned homes would increase the number of households at risk of 
default, since it would increase the number of homes with negative 
equity. 
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How much prices would fall and how many new defaults would be 
created by auctions would depend on the economy. The demand fol'.' 
housing will depend on future population and income growth. The 
number of those at risk who actually default will also depend on 
economic conditions. 
By auctioning foreclosed pl'.'operties, AHFC and other mortgage 
holders would be trading potential losses on the mortgages--selling 
at. prices lower. than the mortgage amountS-···for. reductions i.n holding 
costs. Whether selling at depressed prices would be more or less 
costly than holding on to the properties would depend on 
expectations about future price changes. If prices were expected to 
l'.'ise enough so that holding costs would be less than loan losses, it 
would pay to hold the uni ts. If price declines encouraged future 
defaults, auctioning properties could increase both future loan 
losses and holding costs. 
Mortgage insurers would also be affected by auctions of 
fol'.'eclosed propel'.'ties. The liability of mortgage holders depends on 
the extent to which their mortgages are covel'.'ed by insurance. If 
the mortgage on an auctioned property were fully insured, the 
insurer would bear the losses described above. If the mortgage were 
not fully insured, the loss might be shared by the lender and the 
insure!'.', although the insurer would be liable for the first portion 
of the loss. 
Property owners would see a decline in their home equity H such 
auctions took place. For certain home owners, this decline would 
result in negative equity. Homeowners wouldn't realize actual losses 
unless they were forced to sell. 
Ownet's of rental property would suffer a decline in rents paid 
and in the value of their properties, because owning and renting are 
substitutes. Renters, on the other hand, would gain from this 
progl'.'am, since it would reduce theit' rents and make it cheaper to 
buy houses. 
By reducing the cost of housing, an auction program would allow 
buyers to get better quality housing for less money. 
Increasing the Demand for Owner-Occupied Housing 
In periods of limited population growth or even decline, 
stabilization policies can be aimed at increasing the rate of 
homeownership. Homeownership can increase in a stable population as 
the population ages, household income grows, and family size 
increases. In declining mat'kets, uncertainty about future economic 
status or expectations of future price declines may keep people fl'.'om 
buying homes. Additional factors that may limit housing demand are 
required down payments, restrictions on AHFC loans, and the level of 
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interest rates. AHFC and Mortgage Guarantee Insurance 
(MGIC)--thP. insurer for a large number of AHFC loans--have 
undertaken condominium marketing programs that reduce down 
loosen loan restrictions, and offer interest rates 





Lower mortgage rates in general increase the demand for 
owner-occupied housing. Both the overall number of houses bought 
and the types purchased will change with changes in the mortgage 
rates. But any nonproportional offer of subsidies may simply shift:. 
the demand between types and not increase the overall demand. In 
addition to the lower interest rates AHFC and MGIC are now offering 
through their condominium sales program, AHFC also has a program 
(the HOF program) that effectively subsidizes interest rates for 
lower income buyers. 
Some Alaskans who might want to buy homes may be able to meet 
the monthly payment on a loan but not make the required down 
payment--and AHFC and other lenders have recognized that by reducing 
required down payments in some cases. A variation on these reduced 
down payments would be a lease option program. AHFC could establish 
this program with its foreclosed properties; the corporation could 
lease these uni ts with an option to buy. A portion of the lease 
payment each month could go toward the down payment. Such a program 
would counter the effects of uncertainty on the housing market; 
lease holders would not suffer the long-term risks of a change in 
their economic status or a decline in the price of housing. 
AHFC' s 70 percent ownership rule for condominium complexes may 
have limited demand until recently; that rule says that AHFC loans 
will be available only in complexes where 70 percent of the units 
are occupied by owners rather than renters. By loosening that 
ownership share requirement, AHFC has increased the portion of 
condominium stock eligible for AHFC loans. AHFC might also consider 
replacing the ownership requirement with long-term leases that 
included an agreement to pay the condominium association fee; these 
lease agreements could be enforced by the condominium association. 
AHFC' s recent policy changes sharply increased the number of 
condominiums AHFC sold in Anchorage in the summer of 1987, and the 
other kinds of actions described above might increase demand more. 
Increased demand should tend to shore up prices. AHFC and MGIC are 
of course bearing extra costs for these new marketing measures, and 
any additional measures would mean more costs. For example, 
additional rate subsidies would require funds from either AHFC' s 
reserve or additional state appropriations to buy down market 
interest rates. Additional funds might also be necesrrnry if reducing 
the ownership requirement in condominium projects results ln 
increases in the rates AHFC pays on bonds. Second, AHFC may have to 
establish an insurance fund to support the lower down payment. 
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program. The cost of a lease option program with foreclosed units 
would be the lost capital gains if housing prices rose in the future. 
But if these measures help stabilize prices, AHFC and others 
will also benefit. The rate of defaults and therefore foreclosures 
should be reduced, reducing future loan losses and holding costs. 
Property owners should also ultimately benefit from these types 
of programs, if the programs help increase the value of their homes 
and improve their chances of selling them. owners of rental 
property, however, could be made worse off. By reducing the costs 
of owning and increasing the access to homeownership, these programs 
could reduce the demand for rental units. That in turn would reduce 
rents and the value of rental property. 
By reducing the costs of both renting and owning homes, these 
programs could also improve the quality of housing Alaskans live in 
and increase the rate of homeownership. One general problem with 
programs that reduce the value of rental property is that this 
reduction could result in long-term declines in the quality of the 
stock, because landlords are more likely to defer maintenance. 
The total effects and costs of such programs would depend on the 
future level of population. If the economy grows faster than 
expected, the cost of the programs would increase and add to the 
upward pressure on prices. 
Removing Housing stock 
The most direct strategy for stabilizing the housing market in 
the face of "excess" supply is simply removing a portion of the 
supply. This reduction in supply would put upward pressure on 
prices. Two types of housing would lend themselves to removal: 
mobile homes and poor quality multi-family housing. 
Mobile homes could be shipped to other markets; at some price, 
it would pay to export at least some of the newer mobile homes. 
Removing other types of units would be more difficult. The state's 
urban areas have few poor-quality uni ts, and most that exist are 
rental units. Taking those poor-quality units out of the housing 
stock would require the state to buy them--or trade fol:' foreclosed 
units--and tear them down. If AHFC traded foreclosed units with 
private owners, a number of steps would be involved. First, the 
remaining condominium owners in the selected complexes would have to 
be relocated (this would require refinancing) to foreclosed units in 
other complexes. Second, the condominium complex would have to be 
traded for the apartment unit; the trade might involve additonal 
cash. Finally, the tenants of the rental unit would have to be 
relocated and the building demolished. One variant of this strategy 
would be to trade foreclosed property with the Alaska state Housing 
Authority (ASHA). On a smaller scale, single-family units on lots 
zoned for other uses might be removed through trade. 
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Removing stock in this manner should help stabilize pdces in 
the owner-occupied market and have a limited effect on the rental 
market. The extent of· the increase in prices would depend on the 
proportion of excess stock removed; the smaller the share removed, 
the smaller the effect. The small quantity of poor-quality housing 
available for use in such a program suggests that the effects would 
be limited. 
The costs of such trades to AHFC would 
the traded property, the relocation costs of 
owners, and the demolition costs. There 
benefits for AHFC, including a reduction 
holding costs of foreclosed properties and 
of future foreclosures. 
be the market value of 
renters and condominium 
would be a number of 
in the loan loss and 
a reduction in the rate 
Depending on their level of participation, the insurers would 
have to be paid market values of the properties. Their 
participation might be based on how much they would benefit if their 
future losses were limited. 
Property owners would be better off to the extent that this 
program stabilized housing prices. Owners of rental property would 
be no worse off, since the rental stock would remain the same and 
owner stock would be reduced. Renters should likewise see no change, 
since the amount of rental stock would be the same. 
The overall quality of the housing stock would be improved 
through this program, because it would concentrate renters and 
owners in better quality housing and limit deterioration of the 
stock. 
The costs of this program would depend on the economic future; 
further declines in the value of the housing stock would reduce the 
costs of improving the quality of the stock. Eliminating stock 
would also increase inflationary pressure should there be a surprise 
rapid turnaround in the economy. 
Using Market Power to Maintain a Floor Price 
AHFC's stock of foreclosed properties makes it, as we have 
noted, a major seller in the housing market. This control of a large 
share of the market gives AHFC power to influence prices. AHFC 
could act to prevent a decline in prices simply by establishing a 
floor price for its units and holding them until they could be sold 
for that price. The floor price could be established to minimize 
the average loan loss on foreclosed properties. 
If AHFC were able to stabilize prices by establishing a floor 
price, there would be various costs and benefits. AHFC and its 
mortgage holders would see two benefits: reduced loan losses on 
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sales of foreclosed property, and fewer defaults in the future. 
However, holding costs would be higher, since maintaining the price 
above the market clearing level would increase the length of time 
foreclosed properties were held. But as we noted earlier, AHFC and 
its insurers face large expenses in holding foreclosed properties 
off the market--in the range of $18 to $30 per day for each unit. 
Whether the holding costs would outweigh other benefits would be the 
critical issue for AHFC and its insurers. The policy would save 
money overall if the holding costs up until the time of the sale 
were less than the loan losses would have been if a property had 
been sold earlier at a lower price. 
F'or those loans completely covered by mot"tgage insut"ance, the 
costs and benefits out 1 i ned above would acct"ue to the insut"ers. On 
loans only par·t.ially covet"ed by insurance, the costs and benefits 
would be distt"ibuted between the insurer"s and the lendet"s. 
Owners of both homes and t"ental units would benefit if this 
pt"ogt"am stabilized pt"ices. Homeowners who wanted to sell would have 
a better chance of doing so simply by offedng theit" houses below 
AHFC's floor pt"ice. Renters could be hut"t by this pt"ogt"am, because 
it would increase the costs of buying and t"enting. 
LimittruLJ'!Qrtgage Liabilily 
Falling prices over the past. eighteen months have left many 
Anchot"age homeowners--pat"ticularly those who bought when prices wet:'e 
at tlu-:d r peak--wi th negative <~qui ty: that is, they owe mot:'e on the it:' 
houses t.han l.he houses c.an be sold for. That negative cqui l.y is a 
mat'ket bat't'iet' with set'ious consequences. First, it pushes many 
bot't'OWet's into default if they at'e fot'ced to tt'y to sell and are 
unwilling Ot' unable to make up the sometimes substantial difference 
between what they owe on theit:' houses and what the houses will sell 
for. Second, it prevents some homeownet's ft'om taking advantage of 
lower· pr·i ces and huyhig better quality houses- because they aro 
unable to sell their existing houses for what they owe on them. 
AHFC and other lenders might mitigate the mat'ket bat'rier posed 
by negat.ive equity---and thereby t'educe defaults and increase 
demand lf they limited borrowers' mortgage liability in some 
ci rcurnstances. There are a number of ways lenders could go about 
limiting mortgage liability. 
One way would be for AHFC and its insurers to negotiate 
write-downs of loan liability for borrowers who had to sell. Such 
write-downs would be similar to the pre-fot'eclosure sale agreements 
curt'ently being used by mortgage insurers. Steps involved in such a 
pt'ocess might include having the home appraised by a certified 
appt'aiset' approved by AHFC; forgiving the borrower some pP.rcentago 
or all of the amount owed above the appraised value (or 
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t.l1E-i sale price); having the seller pay closing costs; and splitting 
t.hfl loan 1 osses between AHFC and its insurer:s, in shares 
proportionate t.o their total liability on each loan. 
Of course the lenders would establish guidelines for: determining 
when they would write down mortgage liability rather: than put'sue 
foreclosure: a blanket policy of writing down liability for 
borrowers unable to sell their houses for what they owed on the 
houses would encourage more defaults. And, such a blanket policy of 
not pursuing foreclosures cou 1 d in turn make mortgagf'l i rrnurers and 
bond investors reluctant or even unwilling to buy or insure mortgage 
loans in Alaska in the future. 
But in some cit'cumstances mortgage write-downs could save 
lenders and insurers money, if the alternative were r;oing through 
foreclosure proceedings, taking possession of the house, holding it 
for· ee--sale, ,:md taking a loss on the re-sale. A single judicial 
foreclosure can cost the state in the range of $5,000 to 
$10, 000--plus costs of holding foreclosed units ( $18 to $30 per day 
for each unit). In addition, potential losses on re-sale of a 
property could be as great as the amount of a loan write-down. AHFC 
would have to weigh the relative costs and benefits in making its 
decisions about whether and when to write-down mortgage liability. 
Another possible method of limiting mortgage liability in some 
circumstances would be to allow homeowners who wanted to sell their 
existing houses and move into better ones in Alaska to defer a part 
of t.hei r mo rt gag fl liability until prices went. back up. These 
homEmwners would, in a rnanner of speaking, be taking their negative 
equity along wiLh them. A homeowner with negative equity on his 
current house would be allowed to sell that house for less than the 
outstanding mortgage and buy another house in Alaska, with the 
proviso that he had to repay the lender later, when property values 
and incomes increased. That repayment could be handled in a number 
of ways--the borrower could, for instance, carry the negative equity 
to the new house in the form of a second mortgage, or repay the 
lender out of his capital gains when he sold the second house. Still 
another way the lender could recoup thH loan loss on the first house 
would be to build a graduated payment schedule into the mortgage on 
the second house--so that after a few yeal'.'s, a pol'.'tion of the 
bol'.'l'.'ower' s higher payments would be used to repay the lendel'.' his 
loss on the fil"'st loan. However the tl'.'ansfer was handled, it would 
be a means of helping stabilize the Anchorage rnat"'ket by incl'.'easing 
sales. 
Effects of Selected Poli.des 
We now use our housing market model to assess the relative 
effects of specific policy options on the Anchot"'age housing mat"'ket 
bet.ween now and 1992. All the policy cases discussed below assume 
4-12 
the level of economic activity projected in the medium (base) case 
in Chapter II. We believe that case represents the most likely rate 
of economic growth over the next five years, but it is always 
possible that the economy will grow faster or slower than we expect. 
In the final section of the chapter we discuss how faster or slower 
economic growth would affect the Anchorage housing market. 
Aside from the assumptions about future economic activity, the 
crucial variable in all the policy cases is the rate of sale of 
foreclosed condominiums and single--family houses---but particulal'.'ly 
of condominiums. 
It is much easier to re-sell single-family houses than 
condominiums. Most buyers prefer single-family houses when they can 
afford them, and when prices are down more buyers can afford houses. 
Buyers are scarce in the Anchorage market today, but more of those 
fewer buyers are choosing houses over condominiums. As we noted 
earlier, we anticipate that the existing stock of condominiums and 
other multi-family units (including rental units) will likely exceed 
the projected demand for multi-family housing in Anchorage through 
1992. Condominiums are more difficult to re-sell because they are 
the second choice of many buyers and because there are so many of 
them out there. 
We do not attempt to project future prices for mobile homes 
under the different policies; we don't have enough information on 
the mobile home market to make such price projections. We expect 
that the existing supply of mobile homes will more than meet demand 
from now through 1992, and that AHFC may in fact ship some mobile 
homes outside the state for sale. 
We can group the policy cases this way: the three main cases 
(base, hold-all, auction) assume different rates of sale of the 
total inventory (AHFC's and other lenders') of foreclosed houses and 
condominiums in Anchorage. Three additional cases ( limit liability, 
remove, and subsidy) assume the same rate of sale of foreclosed 
inventory as in the base case, but also look at the effects of 
additional policy changes. The limit liability case looks at how 
limiting mortgage liability of borrowers or allowing them to defer a 
portion of mortgage liability until later would affect defaults and 
the lenders' inventory of foreclosures. The remove case assesses the 
effects of simply removing--not re-selling---some condominiums from 
thE-i inventory of foreclosed condominiums. Finally, we also assess 
how subsidizing mortgage interest rates would affect some aspects of 
t.he Anchorage condominium mal'.'ket, which is much more depl'.'essed and 
where l'.'e-sales al'.'e much mol'.'e difficult than in the market for 
single-family houses. We present results from these last three cases 
only when they are significantly different from base case results. 
Val'.'iables and Their Relationships 
We examine the relative effects of the various policies on 
pl'.'ices, private sales, inventory of foreclosed properties, and 
construction of condominiums and single-family houses between now 
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and 1992. We also assess how each is likely to affect equity of 
homeowners and rental rates. We will of course use some numbers in 
discussing these various effects, but what we consider most 
important is not the specific numbers---which at:'e approximatlons--but 
rather what the numbet:'s sho~ about the relative effects of diffet:'ent 
policies. For instance, we don• t pt:'etend to know that the avet:'age 
price of single-family houses would be pt:'ecisely $139,265 in 1989 if 
the lenders sold a given number of foreclosed units--but we can say 
whether prices would tend to be higher or lower if the lendet:'s sold 
more of fewer houses. 
The housing market variables we examine at:'e of course related, 
and change in one affects the others. In general, our housing market 
model soys that higher prices tend to reduce defaults, increase 
equity, encourage construction, and increase pt:'ivate sales. 
Conversely, lower prices mean mot:'e defaults, lower equity, less 
constt:'uction, and fewet:' pt:'ivate sales. 
Base Case: We use this case as a benchmark against which to assess 
the effects of the auction and hold-all cases, whet:'e we assume that 
more or fewer foreclosed units are sold. This is not a "forecast" 
case in the sense that we considet:' it the most likely to actually 
happen; it incorporates a rate of sales that is neither extt:'emely 
fast nor extremely slow. 
In this case we assume that AHFC and other lendet:'s sell 1,000 
houses per year from their inventories of foreclosed single-family 
houses until the inventory falls below 1,000, and then sell off 
whatever is left in the next year. For condominiums the case assumes 
that lenders sell a constant percentage of their stock of 
foreclosures in any given year; in this case that amounts to between 
400 and 700 condominiums annually from 1988 through 1992. 
Auction Case: The title essentially describes the case: het'e we 
examine the effects of lenders selling a very large pet'centage of 
theit' stock of foreclosed condominiums each year--tht'ee to four 
times as many condominiums (between 1,000 and 2,800 pet' year) 
through 1992 as under the base case. The case assumes roughly double 
the number of sales of single-family houses as under the base 
case--from 1,000 to 2,200 annually until the stock is exhausted. 
Hold-All Condominiums Case: Under this case we assess what would 
happen in the housing market if the lenders sold no foreclosed 
condominiums at all between 1988 and 1992, and restricted sales of 
foreclosed single-family houses to just 400 per year during the same 
pedod. 
Limit Mortgage Liability Case: Here we look at how future defaults 
and other market variables would be affected if lenders or insurers 
limited or deferred mortgage liability of property owners who were 
forced to sell or wanted to move to better homes in Alaska but were 
constrained by having negative equity in their current houses. The 
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borrower• s liability in such cases would be limited to the sale 
price of the property, even if the outstanding mortgage were higher. 
(Assumptions about rates of sale of foreclosed inventories are the 
same as in the base case.) This case represents an extreme: it shows 
the results if lenders limited mortgage liability of all those with 
negative equity who wanted to sell. 
Remove Condominiums: This case differs from the base case only in 
that we look at what would happen if AHFC or other lenders simply 
took 400 units out of their inventory of foreclosed condominiums in 
each of the years 1988, 1989, and 1990; these 1,200 units would not 
be sold but would be demolished or otherwise removed from the market. 
Subsidize Interest Rates: This case examines the effects on just the 
condominium market of subsidizing interest rates and holding rates 
of sale of foreclosed units the same as in the base case. 
Policy Effects on Prices 
A key measure of market stability is price. Figures 4.1 through 
4.4 show the effects that faster or slower sales of foreclosed 
properties would have on house and condominium prices--both nominal 
(not adjusted for inflation) and real (adjusted for inflation) 
prices--in Anchorage over the next several years. The figures also 
compare the projected prices with historical prices from 1980 
through 1986. Under all the cases, prices of condominiums and houses 
reach lows in 1987 or 1988 and then begin climbing--but condominium 
prices drop much further than house prices and take much longer to 
recover to their historic highs. 
Base Case Prices: Under the base case nominal and real average 
prices of houses would bottom out in 1987 and average prices of 
condominiums in 1988. Nominal house prices would reach a low of 
around $109 thousand in 1987 and then begin to rise steadily, 
rebounding to their nominal 1985 levels by 1989. Real prices--prices 
in 1986 dollars to account for projected future inflation--would 
also rise beginning in 1988, but their course would be more jagged: 
real prices by 1992 would be about 13 percent higher than in 1987. 
Average nominal condominium prices under the base case would 
reach a low of about $73 thousand in 1988 and then begin slowly 
rebounding, but not reaching their 1985 levels until 1992. Real 
condominium prices would bottom out at around $68 thousand in 1988 
and increase about 19 percent by 1992. 
Auction Case Prices: High sales of condominiums in this case 
would push nominal prices to a low of $58 thousand in 1988--20 
percent below projected base case prices in that year. Average 
condominium prices in 1992 would still be below their nominal 1985 
lev~ls. Real condominium prices in this case would also bottom out 
in 1988 before beginning a slow recovery that would still leave real 
prices by 1992 about 5 percent lower than they would have been under 
the base case. 
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Figure 4.1 Nominal Prices, Anchorage Condominiums, 
Under Five Cases, 1980-1992 
(In Thousands of Dollars) 
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Figure 4.2 Real Prices, Anchorage Condominiums, 
Under Five Cases, 1980-1992 
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Figure 4.3 Nominal Prices, Anchorage Single-Family Houses 
Under Three Cases, 1980-1992 
(In Thousands of Dollars) 
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Figure 4.4 Real Prices, Anchorage Single-Family Houses 
Under Three Cases, 1980-1992 
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~ Holdall A A.ucUon 
Prices of single-family houses would also be pushed down in the 
late 1980s by faster sales of foreclosed houses, though not as much 
as condominium prices; house prices would also rebound more quickly. 
Under this case average nominal house prices would be around $104 
thousand in 1987 and would change little in 1988--but by 1990 they 
would reach their nominal 1985 levels. Real prices (in 1986 dollars) 
of houses would hit bottom in 1988 and increase about 23 percent by 
1992. So in the short run ( through 1989) auc Honing houses would 
depress prices, but clearing that inventory quickly would make house 
sl than would be under t.he base case 
1992. 
Hold-All Case Prices: This case assumes that lenders simply hold 
onto (or even, at the extreme, demolish) all their stock of 
foreclosed condominiums, selling none between 1988 and 1992, and 
reduce sales of single-family houses through the period. Keeping all 
foreclosed condominiums off the market would have a dramatic effect 
on both nominal and real prices: prices would bottom out sooner, 
fall much less, and recover faster. Nominal prices under t.h:l.s case 
would reach a low of around $78 thousand in 1987, rebound to their 
1985 levels by 1989, and continue to well above their historic highs 
by 1992. Real prices would increase 35 percent between 1987 and 1992. 
The effect of holding more single-family houses off the mat'ket 
would be relatively small; prices would increase slightly faster 
than under the base case in the next few years, but would be about 
the same by 1992. We assume that the Anchorage market could t'eadily 
absorb more than 400 houses from the inventory of foreclosut'es each 
year, because the supply of single-family houses--unlike the supply 
of condominiums--will not exceed the projected demand in the next 
five yeat's. 
St!J:!sidize Case: Subsidizlng mortgage interest rates would 
increase prices of condominiums just slightly ovet' base case levels; 
for instance, in 1989 nominal avet'age prices of Anchorage 
condominiums would be about $85 thousand as compat'ed with $83 
thousand in the base case--ot' about two percent highet'. 
Remove Condominiums and Limit Liability Cases: The results of 
taking some condominiums out of the inventot'y of foreclosures Ot' 
limiting liability of sellers are not shown in Figut'es 4 .1 through 
4.4; those measures would have little effect on pt:'ices as pt:'ojected 
undet' the base case. 
Policy Effects on Inventory of Foreclosures 
The thousands of defaults and foreclosures in Anchorage and 
othet' areas of Alaska in 1986 and 1987 have been the most visible 
signs of distress in the housing market. Figut'es 4. 5 through 4. 8 
show the effects of various policies on the inventory of 
foreclosures in the hands of lenders and insurers over the next five 
years in Anchorage. Projecting future defaults and fot'eclosures is 
particularly difficult and risky--so please keep in mind that what 
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is significant in these figures 




the precise numbers but 
policies would affect 
Base Case Inventories: Under this case--which assumes moderate 
rates of sale of condominiums and houses--the inventory of 
foreclosed condominiums would build until it reaches about 2,400 in 
1989 and then begin to fall, but still stand at around 1,000 by 
1992. The inventory of foreclosed single-family houses would peak at 
just under 2,000 in 1988 and then decline briskly--so that the 
inventory would disappear by the end of 1991. 
Auction Case Inventories: In this case lenders try to reduce 
their inventories quickly by selling condominiums and houses much 
faster than under the base case. But the short-run effect of such 
rapid sales would be to increase rather than to decrease 
inventories--because auctioning off so many units would increase 
defaults, as we noted above. After 1988, however, such large sales 
would bring the inventories down much faster than under the base 
case. So in 1988 the inventory of condominiums would be at around 
2,800 (as compared with 2,200 in the base case) but in 1989 would 
begin dropping sharply so that there would be no inventory of 
foreclosed condominiums by 1992--as compared with an inventory of 
1,000 under the base case. 
The inventory of foreclosed single-family houses would also be 
higher in this case in 1988 (more than 2,000) than under the base 
case, but the difference is not large--and the inventory would 
disappear by 1990, a year sooner than under the base case. Selling 
houses at a faster rate does not have as marked an effect on 
defaults and foreclosures as does selling condominiums 
rapidly--because, as we noted before, we believe the Anchorage 
market can more easily absorb houses than condominiums. 
Hold-All Case Inventories: Keeping all foreclosed condominiums 
and a large share of foreclosed houses off the market would reduce 
defaults in 1988, but the inventory of foreclosures would become 
extremely large if none or few of them were re--sold. By 1992 there 
would be about 3,300 condominiums and almost as many houses still in 
the inventory of foreclosures. 
Limit Liability Case Inventories: This case combines a moderate 
rate of foreclosure sales with limiting mortgage liability of 
sellers with negative equity to the market value of their 
properties. The figures show that this combination would reduce 
inventories of both condominiums and single-family houses far below 
their base case levels: in 1988 the inventory of condominiums would 
be only 60 percent as large as under the base case and by 1992 it 
would be roughly one-third as large. The inventory of houses would 
be only 30 percent as large in 1988 as under the base case, and 
would have almost disappeared by 1989. 
4-19 
,.. 




















Figure 4.5 Inventory of Foreclosed Anchorage Condominiums, 
Under Six Cases, 1987-1992 
(In Thousands) 
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Figur~ 4.6 Inventory of Foreclosed Condominiums, 
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Figure 4.7 Inventory of Foreclose<:! A~c:ll_<>~age Single-Family Houses 
Under Four Cases, 1987-1992 
(In Thousands) 
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Remoye Ca~e. Inventories! Removing 1,200 condominiums from the 
foreclosed inventory would of course reduce that inventory--so that 
by 1992 it would be about one-third the size projected under the 
base case. Taking condominiums out of the foreclosed inventory would 
have no effect on the inventory of foreclosed single-family houses. 
Subsidy Case: By increasing demand, subsidizing interest rates 
for condominiums would have the effect of reducing defaults and 
therefot'e the inventory of foreclosures. I<1 igures 4. 5 and 4. 6 show 
that the inventory of foreclosed condominiums would be substantially 
smaller under the subsidy than the base case; for example, in 1988 
the inventory would be 30 percent smaller under the subsidy than 
under the base case and in 1992 60 percent smaller. 
Policy Effects on Private Sales 
How are sales of foreclosed units under the various policy 
options likely to affect private owners trying to sell their 
condominiums and houses in Anchorage in the next few years? Figures 
4.9 and 4.10 show historical and projected total sales (both private 
sales and foreclosure sales) of condominiums and houses in Anchorage 
under the base, hold-all and auction cases; figure 4. 9 also shows 
projections under the subsidy case. Keep in mind that these 
projected total sales assume that specific numbers of condominiums 
and houses are sold each year--so they do not represent projections 
of likely housing demand, but rather show how prominent a role sales 
of foreclosed units will play in the market in the next several 
years. Sales would of course be highest under the auction case, 
because that case assumes fast sales of foreclosed houses and 
condominiums. 
Figures 4 .11 
condominiums and 
institutional and 
hold-all cases in 
projections. 
and 4 .12 show how the projected total sales of 
single-family houses would be divided between 
private sellers under the base case, auction, and 
1988 and 1992; Figure 4.11 also shows subsidy case 
Bas.e Case Sales: Total condominium sales under this case would 
be between 350 and 700 annually through 1992. Few private owners (at 
best, fewer than 100 in any year) would sell their condominiums 
through 1992: sales by institutional sellers are projected to 
dominate the market throughout the period. For owners of 
single-family houses, the picture would be brighter: of total 
projected annual sales of between 1,700 and more than 2,000 houses, 
private owners would have about half the market through 1990 and 
virtually all by 1992, when the stock of foreclosed houses would be 
exhausted. 
Hold-All Case Sales: If lenders kept most foreclosed 









Figure 4.9 Historical and Projected Total Sales of Anchorage Condominiums, 
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Under Three Cases, 1980-1992 
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Figure 4.11 Projected Private and Institutional Sales; Anchorage Condominiums 
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Figure 4.12 Projected Private and Institutional Sales, Anchorage 










market from 1988 through 1992, leaving the field open for pdvate 
owners, private sales in the late 1980s would be substantially 
higher than if they were competing with institutional sellers--but 
still very low as compared with sales in the first half of the 
1980s. Pdvate owners would sell a projected 500 total units in 
1987 and 1988 and roughly from 100 to 150 per year through 1992. By 
contrast, in the base case, private sellers would sell only a 
handful of condominiums in the whole five-year period. 
Total sales of single--family houses arfJ projected to be lower 
under this case than under the base case--because less than half as 
many foreclosed houses are sold--but private sellers have a bigger 
share of the market: at least 75 percent of sales in each year 
through 1992. 
Auction Case Sales: Total sales under this case would be higher 
than under the base case, because lenders would be put ting more 
units on the market--but private sellers of condominiums would be 
largely squeezed out of the market until 1992, when the inventory of 
foreclosed condominiums would be gone. Likewise, private owners 
would be able to sell few houses until 1990, when they would regain 
about half the market; by 1992 private sellers would have the whole 
market. 
Notice that such very large hypothetical auction sales would put 
more condominiums on the market than were actually sold in Anchorage 
dudng the boom years of the early 1980s; as we noted in the section 
on prices, such large sales of condominiums could only be made at 
much lower prices. 
Subsidy Case: Private sales of condominiums in Anchorage would 
be substantially higher under the subsidy than under the base case; 
between 1987 and 1992, cumulative private sales under the base case 
would be just 180 as compared with about 550 under the subsidy case. 
Figure 4.11 shows that in 1988 roughly 65 condominiums would be sold 
by private owners as compared with virtually none in the base case; 
by 1992 the number of private sales of condominiums would be about 
the same under the two cases. 
Limit Liability and Remove ___ Case Sales: Limiting mortgage 
liability of sellers with negative equity and taking some 
condominiums out of the inventory of foreclosures would have 
relatively little effect on private sales of condominiums or 
single-family houses through 1992. 
Pol!~Y Effects on Construction 
We project that under any of the policy options, there will be 
very little construction of condominiums in Anchorage through 1992. 
This is true because under any of the options we examine, the 
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economy grows faster than we anticipate, demand would be higher. 
Figure 4.13 shows historical numbers of building permits issued and 
projected numbers of permits for single-family houses in the 
Anchorage area under the various cases. 
Base Case Construction: Under this case about 165 permits for 
new single-family houses would be issued in 1987 and about the same 
number in 1988. Numbers of permits would pick up sharply to around 
400 in 1989 and build steadily to about 1,000 in 1992. By 
comparison, in the peak construction year of 1983, mot'e than 3,500 
new houses were built in Anchorage and in 1984 about 2,700. 
Hold-All Case Construction: Under this policy, with fewer 
foreclosed uni ts coming onto the mai:-ket, total construe tion of new 
houses fi:-om 1987 through 1989 would be substantially higher than in 
the base case--with in the neighborhood of 1, 200 new houses bull t 
over that three-year period--about 40 percent more than in the base 
case. But numbers of new uni ts would still be small when compared 
with even 1985 totals, when more than 1,400 houses were built in one 
year. 
Auction Case Construction: This policy would slightly reduce the 
number of new houses bui 1 t from 1988 thi:-ough 1990, because larger 
numbers of foreclosed houses would be on the market in those years. 
But after that, foreclosures sales would be smaller and more houses 
would be built. 
Limit Liability and Remove Case Construction: Taking some 
condominiums out of the stock of foreclosures would bave no effect 
on numbers of. new single-family houses built throughout the period, 
and limiting · mortgage liability of sellers with negative equity 
would have only a slight effect. 
EolJcy Effects on Equity 
Throughout this report we've talked about the problem of 
homeowners with negative equity--homeowners owing more on their 
properties than their market value. Figures 4 .14 and 4 .15 show the 
projected effects of the various policy cases on equity of 
condominium and house owners. We also include figures on historical 
levels of equity. (These are nominal equity f igures--meaning they 
have not been adjusted for the effects of future inflation.) 
Base Case .Equity: In this case, the average equity of 
condominium owners in Anchorage would hit bottom in 198 7 and 1988, 
when the average owner would owe $20 thousand more than his 
condominium was worth. Rising prices would begin increasing equity 
by 1989, but the average equity would not be positive until 1991. 
For owners of single-family houses the outlook is better: average 
equity of homeowners would hit a low in 1987, when homeowners on 
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Figure 4.14 _Historical an~ _P~ojected Average E9.uity of Anchorage' Condominium Owners, 
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average would owe $7,000 more than their properties were worth. But 
in this case equity would begin improving in 1988, and would have 
reached more than $20,000 by 1989 and nearly $40,000 by 1992. 
Auction Case Equity: Auctioning houses and condominiums off 
rapidly has a clear effect on equity of house owners and condominium 
owners alike, although the effect is larger on condominium owners: 
such sales would push equity much further into negative territory in 
the late 1980s. Average equity of condominium owners would drop to 
minus $38,000 in 1988; it would rebound very gradually, but would 
just be around zero by 1992. Homeowners would fare better: average 
equity of single-family houses would drop to around minus $12,000 in 
1987, stay at roughly that level in 1988, and become just barely 
positive in 1989. After that it would rebound briskly, to reach 
around $40,000 by 1992. 
Hold-:-All . .Case Equity: Under this policy condominium owners would 
see their average equity bottom out at minus $18 thousand in 1987 
and be a po::iltive $13 thousand by 1989--climbing upward to around 
$35 to $40 thousand by the early 1990s. This policy would improve 
equity of owners of single-family houses just slightly over what it 
is projected to be in the base case. 
Limit Liability. Case .E:quity: Allowing sellers to take market 
prices for their homes, even if their mortgages were larger, would 
help improve average equity, particularly for condominium ownE\l.'s, 
but the differences under this policy and under the base case are 
not large. 
Subsigy_ Case: Subsidizing interest rates for condominiums would 
improve average equity of condominium owners slightly over base case 
levels; by 1992 average equity under the subsidy case would be 
roughly $13 thousand as compared with $8 thousand under the base 
case. 
Remove Ca~ . .E:qui ty: Taking some condominiums out of the 
for-eclosed inventory in the late 1980s would help improve average 
equity of all condominium owners somewhat but not a great deal over 
projected base case levels. It would have no effect on equity of 
those who own houses. 
Policy Effects on Rental Rates 
We project that none of the policy options we assess here would 
have significantly different effects on rental rates in Anchorage 
over the next few years. What will have a substantial effect--and 
what will likely keep real rents below their 1986 levels throughout 
the period--is the fact that the existing supply of multi-family 
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Figure 4.16 shows a projected real rent index through 1992. This 
is an index that measures real rents in Anchorage--rents adjusted 
for inflation--with 1986 rents as a base. Under any of the policies 
we examined, rents would bottom out at about 83 percent of the 1986 
level in 1989 and then begin a ver:y slow rise--but by 1992 they 
would still be (once adjusted for inflation) just 87 percent of 
their 1986 levels. If the economy grows faster than we project under 
our base case in Chapter II, rents would rise faster. 
Summary of Policy Effects 
Overall what our housing market model tells us is 
straightforward: if lenders sold large numbers of foreclosed 
condominiums very quickly over the next few years, prices would drop 
substantially, defaults would remain high, foreclosures would 
continue to beset the market, equity of the average condominium 
owner would be pushed further into negative territory, and prices 
would be slow to recover. 
The same general f lnd i ngs also apply to rapid sales of 
foreclosed houses, but house prices and equity would not be 
depressed nearly so much as would condominium prices and 
equity--because the demand for houses in Anchorage is greater. And 
house prices would recover and exceed their historic highs much more 
quickly than would condominium prices. 
How much difference might different policies for re-sale of 
foreclosed properties make in average prices over the next several 
years? Our model projects the extreme cases for 
condominiums--selling none and selling all quickly. We project that 
1988 average prices for a standard condominium, for instance, could 
go as low as $58 thousand or as high as $87 thousand--a difference 
of 50 percent. Condominium prices in ]988 under a more moderate rate 
of sale (our base case) could be 20 percent higher than under the 
case where condominiums are auctioned rapidly. Again, the dollar 
values we refer to are less important than relative price levels. 
The potential range of house prices under the various cases is 
much smaller; for example, 1988 prices under the case where houses 
are sold most quickly could be about 15 percent below prices in the 
case where houses are sold much more slowly. St.l l l, 15 percent is a 
significant difference. 
But what about the longer-term effects of getting rid of the 
inventory of foreclosures quickly? Might prices in the 1990s 
rebound faster if the inventory of foreclosures were cleared faster? 
Our model runs indicate that very fast sales of foreclosed 
condominiums would depress prices well into the 1990s; real 
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prices---prices adjusted for inflation--in 1992 would still be about 
5 percent below projected base casP- prices. At the other extreme, 
keeping all foreclosed condominiums off the market would boost real 
prices by 35 percent between 1987 and 1992. 
For single-family houses the story is different. Rapid clearing 
of foreclosed properties would depress prices in the late 1980s, but 
by 1992 prices would be as high or higher than they would have been 
if the houses had been sold more slowly. House prices would recover 
faster bE:~cause the demand for single-family houses over the next 
several years will exceed the existing stock--unlike the case with 
condominiums. 
Quick sales of large numbers of condominiums would also 
substantially increase defaults in the short run--increasing rather 
than decreasing the inventory of foreclosures. As we showed in 
Figure 4.6, auctioning thousands of condominiums could actually make 
the inventory of foreclosed condominiums bigger by the end of 1988 
than it would be under any of the other options we examined. But by 
1992 the inventory would have been eliminated by quick sales--while 
under the more moderate rate of sale assumed in the base case there 
might still be 1,000 foreclosed condominiums in 1992. 
Subsidizing mortgage interest rates for condominiums would 
sharply reduce defaults, as would limiting mortgage liability of 
homeowners who are forced to sell and find that their houses are 
worth less than what they owe on them. As Figure 4. 6 shows, the 
projected inventory of foreclosed condominiums would be much smaller 
in 1988 and 1992 under either the limit liability or the subsidy 
cases than under the base case. 
Many homeowners in Anchorage today do owe more on their 
properties than they can be sold for. Our model projections show 
that quick sales of condominiums and houses--but particularly of 
condominiums--would push prices and therefore average equity of 
homeowners even lower. Under all the cases we examined, average 
equity of condominium owners in Anchorage would be negative in 
1988--but the negative numbers could be nearly twice as large (minus 
$38 thousand as compared with minus $20 thousand) if lenders 
auctioned off condominiums rapidly. And prices and equity would be 
very slow to recover after large-scale auctions: equity would barely 
move out of negative territory by 1992. Average equity for those who 
own houses would not go nearly as low and would improve much faster 
after 1990---under all the options we examined, average equity among 
house owners could be as much as $40 thousand by 1992. 
How will private property owners fare in the market place 
against the big institutional owners of foreclosed properties over 
the next few years? Under all policy options we examined except the 
case where all foreclosed condominiums are kept off the market, 
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private owners trying to sell condominiums in Anchorage through 1992 
will find few opportunities: they will be hard-pressed to compete 
against the prices and the incentives the big lenders will be able 
to offer in a market with limited demand and an ample supply. 
Private owners of single-family houses will fare better; under 
slow or moderate sales of foreclosed houses, private sellers would 
be able to capture half or more of the sales market in the late 
1980s and more in the early 1990s. 
We expect little construction of multi-family housing in 
Anchorage over the next five years---under any policy option--because 
we think the existing stock will meet the likely demand. Some new 
single--family houses will be built over the next few years, but not 
nearly as many as were built during the early 1980s. For example, 
the base case projects that in the neighborhood of 2,700 new 
single-family houses might be built in Anchorage between now and 
1992--about the same number as were built in Anchorage in 1984 alone. 
Another effect of the ample supply of multi-family housing will 
be to keep down rents in Anchorage over the next several years. Our 
real rent index--an index adjusted for inflation and keyed to 1986 
rents--projects that real rents by 1992 will be about 10 percent 
below 1986 levels. Faster economic growth than we expect would push 
rents up faster. 
policy Considerations 
We• ve seen that the thorniest problem for lenders and insurers 
is their inventory of foreclosed condominiums. The market for 
single-family houses has not been depressed as much, and we expect 
it to recover much faster. We know that Alaska lenders are not going 
to keep the condominiums they own off the market for years. We know 
that it costs lenders and insurers in the neighborhood of $20 a day 
in holding costs for each unit they own. We know it is not 
reasonable to propose a policy that leaves AHFC and other lenders 
sitting on hundreds of vacant properties so that other property 
owners can enjoy higher prices. We know that in Anchorage today some 
lenders want to get rid of foreclosed properties even if they have 
to take very substantial losses on re-sales. Lenders and insurers 
are offering prizes, reduced down payments, lower interest rates, 
and more to lure buyers. 
Our policy case that looks at the effects of keeping all the 
foreclosed condominiums off the market is intended not as a policy 
proposal but as an illustration of the powerful effects foreclosure 
sales will have on the Anchorage market in the next few years. The 
case at the other extreme--in which we assume lenders auction off 
their thousands of properties at the cost of much lower prices--also 
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illustrates that power. That case not only shows that lenders have 
the power to push pr.ices further down but that they could in the 
process bring even more foreclosures into their inventories. 
In reality of course lenders don• t just pick some f lxed number 
of units to sell, without regard to market conditions. Demand 
ultimately determines how many properties lenders can sell, 
particularly if they attempt to maintain some price floor. The 
economic forecasts in Chapter II say that after mid-1988 the 
recession will likely end and an economic recovery begin. Figures 
4.17 through 4.19 show how reducing the number of condominiums sold 
in the short run--from now through 1988--would change prices, 
equity, and inventories of foreclosed condominiums from base case 
levels. After 1988 numbers of units sold would be the same as under 
the base case. What these figures show is that this short-run 
change in selling policies ( labeled the "sell fewer" case in the 
figures) would prop up pr.ices and equity for the balance of the 
recession and that in the longer run inventories of foreclosed units 
would be at roughly the same level--because selling fewer units 
through 1988 would reduce defaults. 
Lenders in a down market face many costs. Figures 4.20 through 
4.22 compare some of those kinds of costs. The relationship between 
numbers of foreclosed condominiums sold and real average prices of 
standard condominiums in 1988 and 1989 is shown in Figures 4.20 and 
4.21. With price and sales figures from the six policy cases 
analyzed earlier, we plotted the relationship between the two. As 
the figures show, high sales are linked with lower prices, low sales 
with higher prices, and moderate sales with prices between the 
extremes. At the extremes, prices vary by more than 50 percent and 
numbers of units sold by more than 2,000. 
Figure 4. 22 weighs estimated costs of holding a single 
foreclosed condominium against projected average price increases 
under the base and the auction cases. We assume that the 
hypothetical condominium in this figure was taken under foreclosure 
at the start of 1987, so that holding costs accrued all year. The 
bottom line on each half of the figure represents holding costs, 
estimated at $7 thousand per year for each year the lender holds the 
unit. The top line is the average price for a standard condominium, 
with 1986 prices as a benchmark--so for example in 1987, the average 
condominium price under the base case was about $20 thousand below 
1986 prices. The third line is the sum of the first two, and where 
the holding cost line and the third line cross is the point at which 
prices have risen enough to offset holding costs. 
The figure shows a gr.im picture for the lenders. Under either 
case, 1987 prices are tens of thousands of dollars below 1986 
pr.ices--so lenders begin with a substantial loss. on top of that 
loss are holding costs estimated at $7 thousand per year for this 
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the base case prices exceed 1986 levels by 1991 and under the 
auction case prices just regain their 1986 level by 1992. Holding 
costs increase $7 thousand every year the condominium goes unsold. 
Prices rise enough to offset holding costs by 1991 under the base 
case and by 1992 under the auction case. 
In either case lenders face significant losses--but those losses 
are even larger under the auction case, because prices at'e more 
dept'essed. For example, a lender could see losses (as measut'ed by 
combined declines and holding costs) in t.he of 
$50 thousand on this hypothetical condominium in 1988 under the 
auction case, as compared with losses of about $28 thousand under 
the base case. The figure tells us that lenders are in a tough spot 
in any case, but that their losses can be made even worse if they 
auction large numbers of condominiums. 
Another policy option that we assessed with the model was simply 
demolishing a portion of the inventory of fot'eclosed condominiums. 
We assessed the effects of taking 1,200 condominiums out of the 
inventory over a three-year period, and found that removing that 
many units from the stock would of course reduce the inventory 
faster and would modestly improve prices and other measures of 
market stability. At the extreme, the effects of demolishing all 
foreclosed condominiums would be the same as we projected in the 
case where all condominiums are kept off the market through 1992. 
Demolishing condominiums would be vet'y costly in a number of 
ways, and we are not advocating it. But all options in a depressed 
housing market are costly, including costs of holding onto 
condominiums that may be very difficult to sell at any prlce--and 
which, if sold at very low prices, could create a vicious circle of 
more foreclosures by putting more owners at t'isk of default. We are 
advocating that lenders cat'efully consider the overall costs and 
benefits of any policy they undertake. 
Another measure we looked at fol'.' reducing defaults and 
increasing demand was limiting mortgage liability of homeowners who 
are forced to sell at prices below their outstanding mortgages, or 
who would like to take advantage of lower prices to move into better 
houses but are constt'ained by negative equity on their current 
houses. We found that limiting mortgage liabill ty for those with 
negative equity would sharply reduce the future number of defaults. 
However, our limit liability case represents the extreme: it reports 
how defaults could be reduced if lenders• limited mortgage liability 
of all would-be sellers with negative equity to the market values of 
tlu-d r propP.rti E-':S. Tn n1a l i ty, 1(-mdP.rs would not offer such blanket 
limits on liability--they would establish critieria for determining 
when and how to limit mortgage liability. In the General Policy 
QE_tions section we discussed some of the possible ways lenders could 
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Figure 4.20 Relationship Between Real Prices and 
Sales of Foreclosed "condominiums, 1988 
(In Thousands of 1986 Dollars and Thousands of Units) 
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Figure 4.21 Relationship Between Real Prices and 
Sales of Foreclosed Condominiums, 1989 
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Our policy analyses also showed that subsidizing mortgage 
interest rates on condominiums could help that market in several 
ways: it would help improve prices and average equity, it would help 
private owners sell more condominiums (although sales by 
institutional owners would still dominate the market), and it would 
help reduce defaults. Subsidizing interest rates would of course be 
an additional cost to lenders; lenders would need to weigh the 
benefits of such subsidies against the costs. 
Faster or Slower Economic Growth 
All our policy analyses assume the moderate rate of economic 
growth projected in the base case of Chapter II. The economy may 
grow more or less than we expect in the next few years. Such faster 
or slower economic growth would of course also affect the housing 
market. Figures 4.23 though 4.26 show how some aspects of the 
Anchorage house market would be affected if the economy grew at the 
rates projected under the high and the low cases in Chapter II. 
Real prices--prices in 1986 dollars--for Anchorage condominiums 
and single-family houses under the low, base, and high cases through 
1992 are shown in Figures 4. 23 and 4. 24. (These cases assume the 
same rate of sales of foreclosed houses and condominiums as in the 
base case; only rates of economic activity are different.) Real 
average condominium prices could vary by as much as 25 percent 
between the high and the low cases in 1989 and remain nearly 20 
percent apart by 1992. 
Real average prices for single family houses would also vary 
under the three cases, but not so dramatically as would condominium 
prices. For instance, the difference between prices in the high and 
low case would be greatest in 1991, but the difference would be less 
than 10 percent. The very slow economic growth projected under the 
low case would be harder on condominium owners than on house owners. 
Figure 4. 25 shows another measure of housing market activity 
under the three case: projected numbers of building permits for new 
single-family houses. The figure compares the cumulative projected 
number of building permits from 1987 through 1992 under the high, 
medium, and low cases. Projected permits under the high case would 
be in the neighborhood of 3,400, under the base case roughly 2,800 
and under the low case just over 2,000. Looked at another way, the 
number of building permits for new houses in Anchorage could be 
about 70 percent larger under the high case than under the low. 
Still another measure of housing market activity is sales; 
Figure 9.26 shows cumulative projected private and foreclosure sales 
from 198\'7 through 1992 under the high, medium, and low cases. The 
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Low 
on their mortgages; the high case projects fewer foreclosure sales 
because under better economic conditions fewer homeowners would 
default. In all the cases foreclosure sales are projected to make up 
a signif leant share of total sales, but under the poorer economic 
conditions in the low case they would make up more than half of 
total houses sales from 1987 through 1992. Better economic 
conditions would improve the sales market for private 
sellers--private owners would be able to sell about 30 percent more 
houses under the high than under the low case. 
Other indications of how the housing market would respond if the 
economy grows faster than we expect can be found in earlier ISER 
reports that assessed the effects of AHFC programs during the 
housing market boom of the early 1980s. (The Effects of Change~ i9 
the Alaska Housing Finan~e . Corporation Mortgage Programs, Interim 
and Final Reports, 1986.) 
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APPENDIX A 
ECONOMIC PROJECTION MODEL ASSUMPTIONS 
1987 AHFC STUDY 
SUMMARY OF MAP MODEL ASSUMPTIONS: BASE [AHFC.B] 
A. PETROLEUM REVENUE ASSUMPTIONS: $19 WORLD PRICE 
B. FISCAL ASSUMPTIONS: NEW REVENUES MEASURES IMPOSED 
IN EARLY 1990S (A6.2EX1) 
C. INDUSTRY ASSUMPTIONS: MODERATE GROWTH (S87.Nl) 
D. NATIONAL VARIABLE ASSUMPTIONS: MODERATE GROWTH 
A. PETROLEUM REVENUE ASSUMPTIONS 
1. Average Expected 
OPEC Price 
2. Petroleum Production--
North Slope & Cook Inlet 
3. Severance Taxes 
4. Royalties 
5. Bonuses 
$19 nominal world oil price in late 
1980s. The real price rises slightly 
faster than inflation in 1990s. 
Total production gradually declines 
with the depletion of the giant 
Prudhoe Bay field from 674 million 
barrels/year in 1987 to 452 in 1995 
and 187 in 2003. Producing fields 
include Prudhoe Bay, Kuparuk, West 
Sak, Lisburne, Endicott, Milne Point, 
Cook Inlet, and other small onshore 
and offshore fields (DORD6.7X). 
Based on assumed price and production 
applied to current tax structure. 
After 2003, revenues remain constant 
in nominal dollars (DORD6.7X). Alyeska 
pipeline tariff dispute settlement 
revenues included [RPTS]. 
Based on assumed price and production 
applied to current royalty structure. 
After 2003, revenues remain constant 
in nominal dollars. These revenues are 
distributed between the General Fund 
and Permanent Fund (DORD6.7X) [RPRY]. 
Alaska receives $500 million over the 
period FY 1989 to 1992 in settlement 
of disputed offshore leases in the 
Beaufort Sea. Also treated as bonuses 
are $500 million received between 1991 
and 1995 in settlement of lawsuits and 
tax disputes regarding the valuation 
of North Slope oil. These revenues are 
distributed between the General Fund 
and Permanent Fund [RPBS]. 
(a) Codes in parentheses indicate ISER names for MAP Model SCEN 
case files, and codes in brackets indicate MAP variable names. 
A-1 
6. Property Taxes 
7. Petroleum Corporate 
Income Tax 
8. Rents 
9. Miscellaneous Petroleum 
Revenues 
10. Federal-State Petroleum-
Related Shared Revenues 
11. Windfalls 
B. FISCAL ASSUMPTIONS 
B.1. State Appropriations 
1. Aggregate Appropriations 
2. Capital/Operations Split 
3. General Obligation Bonds 
4. Federal Grants-in-Aid 
for Capital Expenditures 
Based on projections published by 
Alaska Department of Revenue, Revenue 
Sources (D0RD6. 7X) augmented by taxes 
on onshore facilities related to OCS 
development (OCS.6NGT -12) [RPPS]. 
Based on projections published by 
Alaska Department of Revenue, Revenue 
Sources (DORD6. 7X). No change in tax 
regulations [RTCSPX]. 
Increasing slowly from current level 
of $8 million [RPEN]. 
Zero [RP9X]. 
Increasing $1 million annually from 
current level of $25 million [RSFDNPX]. 
During FY 1986 the Permanent Fund 
experienced a capital gain of approxi-
mately $323 million. During FY 1987, 
$250 million accrues to Alaska from a 
litigation settlement with ARCO, 
$450 million in settlement of the 
Alyeska pipeline tariff dispute, and 
$50 million from past federal revenue 
sharing. 
If funds available, ceiling estab-
lished by Constitutional Spending 
Limit; otherwise appropriations equal 
revenues plus 50 percent [EXWIND] of 
general fund balance available for 
appropriations. 
Two-thirds operations if Spending 
Limit in effect; 85 percent operations 
otherwise [EXSPLITX]. 
Bonding occurs up to point where debt 
service is 5 percent of state revenues. 
Constant at $75 million [RSFDNCAX]. 
A-2 
5. State Loan Programs 
6. Municipal Capital Grants 
7. State-Local Revenue 
Sharing 
8. State-Local Municipal 
Assistance 
9. Permanent Fund/Other 
Appropriations in Excess 
of Spending Limit 
B.2. Permanent Fund 
10. Permanent Fund Principal 
11. Permanent Fund Earnings 
12. Permanent Fund Dividend 
B.3. Revenues 
13. Personal Income Tax 
14. Miscellaneous Local 
Revenue Sources 
15. New Federal-State 
Shared Revenues 
New capitalization terminated after 
FY 1987 [EXKTRlX]. Programs continue 
functioning on existing capitalization 
including AHFC [EXLOAN2] and APA 










Continuation proportional to total 
state expenditures [RLTMA]. 
None for operations [EXGFOPSX]; none 
for capital [EXSPCAP]. 
Continuous accumulation from petroleum 
revenues [EXPFl]; inflation-proofing 
eliminated when complete withdrawal of 
earnings commences. 
A quarter of the earnings after 
payment of the dividend are allocated 
to the General Fund beginning in 1988, 
rising to 50 percent of earnings in 
1998, 75 percent in 2002, and all 
earnings in 2005 [EXPFTOGF]. 
Eliminated after FY 1994 distribution 
which occurs in the fall of that year 
[EXPFDIST]. 
Reimposed FY 1991; collections begin 
January of that year [EXPIT]. 
Miscellaneous state-local transfers 
[RLTX], large project property taxes 
[RLPTX], petroleum-related federal 
transfers [RLTFPX] all set to zero. 
Zero [ RSFDNX] . 
A-··3 
16. Large Project Cocyorate 
Income Taxes 
B.4. Miscellaneous 
17. State-Local Wage Rates 
C. INDUSTRY ASSUMPTIONS 
1. Trans-Alaska Pipeline 
2. North Slope--ANWR 
Petroleum Development 
and Production 
3. Upper Cook Inlet 
Petroleum Production 
4. ocs Development 
5. Oil Industry Headquarters 
6. Healy Coal Mining 
7. Beluga Chuitna Coal 
Production 
8. U.S. Borax 




average real wage 
from 1988 through 
rate 
1995 
Operating employment remains constant 
at 885 through 2010 (TAP.S86X). 
Petroleum industry employment on the 
North Slope rises from 3.5 thousand in 
1988 to 4 thousand in 1998. Employment 
engaged in new construction is 
constant at 1 thousand (NSO.S87A). 
Employment in exploration and devel-
opment of oil and gas in the Upper 
Cook Inlet area declines gradually 
beginning in 1983 by approximately 
2.5 percent per year (UPC.S86). 
Employment in exploration and develop-
ment activity associated with Bering 
Sea and Arctic areas peaks at about 
7,000 in 2005. Direct employment con-
tinues through the following decade at 
a level of about 3,000 (OCS.6NGT -12). 
Oil company headquarters employment in 
Anchorage remains at about 3,900 
through 2010 (OHQ.S86). 
Export of approximately 1 million tons 
of coal annually adds 25 new workers 
to current base of 100 by 1986 
(HCL. 84X). 
Development of a 4. 4 million ton/year 
mine for export beginning in 1989 
provides employment of 524 (BCL.04T -4). 
The U.S. Borax mine near Ketchikan is 
brought into production with operating 
employment of 685 beginning in 1993 and 
eventually increasing to 1,020 
(BXM.F84-4). 
A-4 
9. Greens Creek Mine 
10. Red Dog Mine 
11. Other Mining Activity 
12. Agriculture 
13. Logging and Sawmills 
14. Pulp Mills 
15. Commercial Fish 
Harvesting--Nonbottomfish 




18. Federal Military 
Employment 
Production from the Greens Creek Mine 
on Admiralty Island results in 
employment of 150 people from 1988 
through 2003 (GCM.F84). 
The Red Dog Mine in the Western Brooks 
Range begins operation in 1991 with 
production employment of 393 rising to 
428 (RED. F84-1). 
employment 
special projects 
current level at 
(OMN. S86). 
not included i.n 
increases from 
1 percent annually 
Reduction in state support results in 
constant employment in agriculture 
(AGR. S86). 
Logging for export by Native 
corporations expands employment to 
3,100 by 1992 before declining at 1% 
annually due to productivity gains 
(FLL.S87). 
Productivity gains result in employ-
ment declines at a rate of 1 percent 
per year after 1991 from the present 
level of 600 (FPU.S86). 
Employment levels in traditional 
fisheries harvest remain constant at 








The total U.S. bottomfish catch expands 
at a constant rate to allowable catch 
in 2000, with Alaska resident 
harvesting employment rising to 
1.033 thousand. Onshore processing 
capacity expands in the Aleutians and 
Kodiak census divisions to provide 
total resident employment of 
1. 4 71 thousand by 2000 (BCF'. S86) . 
Employment declines at 1 percent per 
year, consistent with the long-term 
trend since 1960 (GFM.S86). 
A-5 
19. Light Army Division 
Deployment 
20. Federal Civilian 
Employment 
21. Tourism 
22. State Hydroelectric 
Projects 
D. NATIONAL VARIABLE ASSUMPTIONS 
1. U.S. Inflation Rate 
2. Real Average Weekly 
Earnings 
3. Real Per Capita Income 
4. Unemployment Rate 
E. REGIONAL ASSUMPTIONS 
1. Population 
2. Employment 
A portion of a new Army division is 
deployed to Fairbanks and Anchorage 
beginning in 1986, augmenting active-
duty personnel by 3,800 by 1989 
(GFM. S87) 
After remaining constant from 1987 
through 1990, employment rises at 0.5 
percent annual rate consistent with 
the long-term trend since 1960 
(GF'C. S87). 
Number of visitors to Alaska increases 
by 30,000 per year to over 1.3 million 
by 2010 (TRS.J85). 
Construction employment from Alaska 
Power Authority projects includes 
several projects in Southcentral and 
Southeast Alaska, including Bradley 
Lake (SHP.F85) and (SHP.B86). 
Consumer prices rise at an annual rate 
of 3% in 1987, 4.6% from 1988 to 1992, 
and gradually increase to 5.4% in 
1997. This assumption is consistent 
with petroleum price and revenue. 
Growth in real average weekly earnings 
averages 1 percent annually. 
Growth in real per capita income 
averages 1.5 percent annually. 
Long-run rate of 6.5 percent. 
Regional population growth allocated 
on the basis of employment growth. 
No significant shifts in the location 
of support industries. 
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A. 
SUMMARY OF MAP MODEL ASSUMPTIONS: HIGH [AHFC.H] 
A. PETROLEUM REVENUE ASSUMPTIONS: $26 WORLD PRICE 
B. FISCAL ASSUMPTIONS: NEW REVENUES MEASURES IMPOSED 
IN EARLY 1990S (A6.2EX2) 
C. INDUSTRY ASSUMPTIONS: MODERATE GROWTH (S87.N2) 
D. NATIONAL VARIABLE ASSUMPTIONS: MODERATE GROWTH 
* 1. Average Expected 
OPEC Price 
$26 nominal world oil price in late 
1980s. The real price continues to 
rise faster than inflation in 1990s. 
The nominal price approaches 
$SO/barrel by 2000. 
2. Petroleum Production--
North Slope & Cook Inlet 
* 3. Severance Taxes 
* 4. Royalties 
5. Bonuses 
Total production gradually declines 
with the depletion of the giant 
Prudhoe Bay field from 674 million 
barrels/year in 1987 to 452 in 1995 
and 187 in 2003. Producing fields 
include Prudhoe Bay, Kuparuk, West 
Sak, Lisburne, Endicott, Milne Point, 
Cook Inlet, and other small onshore 
and offshore fields (DORD6.9X). 
Based on assumed price and production 
applied to current tax structure. 
After 2003, revenues remain constant 
in nominal dollars (DORD6.9X). Alyeska 
pipeline tariff dispute settlement 
revenues included [RPTS]. 
Based on assumed price and production 
applied to current royalty structure. 
After 2003, revenues remain constant 
in nominal dollars. These revenues are 
distributed between the General Fund 
and Permanent Fund (DORD6.9X) [RPRY]. 
Alaska receives $500 million over the 
period FY 1989 to 1992 in settlement 
of disputed offshore leases in the 
Beaufort Sea. Also treated as bonuses 
are $500 million received between 1991 
and 1995 in settlement of lawsuits and 
tax disputes regarding the valuation 
of North Slope oil. These revenues are 
distributed between the General Fund 
and Permanent Fund [RPBS]. 
*Indicates an element different from the base case. 
A-7 
* 6. Property Taxes 
7. Petroleum Corporate 
Income Tax 
8. Rents 
9. Miscellaneous Petroleum 
Revenues 
10. Federal-State Petroleum-
Related Shared Revenues 
11. Windfalls 
B. FISCAL ASSUMPTIONS 
B.l. State Appropriations 
1. Aggregate Appropriations 
* 2. Capital/Operations Split 
3. General Obligation Bonds 
4. Federal Grants-in-Aid 
for Capital Expenditures 
Based on projections published by 
Alaska Department of Revenue, Revenue 
Sources (DORD6. 9X) augmented by taxes 
on onshore facilities related to OCS 
development (OCS.6NGT -5) [RPPS]. 
Based on projections published by 
Alaska Department of Revenue, Revenue 
Sources (DORD6. 7X) . No change in tax 
regulations [RTCSPX]. 
Increasing slowly from current level 
of $8 million [RPEN]. 
Zero [RP9X]. 
Increasing $1 million annually from 
current level of $25 million [RSFDNPX]. 
During FY 1986 the Permanent Fund 
experienced a capital gain of approxi-
mately $323 million. During FY 1987, 
$250 million accrues to Alaska from a 
litigation settlement with ARCO, 
$450 million in settlement of the 
Alyeska pipeline tariff dispute, and 
$50 million from past federal revenue 
sharing. 
If funds available, ceiling estab-
lished by Constitutional Spending 
Limit; otherwise appropriations equal 
revenues plus 50 percent [EXWIND] of 
general fund balance available for 
appropriations. 
Two-thirds operations during 1990s 
when revenues are large; 85 percent 
operations otherwise [EXSPLITX]. 
Bonding occurs up to point where debt 
service is 5 percent of state revenues. 
Constant at $75 million [RSFDNCAX]. 
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5. State Loan Programs 
6. Municipal Capital Grants 
7. State-Local Revenue 
Sharing 
8. State-Local Municipal 
Assistance 
9. Permanent Fund/Other 
Appropriations in Excess 
of Spending Limit 
B.2. Permanent Fund 
10. Permanent Fund Principal 
* 11. Permanent Fund Earnings 
* 12. Permanent Fund Dividend 
B.3. Revenues 
* 13. Personal Income Tax 
14. Miscellaneous Local 
Revenue Sources 
15. New Federal-State 
Shared Revenues 
16. Large Project Corporate 
Income Taxes 
New capitalization terminated after 
FY 1987 [EXKTRlX]. Programs continue 
functioning on existing capitalization 
including AHFC [EXLOAN2] and APA 










Continuation proportional to total 
state expenditures [RLTMA]. 
None for operations [EXGFOPSX]; none 
for capital [EXSPCAP]. 
Continuous accumulation from petroleum 
revenues [EXPFl]; inflation-proofing 
eliminated when complete withdrawal of 
earnings commences. 
Half the earnings after payment of the 
dividend are allocated to the General 
Fund beginning in 2001, rising to 
100 percent of earnings in 2007 
[ EXPFTOGF] . 
Continued through 2010 [EXPFDIST]. 
Reimposed FY 2004; collections begin 
January of that year [EXPIT]. 
Miscellaneous state--local transfers 
[RLTX], large project property taxes 
[RLPTX], petroleum-related federal 





* 17. state-Local Wage Rates 
C. INDUSTRY ASSUMPTIONS 
1. Trans-Alaska Pipeline 
* 2. North Slope--ANWR 
Petroleum Development 
and Production 
3. Upper Cook Inlet 
Petroleum Production 
* 4. ocs Development 
5. Oil Industry Headquarters 
Sa. TAGS Pipeline 
No constraints on average real wage 
rates [EXWR]. 
Operating employment remains constant 
at 885 through 2010 (TAP.S86X). 
Petroleum industry employment on the 
North Slope rises from 3.5 thousand in 
1988 to 5 thousand in 2001. Employment 
engaged in new construction is 
constant at 1.5 thousand (NSO.S87H). 
Employment in exploration and devel-
opment of oil and gas in the Upper 
Cook Inlet area declines gradually 
beginning in 1983 by approximately 
2.5 percent per year (UPC.S86). 
Employment in exploration and develop-
ment activity associated with Bering 
Sea and Arctic areas peaks at about 
7,000 in 1998. Direct employment con-
tinues through the following decade at 
a level of about 3,000 (OCS.6NGT -5). 
Oil company headquarters employment in 
Anchorage remains at about 3,900 




to transport North Slope 
to market in Japan is 
between 2000 and 2008. 
The line extends from Prudhoe Bay to 
Kenai and includes compression 
stations, conditioning facilities, and 
a liquefaction plant. Construction 
employment is 890 in the initial year, 
rises to a peak of 4,782 in 2003, and 
falls to 3,692 in 2008. Operations 
employment rises from 236 in 2005 to 
435 in 2010. Construction and opera-
tions employment occurs all along the 
pipeline corridor. On the Kenai 
Peninsula, employment begins at 73 in 
2000, rises to 2,673 in 2003, and is 
200 in the operations phase (TAG.HIC). 
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6. Healy Coal Mining 
7. Beluga Chuitna Coal 
Production 
8. U.S. Borax 
9. Greens Creek Mine 
10. Red Dog Mine 
11. Other Mining Activity 
12. Agriculture 
13. Logging and Sawmills 
14. Pulp Mills 
15. Commercial Fish 
Harvesting--Nonbottomfish 
16. Commercial Fish 
Processing--Nonbottomfish 
Export of approximately 1 million tons 
of coal annually adds 25 new workers 
to current base of 100 by 1986 
(HCL.84X). 
Development of a 4. 4 million ton/year 
mine for export beginning in 1989 
provides employment of 524 (BCL.04T -4). 
The U.S. Borax mine near Ketchikan is 
brought into with 
employment of 685 beginning in 1993 and 
eventually increasing to 1,020 
(BXM.F84-4). 
Production from the Greens Creek Mine 
on Admiralty Island results in 
employment of 150 people from 1988 
through 2003 (GCM.F84). 
The Red Dog Mine ln the Western Brooks 
Range begins operation in 1991 with 




current level at 
(OMN.S86). 
not lncluded in 
increases from 
1 percent annually 
Reduction in state support results in 
constant employment in agriculture 
(AGR.S86). 
Logging for export by Native 
corporations expands employment to 
3,100 by 1992 before declining at 1% 
annually due to productivity gains 
(FLL.S87). 
Productivity gains result in employ-
ment declines at a rate of 1 percent 
per year after 1991 from the present 
level of 600 (FPU.S86). 
Employment levels in traditional 
fisheries harvest remain constant at 













19. Light Army Division 
Deployment 
20. Federal Civilian 
Employment 
21. Tourism 
22. State Hydroelectric 
Projects 
D. NATIONAL VARIABLE ASSUMPTIONS 
1. U.S. Inflation Rate 
2. Real Average Weekly 
Earnings 
The total U.S. bottomfish catch expands 
at a constant rate to allowable catch 
in 2000, with Alaska resident 
harvesting employment rising to 
1.033 thousand. Onshore processing 
capacity expands in the Aleutians and 
Kodiak census divisions to provide 
total resident employment of 
1.471 thousand by 2000 (BCF.S86). 
Employment declines at 1 
year, consistent with the 
trend since 1960 (GFM.S86). 
per 
long-term 
A portion of a new Army division is 
deployed to Fairbanks and Anchorage 
beginning in 1986, augmenting active-
duty personnel by 3,800 by 1989 
(GFM. S87) 
After remaining constant from 1987 
through 1990, employment dses at O. 5 
percent annual rate consistent with 
the long-term trend since 1960 
(GFC. S87). 
Number of visitors to Alaska increases 
by 30,000 per year to over 1.3 million 
by 2010 (TRS.J85). 
Construction employment from Alaska 
Power Authority projects includes 
several projects in Southcentral and 
Southeast Alaska, including Bradley 
Lake (SHP.F85) and (SHP.B86). 
Consumer prices rise at an annual rate 
of 3% in 1987, 4.6% from 1988 to 1992, 
and gradually increase to 5.4% in 
1997. This assumption is consistent 
with petroleum price and revenue. 
Growth in real average weekly earnings 
averages 1 percent annually. 
A-12 
3. Real Per Capita Income 
4. Unemployment Rate 
E. REGIONAL ASSUMPTIONS 
1. Population 
2. Employment 
Growth in real per capita income 
averages 1.5 percent annually. 
Long-run rate of 6.5 percent. 
Regional population growth allocated 
on the basis of 
No significant shifts in the location 
of support industries. 
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SUMMARY OF MAP MODEL ASSUMPTIONS: LOW [AHFC.L] 
A. PETROLEUM REVENUE ASSUMPTIONS: $15 WORLD PRICE 
B. FISCAL ASSUMPTIONS: NEW REVENUES MEASURES IMPOSED 
IN LATE 1980S (A6.2EX3) 
C. INDUSTRY ASSUMPTIONS: MODERATE GROWTH (S87.N3) 
D. NATIONAL VARIABLE ASSUMPTIONS: MODERATE GROWTH 
A. PETROLEUM REVENUE ASSUMPTIONS 
* 1. Average Expected 
OPEC Price 
2. Petroleum Production--
North Slope & Cook Inlet 
* 3. Severance Taxes 
* 4. Royalties 
5. Bonuses 
$15 nominal world oil price in late 
1980s. The real price remains constant 
in 1990s. 
Total production gradually declines 
with the depletion of the giant 
Prudhoe Bay field. Producing fields 
include Prudhoe Bay, Kuparuk, West 
Sak, Lisburne, Endicott, Milne Point, 
Cook Inlet, and other small onshore 
and offshore fields (DORD6.3X). 
Based on assumed price and production 
applied to current tax structure. 
After 2003, revenues remain constant 
in nominal dollars (DORD6. 3X). Alyeska 
pipeline tariff dispute settlement 
revenues included [RPTS]. 
Based on assumed price and production 
applied to current royalty structure. 
After 2003, revenues remain constant 
in nominal dollars. These revenues are 
distributed between the General Fund 
and Permanent Fund (DORD6.3X) [RPRY]. 
Alaska receives $500 million over the 
period FY 1989 to 1992 in settlement 
of disputed offshore leases in the 
Beaufort Sea. Also treated as bonuses 
are $500 million received between 1991 
and 1995 in settlement of lawsuits and 
tax disputes regarding the valuation 
of North Slope oil. These revenues are 
distributed between the General Fund 
and Permanent Fund [RPBS]. 
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* 6. Property Taxes 
7. Petroleum Corporate 
Income Tax 
8. Rents 
9. Miscellaneous Petroleum 
Revenues 
10. Federal-State Petroleum-
Related Shared Revenues 
11. Windfalls 
B. FISCAL ASSUMPTIONS 
B.1. state Appropriations 
1. Aggregate Appropriations 
2. Capital/Operations Split 
3. General Obligation Bonds 
4. Federal Grants-in-Aid 
for capital Expenditures 
Based on projections published by 
Alaska Department of Revenue, Revenue 
Sources (DORD6. 3X) augmented by taxes 
on onshore facilities related to OCS 
development (OCS.CM3Z -3) [RPPS]. 
Based on projections published by 
Alaska Department of Revenue, Revenue 
Sources (DORD6. 7X) . No change in tax 
regulations [RTCSPX]. 
Increasing slowly from current level 
of $8 million [RPEN]. 
Zero [ RP9X] . 
Increasing $1 million annually from 
current level of $25 million [RSFDNPX]. 
During FY 1986 the Permanent Fund 
experienced a capital gain of approxi-
mately $323 million. During FY 1987, 
$250 million accrues to Alaska from a 
litigation settlement with ARCO, 
$450 million in settlement of the 
Alyeska pipeline tariff dispute, and 
$50 million from past federal revenue 
sharing. 
If funds available, ceiling estab-
lished by Constitutional Spending 
Limit; otherwise appropriations equal 
revenues plus 50 percent [EXWIND] of 
general fund balance available for 
appropriations. 
Two-thirds operations if Spending 
Limit in effect; 85 percent operations 
otherwise [EXSPLITX]. 
Bonding occurs up to point where debt 
service is 5 percent of state revenues. 
Constant at $75 million [RSFDNCAX]. 
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5. state Loan Programs 
6. Municipal Capital Grants 
7. state-Local Revenue 
Sharing 
8. State-Local Municipal 
Assistance 
9. Permanent Fund/Other 
Appropriations in Excess 
of Spending Limit 
B.2. Permanent Fund 
10. Permanent Fund Principal 
* 11. Permanent Fund Earnings 
* 12. Permanent Fund Dividend 
B.3. Revenues 
* 13. Personal Income Tax 
14. Miscellaneous Local 
Revenue Sources 
15. New Federal-State 
Shared Revenues 
New capitalization terminated after 
FY 1987 [EXKTRlX]. Programs continue 
functioning on existing capitalization 
including AHFC [EXLOAN2] and APA 
revenue bond expenditures [EXCPSRl]. 
Funding terminated 
[RLTMCAP]. 
after FY 1987 
Continuation proportional to total 
state expenditures [RLTRS). 
Continuation proportional to total 
state expenditures [RLTMA]. 
None for operations [EXGFOPSX]; none 
for capital [EXSPCAP]. 
Continuous accumulation from petroleum 
revenues [EXPFl]; inflation-proofing 
eliminated when complete withdrawal of 
earnings commences. 
All the earnings of the Permanent Fund 
allocated to the General Fund 
[ EXPFTOGF] . 
Eliminated after FY 1988 distribution 
which occurs in the fall of that year 
[EXPFDIST]. 
Reimposed FY 1989; collections begin 
January of that year [EXPIT]. 
Miscellaneous state-local transfers 
[RLTX], large project property taxes 
[RLPTX], petroleum-related federal 
transfers [RLTFPX] all set to zero. 
Zero [RSFDNX]. 
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16. Large Project Corporate 
Income Taxes 
B.4. Miscellaneous 
* 17. state-Local Wage Rates 
C. INDUSTRY ASSUMPTIONS 
1. Trans-Alaska Pipeline 
* 2. North Slope--ANWR 
Petroleum Development 
and Production 
3. Upper Cook Inlet 
Petroleum Production 
* 4. ocs Development 
* 5. Oil Industry Headquarters 
6. Healy Coal Mining 
7. Beluga Chuitna Coal 
Production 





average real wage 
from 1988 through 
rate 
2000 
Operating employment remains constant 
at 885 through 2010 (TAP.S86X). 
Petroleum industry employment on the 
North Slope contracts to 2 thousand in 
the early 1990s. Employment engaged in 
new construction is constant at 
1 thousand (NS0.860G). 
Employment in exploration and devel-
opment of oil and gas in the Upper 
Cook Inlet area declines gradually 
beginning in 1983 by approximately 
2.5 percent per year (UPC.S86). 
Employment in exploration and develop-
ment activity stops due to the low 
price of oil (OCS.CM3Z -3). 
Oil company headquarters employment in 
Anchorage contracts from 3,900 to 300 
in 2010 (OHQ.F84W). 
Export of approximately 1 million tons 
of coal annually adds 25 new workers 
to current base of 100 by 1986 
(HCL.84X). 
Development of a 4. 4 million ton/year 
mine for export beginning in 1989 
provides employment of 524 (BCL.04T -4). 
The U.S. Borax mine near Ketchikan is 
brought into production with operating 
employment of 685 beginning in 1993 and 
eventually increasing to 1,020 
(BXM.F84-4). 
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9. Greens Creek Mine 
10. Red Dog Mine 
11. Other Mining Activity 
12. Agriculture 
13. Logging and Sawmills 
14. Pulp Mills 
15. Commercial Fish 
Harvesting--Nonbottomfish 




18. Federal Military 
Employment 
Production from the Greens Creek Mine 
on Admiralty Island results in 
employment of 150 people from 1988 
through 2003 (GCM.F84). 
The Red Dog Mine in the Western Brooks 
Range begins operation in 1991 with 




current level at 
(OMN.S86). 
not included in 
increases from 
1 percent annually 
Reduction :i.n state support results in 
constant employment in agriculture 
(AGR. S86). 
Logging for export by Native 
corporations expands employment to 
3,100 by 1992 before declining at 1% 
annually due to productivity gains 
(FLL.S87). 
Productivity gains result in employ-
ment declines at a rate of 1 percent 
per year after 1991 from the present 
level of 600 (FPU.S86). 
Employment levels in traditional 
fisheries harvest remain constant at 




in processing traditional 
harvest remains at 7,000 
The total U.S. bottomfish catch expands 
at a constant rate to allowable catch 
in 2000, with Alaska resident 
harvesting employment rising to 
1.033 thousand. onshore processing 
capacity expands in the Aleutians and 
Kodiak census divisions to provide 
total resident employment of 
1.471 thousand by 2000 (BCF.S86). 
Employment declines at 1 percent per 
year, consistent with the long-term 
trend since 1960 (GFM.S86). 
A-19 
19. Light Army Division 
Deployment 
20. Federal Civilian 
Employment 
21. Tourism 
22. state Hydroelectric 
Projects 
D. NATIONAL VARIABLE ASSUMPTIONS 
1. U.S. Inflation Rate 
2. Real Average Weekly 
Earnings 
3. Real Per Capita Income 
4. Unemployment Rate 
E. REGIONAL ASSUMPTIONS 
1. Population 
2. Employment 
A portion of a new Army division is 
deployed to Fairbanks and Anchorage 
beginning in 1986, augmenting active-
duty personnel by 3,800 by 1989 
(GFM. S87) 
After remaining constant from 1987 
through 1990, employment rises at 0.5 
percent annual rate consistent with 
the long-term trend since 1960 
(GJlC, S87). 
Number of visitors to Alaska increases 
by 30,000 per year to over 1.3 million 
by 2010 (TRS.J85). 
Construction employment from Alaska 
Power Authority projects includes 
several projects in Southcentral and 
Southeast Alaska, including Bradley 
Lake (SHP.F85) and (SHP.B86). 
Consumer prices rise at an annual rate 
of 3% in 1987, 4.6% from 1988 to 1992, 
and gradually increase to 5.4% in 
1997. This assumption is consistent 
with petroleum price and revenue. 
Growth in real average weekly earnings 
averages 1 percent annually. 
Growth in real per capita income 
averages 1.5 percent annually. 
Long-run rate of 6.5 percent. 
Regional population growth allocated 
on the basis of employment growth. 
No significant shifts in the location 
of support industries. 
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APPENDIX B 
ECONOMIC PROJECTION OUTPUT TABLES 
986 
MAP MODEL 
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TOTAL EMPLOYMENT (EM99) INCLUDES ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY ND PROPRIETORS--
PRE 1985 PROPRIETOR DEFINITIONt 
WAGE AND SALARV EMPLOYMENT (EM97) IS ALASKA 
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR DEF1NITI0N: 
PERSONAL I COME (OF;PIB) IS US BEA DEFINITION; 
PETROLEUM R VENUES (DFlRP9S) INCLUDES PERMANENT FUND CONTRIBUTION: 
B-1 
MAP MODEL ECONOMIC PROJECTIONS 
AUGUST 1987 AHFC 
TABLE 2, 
EMPLOYMENT BY S C OR 
(THOUSANDS) 
INFRA-
TOTAL BASIC STRUCTURE SE VICES GOVERNMENT 
i 985 272, i46 
iS'86 263:366 
i 987 254. 825 
1988 250:062 
i 9B9 2::2 r 888 
i 990 256 l 969 




































































































SOURCE: iS R MAP MODEL SIMULATION AHFC.B, CREATED AUGUST 1987. 
TOTAL EMPLOYMENT (EN99).
BASIC EMPLOYMENT (EM9BASE) CONSISTS OF EXOGENOUS CGMPONENiS OF 
CONSTRUCTION, MANUFACTURING, AND TRANSPORTATION; MIN NG (PETROLEUM); 
TOURISM! FEDERAL GOVERNMENT; AND AGRICULTURE; FORESTRY1 AND FISH 
HARVESTiNG, 
INFRASTRUCTURE EMPLOYMENT (EFi9iNFR) CONSISTS OF TRANSPORTATIONi 
COMMUNICATIONS, PUBLIC UTILITIES1 nwowrnvs CONSTRUCTION1 
AND BUSINESS SERVICES, NET OF EXOGENOUS AND TOURISM-RELATEO TRANSPORTATiON, 
SUPPORT EMPLOYMENT \EM9SUPRT} CONSISTS OF TRADE, FINANCE, SERVICES, 
LOCAL MANUFACTURING, AND PROPRIETORS N T ENGAGED IN FISH ARVESTING, 
NET OF TRADE ANO SERVICE TOURISM EMPLOYMENT ANO BUSINESS SERVICES, 
GOVERNMENT E PLUYtiENT !EMGA) CONSISTS OF STATE AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT EftPLOYflENT: 
B-2 
ISER MAP MODEL ECONOMIC PROJECTIONS 




TOTAL CULTURE, cm1srnuc-~ANU- COHMUNI-




















































































ii .: .-.c. 

































































































SOURCE: IS R MAP MODEL SIMULATION AHFC:B, CREATED AUGUST 1987, 
PRIVATE (EMPVTJ IS ALL NON-GOVERNMENT: 
AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY, FiSHERIES { MAFF}, 
MINING (EMP9) IS TOTAL MINING, INCLUDING OIL AND GAS= 
CONSTRUCTION (EMCN): 
NANUFACTURING (EMN9l, 
TRANSPORTATION, COMMUNICATIONS, PUBLIC UTILIT ES (EHTCU) ~ 
SUPPORT (EMSUP) INCLUDES TRADE, FINANCE, SERV CE, AND 




























ISER MAP MODEL CONOMI PROJECTIONS 
AUGUST 1987 AHF BASE 
TABLE ' " "!, 
GOVERNMENT E PLOYMENT 
(THOUSAM[iS/ 
FEDERAL 




1985 90ri83 22.579 17,bOO 20.904 29 I 100 
1986 90,117 23.253 18.000 19,9H 28.953 
i i'dli 
7Qf 88,590 23.230 J8r2J(l i9 .007 28.104 
1988 88,264 24.308 16:250 19,035 26.670 
1969 90,388 25.489 iB.250 20.24b 26.402 
19% 69,347 25.272 iB.250 i9.858 25.967 
111,i. 
111 o~ 1Hi1 / l S I I I 25.058 i6,34i 2(i,851 27.247 
1992 9fs19b 24.845 18s4JJ 20.666 27.252 
1001 
II':.: 69.609 24.635 i6,525 19,754 2b.b9b 
1qq4 93.311 24.426 18:618 21,607 28.660 
1995 93=552 24. 220 1B.71i 21.390 29.231 
1996 92,281 24.016 13.804 19.855 29.bOb 
1997 QC\ { ·}f l .• nJ.J..! 23.814 18:898 2i.774 30.641 
1996 95,724 23,613 i8,993 21.920 3Li98 
1999 94.277 23.415 19.088 20.490 31.2&4 
2000 O·i O,ii u:..,1.; 23.219 i9.i83 19,432 31.113 
200i 9i.282 23.025 19c279 iS.307 30,671 
2002 92.685 22.833 i9i376 ia.834 31.844 
2003 9i.866 22.642 19.472 18.006 31.746 
2004 91:578 22.454 191570 i7.469 32.085 
2005 9i.265 22,267 19:668 i6. 981 32.349 
2006 9i,444 22.083 i ~\ 766 i6.630 32. 965 
2007 92,000 21.900 19,865 16,117 34.iVi' 
2006 94,634 21. 719 '19,964 16.933 36.018 
2009 941168 21.540 20c064 i6. 380 36,185 
20i0 93,745 21.362 20i ib4 iS.750 36.468 
SOURCE: IS R MAP MODEL SIMULATION AHFC.B, CREATED AUGUST i987. 
MILITARY (EMGM) IS ACTIVE DUTY. 
FEDERAL CIV1LIAN (EMGC). 
STATE { M6S), 
LOCAL (EMGU • 
B-4 
ISER MAP MODEL ECONOMI PROJECTIONS 
TOTAL 
AUGUST AHF BASE 
TABLE 5: 





POPULATION AN UAL NATURAL MILITARY MILITARY 











1951  S:511 864 
i 996 ::54, 932 








2(H)5 b35: 828 
2006 652,227 
2007 6t1i .881 
2008 676,612 


































































-1 ,'t Hi 
-1r404 
-i,39i 








SOURCE: IS R HAP MODEL SiRULATION AHFCiB, CREATED AUGUST 1987. 
NOTE; POPULATION IS EtlUAL TD POPULATION IN PRIOR YEAR 
PLUS Mi6RATION ANO NATURAL INCREASE= TH  SUM OF COMPONENTS 
DOES NOT E@U,4L THE TOT AL DUE TO ROUND I GIN THE 
ALLOCATION OF MIGRANTS TO INDIVIDUAL COHORTS: 
POPULATION (POP) IS JULY 1, CENSUS DEFINITION, 
ANNUAL CHANGE IN POPULATION (DELPOP) IS YEAR TO YEAR JULY 1 CHANGE; 
NATURAL INCREASE (POPNI9) INCLUDES CIVILIAN AND MILITARY, 
NON-MiLITARY MIGRATION (PDPMIG). 
MILITARY MIGRATION {P PM16M) INCLUDES ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY 
PLUS DEPENDENTS, B-5 
ISER :.!.Hi HODEL CONOMIC PROJECTIONS nnr 
AUGUST !987 AHFC BASE 
TABLE I 0, 
Hi?ULATION C HPONHiTS 
(THOUSANDS! 
CIVILIAN 
TOTAL NON-NATIVE NATiVE MILITARY 
---------- ---------- --------------------
1985 539.963 419.416 73,639 46,908 
1 GQ, .:ub 5351654 411.839 75s507 48,309 
1 Qif7 
!Ui 529,318 403.677 ~, 1n, f i n..ii:iJ. 48.260 
1988 523.57i 393,810 79.261 50.501 
1989 524.658' 390.558 81.147 52.954 
1990 527.605 392.062 83.040 52.504 
199i c;.,~ a~,n ..:JlaUL.U 394.829 84,942 52:058 
1992 534.612 396.141 86,855 51.616 
1001 !I-.} 537.770 397.B08 88.764 5Li79 
19~'4 547,310 405.834 90.730 50.746 
1995 55i.864 408,850 92,t:87 50 .317 
1996 cc a u-111 .JJr, ;.J::. 410.350 o~ L no ;tt,uO; 49 .393 
1997 563,507 417.326 96,708 49.473 
1998 572,660 424.845 98.758 49.057 
1999 580,b(Jb 431. i2i 100,840 48.646 
2000 587.973 436.778 102.957 48.238 
2001 593,792 440.846 105. ii 1 47.835 
2002 603,983 449.244 107.304 47.435 
2(103 6ii.801 455.225 109,536 47,040 
2004 6201032 461. 575 11il810 46.648 
2005 635,828 475.443 1 i 4, 125 46.261 
2006 Li;·i ·~1"11 489.866 116~482 45.877 u_:t,.,L.t..l 
2(H)7 66i:881 497 .500 iiB.883 45. 497 
2008 676,612 510.164 121,328 45, i21 
2009 b91,i24 522.559 123,816 44,749 
20ii) 705.S05 535;075 126.350 44.380 
SOURCE: IS R nAP MODEL SlMULATiON AHFC,Bi CREATED AUGUST 1987. 
POPULATION IPOP) IS JULY 1, CENSUS DEFINITION. 
CIVILIAN NON-NATIVE (CNNTOTl. 
NATIVE (NATTOT) CIVILIAN. 






ISER HAP MODEL ECDNOMI PROJECTIONS 
AUGUST 1987 AHF BASE 
TABLE 7: 

























1989 2220,214 21Q9t9ff i668c6J5 228,671 212.605 
1990 2207,873 2084.385 1649t732 227,526 207.127 




















































































































SOURCE: IS R HAP MODEL SIMULATION AHFCiB, CREATED AUGUST 1987,
EXPENDITURES 1DF.EX6FBI IS UNRESTRICTED GENERAL FUND EXPENDITURES. 
TOTAL REVENUES \DF.RS6FB), 
PETROLEUM REVENUES WF .RP9SG) EXCLVOES P RMANENT FUtiDCuNTRIBUTIGN. 
ENDOGENOUS REVENUES !DF:RSENG) 1S TOTAL NET OF PETROLEUM AND 
INVESTMENT EARNINGS, 
INVESTMENT EARNINGS {DF:RSIN} IS EARNINGS FROM ALL SOURCES 
DEPOSITED N THE GENERAL FUND, 
B-7 
ISER MAP MODEL ECONOMI PROJECTIONS 
AUGUST 987 AHF BASE 
ABLE 8, 
STATE GOVERNMENT MISCELLANEOUS VARIABLES 
GENERAL FUND APPROPRIATIONS 
------------------------------------------- PERMANENT P RMANENT P RSONAL 
DEBT FUND FUND INCOME TAX 










1990 2210,799 1790.716 
1991 2308:813 1894.628 
1992 2275,593 i888,7i2 
1993 2166,221 1778=544 
1994 2430:222 1976,702 
1995 2425:913 i953,58i 
1996 22461582 17951292 
1997 2544,211 2054i710 
1998 2620.009 2125,120 
1999 2482=633 2015.516 
2000 2378,905 1932,719 
2001 2263?982 18331054 
2002 2404,736 iq48,432 
2003 2333,772 1888:189 
2004 2303:362 1860.691 
2005 2275i169 1837:723 
2006 22641904 1833:039 
2007 2223~957 1802:121 
2008 2404a8iEa i96B,39b 
2009 2348:691 i94i:229 














































104:074 300.635 8292,332 0.000 
79.839 293.077 6498:727 140=190 
53:580 27i:401 6438:848 26J 
73,818 280.906 8616.234 264.653 
104:690 291.092 8830,430 273:220 
127,575 0.000 9256.480 275.517 
134,473 0:000 9655.640 274.440 
126.905 0,000 0107:340 280,i68 
119,870 0;000 0340.410 289l194 
iii,441 01000 0562,300 297.277 
1os,122 otooo 0765.650 30J.6Bt 


























SOURCE: IS R MAP MODEL SiMULATION AHFC:St CREATED AUGUST 1987: 
TOTAL (DF,APGF) ~ 
OPERATING (DFzAP6FO), 
CAPITAL (DF,APGFC), 
DEBT SERVICE (DF,EXDSS} iNCLUDES ONLY GENERAL OB IGATION DEBT FSTATE, 
PERflANEf~T FUND IVIDEND (DF ,EXTRN) f 
PERMANENT FUND BALANCE (DFtBALPF) = 
PERSONAL I CONE TAX (OF,RTIS1 ~ 
B-8 
ISER fiAP MODEL CDNOfHC PROJECTIONS 
AUGUST t AHFC BASE 
u 
i: 























i. 77 r 
1998 
~OOQ 















































































































































237:1 • 777 
2457a641 
SOURCE: IS R MAP MODEL SIMULATION AHFC1B, CREATED AUGUST 1987, 
WAGE AND SALARY PAYMENTS (OF;PIWS) IN NONf,GRI CULTURAL 
WAGE AND SALARY JOBCATEGORIES PLU  MILITARY~ 
NET EARNINGS (OF.PINE) IS NET LABOR AND PROPRIETORS' INCOME 
BY PLACE OFWORKt 
RESIDENCE ADJUSTMENT (DF=PIRAD)= 
DIVIDENDS, INTEREST~ ANO RENT {OF:PIOIR), 
TRANSFERS (DF,PlTRAN); 
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MAP MODEL ECONOHI ROJECTIONS 
ANCHORAGE ALASKA/US 




334 i 29~r 
1t;Q 1·11 








































1 s ii 4 





SOURCE: IS R MAP MODEL SIMULATION AHFC,B; CREATED AUGUST 19871 
ANCHORAGE CPI (PDANCPI) ONSUMER PRICE INDEX FOR URBAN WAGE EARNERS, 
ALASKA/US PRICE LEVEL (PDRATIO) IS THE RATIO OF US AND 





























ISER MAP REGIONAL MODEL ECONOMIC PROJECTIONS 
AUGUST 1987 AHFC BASE 
TABLE ii. 
POPULATION BY LABOR MARKET AREA 
(THOUSANDS) 
ANCH/MATSU SOUTHEAST MORTH 






























! 0 :1 ! 















































i 9, i 02 





£'1 :c ! 
j ;1 I/_!{:: 
i9. i6:: 
19,202 
i 9 r i 02 
~ D ilLr1 

































































., '" .jlJ 


























NOTE:OFFICIAL STATE OF ALASKA AND CENSUS AREA GOVERNMENT POPULATION ESTiflATES 
MAY NOT BE EQUAL; 




GULF COAST {PL=GULFJ t 
SOUTHWEST {PL.SUEST) t 
TOTAL {PlST) 
B-11 
ISER MAP REGIONAL HODEL CONOHIC PROJECTIONS 
AUGUST 1987 AHFC BASE 
TOTAL 
(THOUSANDS) 









































































































::3 I 793 
54;670 




.i l !:":C 
i 1 I _i i .J 
11.535 

















































~ L ·){iO 
.1..Ud .. V! 
16,27i 
iti,039 














.? ii Ci:/ 
i0,J70 














GULF COAST (Ml,GULF t 
SOUTHWEST (ML,SWEST t 




















































ISER HAP MODEL ECONOMI PROJECTIONS 
AUGUST 1987AHF HIGH 
TAD! C 4 
!nt..'L!.. .\.: 
SUMMARY 
POPULAT ON HOUSEHOLDS TOTAL SALARY INCOME REVENUES 



















































£.Ul ,, • .i.,;._: 
285:638 





























226.929 9618.600 3175,935 
218,182 9272,130 2547:350 
2i0.342 9059.820 i358:30b 
208.013 8891:840 2153:363 
2i4:09i 9107,500 25721932 
222:079 9411.580 2558;485 
2291168 9679s180 2562,257 
232r575 9941,160 2556:920 
232.905 10128,800 2428;129 
242r454 10612:200 J140,116 
2461726 10940.980 30511522 
249,180 11212:520 2779:018 
260.330 11782,650 3527,187 
270:850 12428,000 32811153 
278.803 12953:910 3029;897 
280:524 13150,430 2791,419 
287.242 13588~560 2557:957 
293.786 14033:160 2377:618 
303.620 14623,690 2268.199 
310.596 15102:870 2163,265 
309,062 i5068t120 1986=740 
312,472 15433.660 1897,679 
323:i/J f6{)8fJ,22() i6i2r~132 
329.242 16537,260 1732i008 
329.071 16759,380 1654,382 
332,097 17110,290 1580:551 
SOURCE: IS R HAP HODEL SIMULATION AHFC,H, CREATED AUGUST 1987= 
POPULATION (POP) ISJULY ii CENSUS DEFINITION. 
HOUSEHOLDS (HH) IS JULY 1, CENSUS DEFINITION; 
TOTAL EMPLOYMENT !EN99) INCLUDES ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY ND PROPRIETORS--
PRE 1985 PROPRIETOR DEFINITiON: 
WAGE AND SALARY EMPLOYMENT (EH97l IS ALASKA 
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR DEFINITION, 
PERSONAL I COME (OFrPIB) IS US BEA DEFINITION, 






















































i'i'U "'H n 
·.Hi9",:.HO 
387.478 
ISER MAP MODEL ECONOMI ROJECTIONS 
AUGUST 1987 AHF lGH 
TABLE 2= 












































































































SOURCE: IS R MAP HODEL SIMULATION AHFC,H, CREATED AUGUST 1987. 
TOTAL EMPLOYMENT {EM99J= 
BASIC EMPLOYMENT IEH9BASEI CONSISTS OF EXOGENOUS COMPONENTS OF 
CONSTRUCTION, MANUFACTURING, AND TRANSPORTATION; MINING (PETROLEUM); 
TOURISM, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, ANO AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY, ANDFISH 
HARVESTING, 
INFRASTRUCTURE EMPLOYMENT {Er19INFR) CONSISTS OF TRANSPORTATION, 
COMMUNICATIONS, PUBLIC UTILITIES, NDOGENOUS CONSTRUCTION, 
AND BUSINESS SERVICES, NET OF EXOGENOUS AND TOURISM-RELATED TRANSPORTATION= 
SUPPORT EMPLOYMENT (EM9SUPRTl CONSISTS OF TRADE, FINANCE, SERVICES, 
LOCAL MANUFACTURING, ANO PROPRIETORS NOT ENGAGED IN FISH ARVESTiNG, 
NET OF TRADE AND SERVICE TOURISM EMPLOYMENT AND BUSINESS SERVICES: 
GOVERNMENT E PLOYMENT (EHGAJ CONSISTS OF STATE ANO LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT E PLOYMENT; 
B-14 
ISER MAP MODEL ECONOMIC PROJECTIONS 




TOTAL CULTURE~ CONSTRUC-f!ANU- COMMUNI-
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4 F. L·~1Q 
!"Tt!.!i.! 










































SOURCE; ISER MAP MODEL SIMULATION AHFC,H~ CREATED AUGUST 19f,7: 
PRIVATE {EMPVT) IS ALL NON-GOVERNMENT, 
AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY, FISHERIES ( MAFFJ, 
MINING (EMP9} IS TOTAL MINING, INCLUDING OIL AND GAS: 
CONSTRUCTION {EMC ) I 
MANUFACTURING (EHH9), 
TRANSPORTATION, COMMUNiCATIONS, PUBLIC UTILITIES ( MTCU), 
SUPPORT (EMSUP/ INCLUDES TRADE, FINANCE, SERVICE, ANO 


























ISER MAP HODEL ECONOMI PROJECTIONS 




































































































! 7 ,\.tOu 



















23 I 158 










































SOURCE: IS R MAP MODEL SIMULATION AHFC.H1 CREATED AUGUST 1987, 
TOTAL (EM69). 
MILITARY IEMGMI IS ACTIVE DUTY. 
FEDERAL CiVILiAN (EHGC), 
STATE ( MGS) INCLUDES UNIVERSITY OF ALASKA, 
LOCAL IEMGU. 
B-16 
ISER MAP MODEL ECONOMl PROJECTIONS 
AUGUST i987 AHF HIGH 
POPULATION CHA GE 
(THOUSANDS) 
COMPONENTS DF CHi4NGE 
TGT AL TOT AL NON-
POPULATION AN UAL NATURAL MILITARY MILITARY 
CHANGE INCREASE MIGRATION MIGRATION 
i985 539:963 





i 99i 551 l 507 
1992 556:558 
i 5'93 562,566 





1999 643. 3(if: 
2000 b53~56i 
2(H)i 668 =097 
2'(H)2 682: 962 










































































































SOURCE: IS R MAP MODEL S1MULAT10N AHFC.H, CREATED AUGUST 1987= 
NOTE: POPULATION IS EQUAL TO POPULATION IN PRIOR YEAR 
PLUS MIGRATION AND NATURAL INCREASE, THESUM OF COMPONENTS 
DOES ilOT EfiU!ll THE TOTAL DUE TO ROUNDING lN THE 
ALLOCATION OF MIGRANTS TO INDIVIDUAL COHORTS, 
POPULATION !P P} IS jULY i; CENSUS DEFINITIOft 
14NNUAL CHANGE IN POPULAT ON {DELPDP) IS YEAR TO YEAR JULY 1 CHANGE, 
NATURAL INCRE~SE (POPNI9 INCLUDES CltJILlAN AND MILITARY, 
NON-MILITARY MiGRATION P PMIGJ, 
MILITARY MIGRATION (P PM GM) INCLUDES ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY 
PLUS DEPENDENTS, 
B-17 
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ISER MAP MODEL ECONOMI PROJECTIONS 
AUGUST i9B7AHF HIGH 
TABLE 8. 
STATE GOVERNHENT I5CELLANEOUS VARIABLES 
(MILLION 1986 DOLLARS) 
GENERAL FUND APPROPRIATIONS 
-------~------------------------------~----PERMANENT P RMANENT P RSONAL 
DEBT FUND FUND INCOME TAX 
TOTAL OPERATING CAPITAL SERVICE OlVIDErJO BALANCE 
1985 3279:325 2295,079 824:981 
i986 3115.421 2308:209 6521082 
1987 2528.572 i965,826 412:647 
1988 2127:893 1743.123 246,520 
i989 2989,249 1920.889 946.109 

















1991 2744;772 1779.175 876:310 89.288 303l080 9228,920 0:000 
1992 2657r466 1721:005 
1993 2J29i583 1614.876 
1994 3151:271 2023.105 
1995 3065.378 1968.129 
1996 2818,560 1792.763 
1997 3469;491 2219,693 
1998 3253,914 2080:829 
1999 3008:969 1913.400 




































































































SOURCE: IS R MAP MODEL SIMULATION AHFC,H. CREATED AUGUST i987: 
TOTAL ( DF C APGF) I 
OPERATiNG {DF.APGFO), 
CAPITAL (OFrAPGFC); 
DEBT SERVICE (OF:EXDSS) INCLUDES ONLY GENERAL OB IGATION DEBTOF STATE, 
PERMANENT FUND DIVIDEND (OF.EXTRN): 
PERMANENT FUND BALANCE (DF.BALPF) c 









:!!"1"'1 .i .. ·1·-t 
~Jl s'7LL 
WAGE ANO 
ISER MAP MODEL ECONOMIC PROJECTIONS 
AUGUST 987 AHFC HIGH 
ABLE 9, 
COMPONENTS DF REAL PERSONAL I COME 
(MILLION 1986 DOLLARS) 
DISPOSABLE 
SALARY NET RESIDENCE INTERESTj TRANSFERS PERSONAL PERSONAL 

























































































































































SOURCE: IS R NAP HODEL SIMULATION AHFC.H~ CREATED AUGUST 1987, 
WAGE AND SALARY PA MENTS (DF,PIWS) IN NONAGRICULTURAL 
WAGE AND SALARY j08 CATEGORIES PLUS MILiTARY: 
NET EARNINGS (OF.PINE) IS NET LABOR AND PROPRIETORS1 INCOME 
BY PLACE OF WGRK, 
RESIDENCE AOJUSTHENT (DF,PIRAD); 
DIVIDENDS, INTEREST, AND RENT (DF,PIDIR), 
TRANSFERS (OF,PITRAN i 
PERSONAL I COME (DFi IB) I 




























ISER MAP MODEL ECONOMI PROJECTIONS 
AUGUST i9B7AHF HIGH 
TABLE iO,
ANCHORAGE ALASKA/US 




19Bf1 295 I B49 
1989 307,512 
i990 319.493 

























i r 194 
i1i86 
J i:n 
l, i I 0 
i I 170 




: '1 ·JU 
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SOURCE: IS R HAP HODEL SIMULATION AHFC.H, CREATED AUGUST 1987: 
ANCHORAGE CPI (POANCPI) ONSUMER PRICE INDEX FOR URBAN WAGE EARNERS. 
ALASKA/US PRICE LEVEL \PDRATIO) IS THE RATIO OF US AND 
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ISER MAP REGIONAL MODEL ECONOMiC PROjECTIONS 
AUGUST i987AHFC HiGH 
TABLE 12:
{THOUSANOSJ 
ANCH/NATSU SOUTHEAST INTERIOR NORTH GULF COAST OUTHWEST TO AL 


































































39. i 7 4 

























































































































SOURCE: IS R HAP MODEL SIMULATION AHFC,R.H, CREATED AUGUST 1987, 
ANCH/MATSU Hil:ANCMS) = 
SOUTHEAST (Ml.SEAST), 
INTERIOR !ML.INTER), 
NORTH (Ml :f~ORTH) 
GULF COAST (Hl,GULF)= 
SOUTHWEST {HlaSWEST) = 
TOTAL {M,STJ, 
B-24 
ISER MAP MODEL ECONOMIC PROJECTIONS 
AUGUST 1967 AHFC LOW 
TABLE l, 
SUMMARY 
POPULATION HOUSEHOLDS TOTAL SALARY INCOME REVENUES 
10001 10001 EMPLOYMENT E PLOYMENT ( ILLION !MILLION 

























































































































































SOURCE: IS R MAP HODEL SIMULATION AHFCrL, CREATED AUGUST 1987= 
POPULATION (POP) IS JULY i, CENSUS DEFINITION: 
HOUSEHOLDS (HH) IS JULY 1, CENSUS DEFINITION, 
TOTAL EMPLOYMENT IEH991 INCLUDES ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY ND PROPRIETORS--
PRE 1985 PROPRIETOR DEFINITION. 
WAGE AND SALARY EMPLOYMENT (EH97) IS ALASKA 
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR DEFINITION, 
PERSONAL I COME (DF.PIB) ISUS BEA DEFINITION, 




















































ISER MAP MODEL ECONOMIC PROJECTIONS 
AUGUST 1987 AHFC LOW 
TABLE 2, 






























































i39, bi i 






































1:1 ~ 4 c, 





SOURCE: IS R MAP MODEL SIMULATION AHFClL1 CREATED AUGUST 1987, 
TOTAL EMPLOYMENT (EM99).
BASIC EMPLOYMENT (EH9BASE) CONSISTS OF EXOGENOUS COMPONENTS OF 
CONSTRUCTION, MANUFACTURING, ANO TRANSPORTATION; MINING (PETROLEUM); 
TOURISM, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, AND AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY, ANOFISH 
HARVESTiNG= 
INFRASTRUCTURE EMPLOYMENT (EM9iNFR) CONSISTS OF TRANSPORTATION~ 
COMMUNICATIONS, PUBLIC UTILITIES, NDOGENOUS CONSTRUCTION, 
ANO BUSINESS SERVICES, NET OF EXOGENOUS AND TOURISM-RELATED TRANSPORTATION, 
SUPPORT EMPLOYMENT (EM9SOPRTJ CONSISTS OF TRADE, FINANCE, SERVICES1 
LOCAL MANUFACTURING, AND PROPRIETORS N T ENGAGED IN FISH ARVESTING, 
NET OF TRADE AND SERVICE TOURISM EMPLOYMENT AND BUSINESS SERVICESz 
GOVERNMENT E PLOYMENT (EMGA) CONSISTS OF STATE AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT E PLOYMENT: 
B-26 
iSER NAP MOtiEL ECONmm PROJECTiaNS 
AUGUST 1987 AHFC LOW 










i985 i8i.%3 9.330 9:472 18.810 11.844 rn. 724 
1966 173.248 9,532 9. i25 12,300 12.620 16.455 
1987 ibb.235 9.560 8,913 6.513 12,782 13.229 
1986 159.433 9.577 7.113 7,623 12.926 17.858 
1989 155. Hi q I 4 -":1 . :Oli. 62826 8.448 13.033 17.347 
1990 157.086 9.675 6.860 1L036 13.330 17.337 
1991 158.900 9.741 6.591 i2: 181 i3.640 i 7 .431 
1992 160.452 9.612 b.478 12sb95 13.888 17.559 
1993 161.868 o ngn ; ,OuO 6,735 12.778 13.949 17.697 
1994 163.009 9,972 b.888 i2.i85 H.020 17 .930 
1995 163.021 10,064 6,92i 10. 783 H.iOO 18.141 
1996 163.676 10:117 6:8i0 10,395 i4:.l'04 i8, 307 
1997 i65,5i2 ff), 184 6;779 iO.iiO 14,348 18.524 
i998 167,674 10.268 6.678 10.054 14.530 13.765 
iq99 170.221 10,374 6,571 10,031 14,769 19,031 
2000 17J,i93 10.429 6:456 i0.026 15,036 i 9,336 
200l 175:790 Hi.429 b.362 Hi.OJO iS.038 19.649 
2002 178,673 10,429 6.287 i0.130 i5.045 i9.965 
2003 181. 94i 10.429 6i2i1 i0,281 15,054 20.309 
2004 185.136 10.429 5.993 10.293 15.066 20.b70 
2005 188.563 10.429 5.932 10.213 i5.079 21.044 
2006 192.293 101429 5.886 10.215 15.096 21.437 
2007 196.318 10:429 5,836 i0.286 15,116 21.848 
2008 200.773 101429 5.793 10.434 15,142 22.289 
2009 205.956 10,429 5,764 i0.89B 15.173 22.763 
20!0 211,751 10:429 5. 729 11.645 15,209 23,264 
SOURCE: ISER HAP MODEL SIMULATION AHFC.L, CREATED AUGUST 1987, 
PRIVATE !EflPVTJ IS ALL NON-GOVERUNENT. 
AGRICULTURE; FO ESTRY, FISHERIES ( nAFF), 
MINING IEMP91 IS TOTAL MINING, INCLUDING OIL AND 6AS. 
CONSTRUCTION (EnCNl.
MANUFACTURING {ENH9i. 
TRM!SPORTAT10N, COMMUNICATIONS; PUBLIC UTILITIES ( HTCUJ, 
SUPPORT (EMSUPl INCLUDES TRADE1 FINANCE; S RVICE; AND 






































ISER MAP MODEL ECONOMIC PROJECTIONS 
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19:279 



































29 I 100 
28,953 
























SOURCE: IS R MAP MODEL SIMULATION AHFC1L1 CREATED AUGUST 1987= 
TOTAL (EMG9). 
MILITARY {EMGM) IS ACTIVE OUTY1 
FEDERAL CIVILIAN (EMGC), 
STATE { M6SJ INCLUDES UNIVERSITY OF ALASKA, 
LOCAL (EMGL), 
B-28 
rnrn MAP r-lODEL ECONO!HC PROJECTIONS 
AUGUST i987AHFC LOW 
TABLE 5, 
POPULATION CHA GE 
!THOUSANllSl 
COMPONENTS DF CHANGE 
---------------------------------------=---
TOTAL TOTAL NON-
POPULATION AN UAL NATURAL iil ITARY MILITARY 
CHANGE INCREASE MIGRATION 1HGRATiON 
---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ----------
1985 539.963 ib.915 (1,203 5.377 0.623 
19B6 535.654 -4.309 (l, 149 -14.350 1),391 
1987 529.318 -b1336 9.542 -H.361 -i.058 
1S1B8 521.345 -7.973 9.084 -ta.283 Li85 
10BO P.Ji 5i5.87b -5.469 8.591 -15,455 1,34b 
1990 5i5.M7 -0.229 8.173 -6.899 -ii548 
1001 f ! 1 516.346 0.701 8.028 -5.823 -i.534 
1992 516.125 -0.224 7.916 -6.651 -i1521 
1993 515.208 -0.917 7.789 -7.231 -i,507 
1994 5i4.179 -i .025' 7,658 -7.230 -i.494 
1ooi; ;;_; 512.457 -i.722 71537 -7.817 -1.481 
1996 510. 951 -i.506 7.408 -7.488 -i.467 
1997 511.357 0.406 7,295 -5.477 -1,454 
1998 512,417 i.060 7.245 -4.784 -i .44i 
1999 ~·4 6'~ }1 , lj 2.1% 7.212 -J.627 -i,429 
2000 518.269 3.656 7.212 -2.178 -1.416 
200i 519,848 i.580 7.249 -4.302 -i ,404 
2002 523.454 3.605 7,220 -2.264 -1.391 
2003 527.936 4.482 7.255 -i.431 -1.J79 
2004 533.370 5.43:t 7,308 -0.543 -1.367 
2005 539.518 b. 143 7.383 0.085 -1.355 
2006 546.622 7.104 7.472 0.939 -1.343 
2007 554.622 8.000 7.582 1.715 -1.331 
200B 563.886 9.264 7. 710 2.841 -i.319 
2009 574.332 0.497 7.866 3.908 -i.308 
2010 585. 915 1.533 8.047 4.754 -1.296 
SOURCE: IS R HAP MODEL SIHULATiON AHFC.L; CREATED AUGUST i987. 
NOTE: POPULATION iS E@UAL TO POPULATION IN PRIOR YEAR 
PLUS MIGRATION AND NATURAL INCREASE. THESUM OF COMPONENTS 
DOES NOT EijUAL THE TOTAL DUE TO ROUNDING IN THE 
ALLOCATION OF MIGRANTS TO INDIVIDUAL COHORTS. 
POPULATION (P P) IS JULY I, CENSUS DEFH/ITION. 
ANNUAL CHANGE IN POPULATION !DELPOPl IS YEAR TO YEAR JULY i CHANGE. 
NATURAL INCREASE IPOPNI91 NCLUDES CIVILIAN D MILITARY. 
NON-MILITARY MIGRATION (P PMIGl. 
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ISER MAP MODEL ECONOMiC PROJECTIONS 













































































































































SOURCE: IS R NAP MODEL SIMULATION AHFC.L, CREATED AUGUST 1987= 
POPULATION IPOPI ISJULY fi CENSUS DEFINITION. 
CIVILIAN NON-NAT VE {CNNTOT) I 
NATIVE (NATTOTl IVILIAN, 






























ISER MAP MODEL ECONOMIC PROjECTIONS 
AUGUST 1987 AHFC LOW 
TABLE 7, 
STATE UNRESTRICTED GEN RAL FUND 









































































































SOURCE: IS R HAP MODEL SIMULATION AHFC1L, CREATED AUGUST 1987: 
EXPENDITURES (OF, XGFB) IS UNRESTRICTED GEN RAL FUND EXPENDITURES, 
TOTAL REVENUES WF. RSGFB) • 
PETROLEUM R VENUES (0F,RP9S6) EXCLUDES PERMANENT FUND CONTRIBUTION= 
ENDOGENOUS REVENUES (OF:RSENG) IS TOTAL NET OF PETROLEUM AND 
INVESTMENT EARNINGS. 
INVESTMENT EARNINGS (OF:RSIN) IS EARNINGS FRON ALL SOURCES 
DEPOSITED N THE GENERAL FUND. 
B-31 
ISER MAP MODEL ECONOMIC PROJECTIONS 
AUGUST 1937 AHFC LOW 
TABLE 8, 
STATE GOVERNMENT MISCELLANEOUS VARIABLES 
(MILLiON 98b DOLLARS} 
GENERAL FUND APPRGPRIATIONS 
------------------------------------------- PERMANENT P RMANENT P RSONAL 
DEBT FUND FUND INCOME TAX 
























































































































87 Ii 48 
7i,8i5 
64 = i 09 
59,076 


































SOURCE: IS R MAP MODEL SIMULATION AHFC=L, CREATED AUGUST 1987: 



























DEBT SERVICE (DF,EXDSS) INCLUDES ONLY GENERAL OB IGATION DEBTOF STATE: 
PERMANENT FUND DIVIDEND (DF.EXTRNJ, 
PERMANENT FUND BALANCE (DF.BALPFJ. 
PERSONAL I COME TAX (DF~RTISJ. 
B-32 
ISER MAP MODEL ECONOMIC PROJECTIONS 
AUGUST 1987 AHFC LOW 
TABLE 91 
COMPONENTS OF REAL PERSONAL I COME 






























































































































































SOURCE: IS R MAP HODEL SIMULATION AHFC,L, CREATED AUGUST 19872 
WAGE AND SALARY PAYMENTS {DF,PIWS) IN NONAGRiCULTURAL 
WAGE AND SALARY JOBCATEGORIES PLUS MILITARY. 
NET EARNINGS (OF.PINE} IS NET LABOR ANO PROPRIETORS1 INCOME 
BY PLACE OFWORK, 
RESIDENCE ADJUSTMENT (OF.PIRAD}. 
DIVIDENDS, INTERESTj AND RENT (DF:PID1R) t 
TRANSFERS (OF:PITRAN = 
PERSONAL I COME (OF: IB) I 


















































































ISER MAP MODEL ECONOMIC PROJECTIONS 




CPi-W PRICE LEVEL 































i = 210 
i .203 
i: i 95 
i,i87 
i!i80 















SOURCE: IS R MAP MODEL SIMULATION AHFC:L, CREATED AUGUST 1987. 
ANCHORAGE CPI fPOANCPI) ONSUMER PRICEINDEX FOR URBAN WAGE EARNERS, 
ALASKA/US PRICE LEVEL (PDRATIO) IS THE RATIO OF US ANO 





























ISER MAP REGIONAL MODEL ECONOMIC PROJECTIONS 
AUGUST i987AHFC LOW 
TABLE ii, 































































































































































































565 = 91:: 
NOTE:OFFICIAL STATE OF ALASKA AND CENSUS AREA GOVERNMENT POPULATION ESTIMATES 
MAY NOT BE E@UAlr 
ANCH/MATSU {PL,ANCMS), 
SOUTHEAST (PL.SEAST) I 
INTERIOR PL,INTERI. 
NORTH (PL:NORTH)= 




ISER MAP REGIONAL MODEL ECONOMIC PROJECTIONS 
AUGUST 1987 AHFC LOH 
TABLE 12= 


























































































42 I 162 
42:277 

































































































GULF COAST (ML.GULF} C 
SOUTHWEST (ML.SWEST), 






























DOCUMENTATION FOR HOUSING MODEL, AHFC87C 
APPENDIX C 
DOCUMENTATION FOR HOUSING MODEL, AHFC87C 
Introduction 
The model AHFC87C projects a regional Alaska housing market 
a set of economic projections and a set of assumptions about 
alternative policies which influence mortgage interest rates and the 
rate of disposal of inventories of foreclosed homes. The model 
coefficients are estimated using market for the greater Anchorage 
area housing market, with Fairbanks data included for some 
equations. The model structure follows closely the model of the 
housing market described in Berman and Huskey (1986) [AHFC final 
report], Chapters 3 and 4. 
The model produces forecasts of sales prices for two types of 
standard units, single-family homes and condominiums, and sales 
quantities of single-family homes and condominiums. Condominium 
prices and sales are intended to represent the market for all 
owner-occupied nonsingle-family units, except for mobile homes. 
ysing__the Mod~l for Policy Analysis 
Assumptions about housing policy enter the model and affect the 
forecasts in a number of ways. Changes in interest rates affect 
housing demand. A portion of this long-term demand change affects 
sales demand in each period. A policy which allow buyers to sell 
homes and not be liable for negative equity enters the model by 
changing the value of the parameter FORGIVE to 1. 0. The exact 
definition of these and other parameters used in the model is given 
below in the section on parameter definitions and sources. 
A number of options exist for treating foreclosures which the 
model forecasts for single-family homes and condominiums. These 
options include (1) the portion immediately listed for sale by 
realtors (parameters Al and Bl). (2) the rate of sale of listed 
foreclosures (parameters FS. SFO and FS. CO) • and (3) the proportion 
of the inventory of unsold foreclosures sold by auctions (parameters 
A4 and B4). The "auction sales" produced by the model do not 
necessarily refer to actual auctions but signify any sales where the 
institutional seller is willing to accept a potentially significant 
price reduction in order to reduce the foreclosure inventory. 
Estimation of Model Coefficients 
Coefficients for equations representing the effects of economic 
conditions on sales prices and quantities and on properties listed 
for sale are estimated using quarterly data derived mainly from the 
C-1 
Anchorage Multiple Listing Service. Data on building permits are 
derived from the Municipality of Anchorage and the Matanuska-Susitna 
Borough. The regression equations showing the estimation of these 
coefficients are shown below in the section on regression results. 
Coefficients for equations representing long-term housing 
demand, including changes in owner-occupancy rates and the pro-
portion of buyers choosing single-family homes, multifamily units, 
and mobile homes as well as default t'ates on condominiums and 
single-family homes, are estimated from survey microdata. The 
equation results are presented for several alternative specifica-
tions of the equations in tables D-1 through D-22 in Appendix D. 
The section below on parameter definitions and values specifies the 
actual table number used to compute the parameters for each equation 
of the forecasting model. 
The equation results on the effect of changes in economic 
conditions on owner--occupancy were estimated from the 1980 U.S. 
Census Public Use Sample for Anchorage and the Alaska Economc Survey 
conducted in Anchorage in June, 1987. The coefficients, therefore, 
include the effects of changes in economic and housing market 
conditions between 1980 and 1987 as well as differences among 
individual households in each survey. 
Coefficients for equations forecasting defaults were estimated 
from data on individual mortgage borrowers who financed home 
purchases through AHFC. These data cover over 4,700 homes purchased 
in Anchorage, the Mat-Su Borough, and Fairbanks between the spring 
of 1980 and June 1987. The model used for predicting defaults is 
described in Chapter 4 of Berman and Huskey (1986). Households are 
assumed to have always available to them the option to sell their 
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MODEL: AHFC87C 
JO: l06(RNPR, ) = /DJ. f(LOG(MSAL,C/CFORCE -D ,0-D3,21L06(RA.CPIRN)-D3,31((CFORCE-CFORCE{-4}J/CFORCE 
(-4) )-D3r tLOG RPCN .AKJ-D3.5il0G{RAHFC ST ) 
t.(CFORCE-CFORCE(-4JfCFORCE(-4J1 
34: LOGfNLIS,C-NFl.C) = LOG(CFORCE(-4)}+SS,O+S5:11L06(ERMPR:Cl+S5,21L0G(MlSDAYSt+SS.3tREQUIT.C/RMPR.C 
+S5:bf(CFORCE-CFORCE(-4)/CFORCE(-4l) 
35: LOG(PSAL,R) = IF PSAL.R(-f)-FS1SF+FS.SF(-1) LE 100 THEN 4,605 ELSE (IF N1,0+Mi:1tREQVIT,R/RMPRtR{ 
-i} LT -0,04+LQG( {PSAL, R (-ij-f'.3 ,Sf +FS rSF (-if j /MALI IR {-1)) THEN LDG{MAL} 1 R)-0, 04+L[!{j { PSAL ,R(-i J-
FS,SF+FS,SF (-1)) /MALI .R(-1)) ELSE (IF M1:0+M1.1tREGUIT:RIRNPRtR(-t) 6T 0,04+L06l(PSAL.Rt-1)-FS,SF 
+FS,SFf-1))/MALl.R(-1)) THENLOG(MALI1Rl+0,04+L0G((PSAL.R(-i)-FS:SF+FS.SF(-f))/MALI;R{-t)J EL E 
LOG(NALI.R)+H1.0+N1:11REGUIT1R/RNPR1Rl-i)l) 
36: LOG(PSAL.C) = IF PSAL.C!-11-FS.C+FS,C(-f) LT 7 THEN 2 ELSE IIF M2,0+M2.i*REQUIT,C/RMPR,C(-1) LT 
-0.04+LOG({PSAL.C(-1l-FS.C+FS;C(-i))/MALI,C(-i)) THEN L06(NALI.C)-0.04+L06{(PSAL1C(-1)-FS,C+FS.C( 
-il)/NALI.C(-1)) ELSE (IF M2.0+M21t1REOUIT.C/RMPR.C(-1l GT 0.04+L06f !PSA~.C(-i)-FS,C+FS.C(-1))/ 
XALI.Cf-i)) THEN L05(NAL1,C)+0.04+L06{(PSAL,C(-1)-F5,C+FS.C(-1Jl/NALI.C(-1J} ELSE LOG(NALI,C}+ 
N2,0+M2:1tREGU!T,C/RMPR,C(-1))) 
37: L06(WDRAW.R/HALI.R(-1)) = IF REGUIT,R LT OTHEN W1,01+W1:1*L06(MLSDAYSl-l)) ELSE W1.0+W1.1fl06{ 
MLSDAYSi-1})+W1,2tREGU!T.R/RKPR,R(-1l 
LOG(RA.CPIRN) = Ri.O+R1,2*LOG(CFORCE)+R1:3tLOG(RPCMI.AK)+R1,41L06(RA:CPIRN!-4l)+R1.5+LOG(RBLDINDX 
40: LO.SF= HHtPSFi(PO-P0(-1)l+LD.SF(-1) 
41: LO.NH= HH1PNH1(PD-P0(-l))+LD,MH(-1) 
42: LD,C = HHt(i-PSF-PMHJt(PG-P0(-11 )+LD1C(-tl 
44: L06(PO/(i-P0)) = L1,0+L1.i1(RMPR.R/135-RENT:Ll+Li.2*RPCMI.AK+Lt,31RMORTHFC 
45: PSF = i/(1+EXP((-i)t(L2.0+l2.itLOG(RNPR.R/RNPR,C)+L2,21LOG(RPCM1,AK)+L2,3*RMORTHFC+L2r4tLOG( 
RMPR.CJ 1) J 
46: PHH= 1/(1+EXP(f-ili(L3.0+LJ.i1LOG(RMPR.C)+L3.2tLQ6(RPCMI.AKJ+LJ.31RMORTHFC))) 
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TABLE C.3. DATA DEFINITIONS AND SOURCES 
The time pedod (2/1982 - 1/1987) whfln ABE mortgage 
structure is in effect. 
Quarterly series of AKRAM2_A.CPIXM, Anchorage Consumer 
Price Index for all items for urban wage corners and 
cledcal workers (with NA• s r0p laced by interpolated 
values), with 1986 = 100, using the annual average 
value for 1986, 2.803. 
SOURCES: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
A.CPIQ86=A.CPIQ/2.803 
Quarterly series of the Anchorage Consumer Price Index 
for residential rent, for urban wage earners and 
clerical workers, 1967 = 100. 
SOURCES: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
A.CPIRNT=COMPACT (A.CPIRNT,0,4) 
Alaska employment adjusted to be consistent with the 
CPS annual average for the state, in thousands 
SOURCE: Alaska Department of Labor 
Alaska labor force adjusted to be consislenL wllh the 
CPS annual overage for the state, in thmrnands. 
SOURCE: CFORCE = CEMP + CUNEM 
Anchorage-Matsu region employment adjusted to be 
consistent with the CPS annual average for the state, 
in thousands 
SOURCE: Alaska Department of Labor 
Fairbanks North Star Borough employment adjusted to be 
consistent with the CPS annual average for the state, 
in thousands 
SOURCE: Alaska Department of Labor 
Anchorage-Matsu region labor force adjusted to be 
consistent with the CPS annual average for the state, 
in thousands. 
SOURCE: CPSFO.AM = CPSEM.AM + CPSUN.AM 
Anchorage-Matsu region unemployment adjusted to be 
consistent with the CPS annual average for the state, 
in thousands 













Fairbanks North Star Borough unemployment adjusted to 
be consistent with the CPS annual average for the 
state, in thousands 
§OURCE: Alaska Department of Labor 
Alaska unemployment adjusted to be consistent with the 
CPS annual average for the state, in thousands 
§OURCE: Alaska Department of Labor 
Equals 1 during time period (1975-78) when MLS sales 
data include land, residential and commercial; zero 
during other periods. 
SOURCE: Anchorage Multiple Listing Service. 
Equals 1 during time period (10/1982 forward) when MLS 
sales data refer to just residential properties, not 
condos, nor lots and acres, nor all other; zero during 
other periods. 
SOURCE: Anchorage Multiple Listing Service. 
Equity after five years, condos, in thousands of 
dol::::CE: EQUITY .C a HPR.C -(_i.20 HPR.C(i )*HSAL.C(i) ~ 20 HSAL.C(i) 
.r=-4 J/i:-4 
Equity after five years, single-family residences, in 
th0
::::::, o:;::lRa:sHPR.R -~~~: HPR.R(i)*HSAL.R(fi~: HSAL.R(i) 
Foreclosures that quarter, condominiums, Anchorage-
Matsu, in units. 
~OURCE: AHFC and other mortgage lenders. 
Foreclosures that quarter, single-family residences, 
Anchorage-Matsu, in units 
SOURCE: AHFC and other mortgage lenders. 
Foreclosed inventory as of the quarter, condominiums, 
Anchorage-Matsu, in units 
SOURCE: AHFC and other mortgage lenders 
Foreclosed inventory as of the quarter, mobile homes, 
Anchorage--Matsu, in uni ts 
SOURCE: AHFC 
Foreclosed inventory as of the quarter, single-family 
residences, Anchorage-Matsu, in units 











Number of sales of foreclosed units, condominiums, 
Anchorage-Matsu, in units 
SOURCE: AHFC and other mortgage lenders 
Number of sales of foreclosed units, single-family 
residences, Anchorage-Matsu, in units 
[QU~CE: AHFC and other mortgage lenders 
Number of households (total occupied housing units), 
Anchorage-Matsu, in units. 
SOURCES: Matanuska-Susitna Borough, Development 
Services Dept. ; Municipality of Anchorage, 
Community Planning Dept.; Federal Home Loan Bank of 
Seattle, Anchorage, Alaska Housing Vacancy Survey, 
June 1986. 
Number of building permit applications accepted for 
multifamily structures, Anchorage, in units. 
SOUl~CF;_: Municipality of Anchorage, Building Safety 
Division, Building Safety Activity Reports. 
Number of building permit appl :icaHons ac.cepted for 
single-·family structures, Anchorage, in units. 
SOURCE: Municipality of Anchorage, Building Safety 
Division, Building Safety Activity Reports. 
Number of active listing for Anchorage Matsu, condos, 
in units. (Note: condos were not listed separately in 
1975 and 1976 but were included in the residential 
listings.) 
SOURCES: Multiple Listing Service, Anchorage; and 
Valley Board of Realtors (1987 forward). 
Number of active listings for Anchorage-Matsu, 
residential, in units. (Note: the values for 1975 and 
1976 include condos.) 
SOURCE]i: Multiple Listing Service, Anchorage; and 
Valley Board of Realtors (1987 forward). 
Number of active residential listings in the Mat-Su 
area (condos not included), in units. 
SOURCES: Anchorage Multiple Listing Service and 
Valley Board of Realtors. 
Number of new condominium listings with Anchorage MLS, 
minus number of foreclosures, in units. (Note: Most 
current 12 months are preliminary.) 
SOURCES: Multiple Listing Service, Inc., Listing 










Number of new residential listings with Anchorage MLS, 
minus number of foreclosures, in units. (Note: 1980 
and most current 12 months are preliminary, all others 
are revised.) 
SOURCES: Multiple Listing Service, Inc. , Listing 
Exchange Statistics. MLIS.R = MLIS.R-F.SF 
Average number of days on market of MLS residential 
1i 
§Q!!RCE: Multiple Listing Service, Inc. 
Average sale price of condominiums, in thousands of 
dollars. MPR.C = MVOL.C/MSAL.C*lOOO to 1980 3 (MLS 
data). Figures for 1980 4 forward are prices based on 
AHFC data and adjusted using hedonic equations. 
~QYRCES: Multiple Listing Service, Inc. , and AHJ.i'C. 
Average sale price of residences, in thousands of 
dollars. MPR.R = MVOL.R/MSAL.R*lOOO for 1974 5 to 
1980 3 (MLS data). Figures for 1970 1 through 1974 4 
are estimates based on census data. Figures for 1980 4 
forward are prices based on AHJ.i'C data and adjusLE\d 
using hedonic equations. 
SOURCE!;;_: Multiple Listing Service, Inc.; AHFC; and 
U.S. Bureau of the census. 
Number of condominium sales 
units. (Note: most current 12 
SOURCE: Multiple Listing 
Exchange statistics. 
closed through MLS, in 
months are preliminary.) 
Service, Inc., Listing 
Number of residential sales closed through AnchoragE\ 
MLS, in units. (Note: 1980 and most current l?. months' 
figures are prRliminary, all others are revised. Also, 
figures for 1970 1 through 1974 4 are estimates based 
on census data.) 
SQURCES: Multiple Listing Service, Inc. , Listing 
Exchange Statistics; U.S. Bureau of Lhe Census. 
Total volume of condominium sales closed through 
Anchorage MLS, in millions of dollars. (Note: most 
current 12 months are preliminary.) 
SOURCE: ~ultiple Listing Service, Inc., Listing 
Exchange Statistics. 
Total volume of residential sales closed through 
Anchorage MLS, in millions of dollars. (Note: 1980 and 
most current 12 months' figures are preliminary; all 
others are revised.) 














Per-sonal income: Total, in millions of 
dollar-s. Series adjusted for 1975 1 thr-ough 
ISER. Based on BEA's annual r-evised ser-ies 
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis 
cur-rent 
1979 4 by 
Aver-age personal income per- wor-ker-, Alaska, in 
thousands of dollar-s. (Note: Value for- 1987 1 is ISER 
estimate.) 
PCMI.AK PI/Cli'ORCE 
Aver-age ear-nings per- worker-, Anchor-age-Matsu, in 
thousands of dollars. 
SOURCES: Alaska Dept. of Labor (wages and salar-ies 
and labor force). PCMI.AMS = WSAMS*4/CPSFO.AM. 
Average earnings per worker, Fairbanks, in thousands 
of dollars. 
SOURCES: Alaska Dept. of Labor (wages and salaries 
and labor force). PCMI.FBK = WSFBK*4/CPSFO.FB 
Real Anchorage Consumer Price Index for residential 
rent, 1986 = 100. 
SOURC~: RA.CPIRN = CPIRNT86/A.CPIQ86*100 
Home mortgage interest rates on a $135,000 mortgage in 
the AHFC conventional, taxable pt'ogram for the period 
1981 4 forward. Prior to this, u. S. average fol'.' new 
home purchases, in percent. 
SOURCES: AHFC, and U.S. Dept. of Commel'.'ce, Survey 
of Current Business. 
Real construction cost index for insLltutional and 
large commercial buildings, Anchorage, 1986 = 100. 
SOURCES: HMS, Inc., developed by Cliff Hitchins; 
RRLDINDX = EXPAND(BLDINDXY/PDANCPI,4,4)/0.00717 
The time period (1986 1 1987 2) that the AHFC 
refinance program is in effect. 
New r-esale listings, residential, in units. 
~OURCES: Multiple Listing Serv:ie.l'i, Inc.; and 
Municipality of Anchorage, Building Safety Division. 
RESAL.R = MLIS.R-HUSF(-1)-MALIMS.R+MALIMS.R(-1) 
Real average sole price of condominiums, in thousands 
of dollars. 
SOYRG~: RMPR.C = MPR.C*A.CPIQ86/100 
Real average sale price of residences, in thousands of 
dollars. 








Prime rate charged by banks on short-term business 
loans, in percent. 
SOURCE: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Survey of current 
Business. 
Housing stock, multifamily structures, 
Matsu, in units. 
SOURCES: Matanuska-Susitna Borough, 
Services Dept.; Municipality of 




Housing stock, mobile homes, Anchorage--Matsu, in uni ts. 
SOURCES: Matanuska--Susitna Borough, Development 
Services Dept. ; Municipality of Anchorage, 
Community Planning Dept. 
Housing stock, single-family 
Anchorage-Matsu, in units. 
SOURCES: Matanuska-Susitna Borough, 
Services Dept. ; Municipality of 




Number of condominiums withdrawn from the market 
(nonforeclosures), in units. 
~OURC_§_: WDRAW.C = MALI.C(-1)-MALI.C-MSAL.C+MLIS.C+F.C 
Nurnher of single-family residences withdrawn from the 
market (nonforeclosures), in units. 
~OURCE: WDRAW. R = MALI. R (-1 )-MALI. R-MSAL. R+MLIS. R+F. SF 
C-14 













D2.0 - D2.5 




L1.0 - L1.3 
L2.0 - L2.4 
L3.0 - L3.3 










S1 .0 - S1 .4 
S2.0 -S2.5 





Long-run demand adjustment, condos. 
Long-run demand adjustment, single-family. 
Fraction of single-family foreclosures listed for sale. 
Ratio of single-family foreclosure sales to single-
family foreclosure listings. 
Fraction of single-family foreclosure inventory auctioned. 
Fraction of condo foreclosures listed for sale. 
Ratio of condo foreclosure sales to condo foreclosure 
listings. 
Fraction of condo foreclosure inventory auctioned. 
Depreciation rate for housing stock, multifamily. 
Depreciation rate for housing stock, mobile homes. 
Depreciation rate for housing stock, single-family. 
Single-family demand coefficient. 
Condo demand coefficient. 
Days on market coefficient. 
Rate of sales out of foreclosed inventory, single-
family houses. 
Rate of sales out of foreclosed inventory, condos. 
Estimated ownership demand coefficient. 
Housing demand coefficient. 
Housing demand coefficient. 
Probability of default coefficient. 
Price adjustment coefficient. 
Price adjustment coefficient. 
Price adjustment coefficient. 
Occupancy rate, multifamily. 
Occupancy rate, mobile home. 
Occupancy rate, single-family. 
World real price of mobile homes. 
Minimum real rent, 1986 rent= 100. 
Rent index coefficient. 
New construction coefficient. 
New construction coefficient. 
New construction coefficient. 
New construction coefficient. 
Market adjustment coefficient. 















gate historical data. 
Estimated from aggre-
gate historical data. 
Estimated from aggre-




AHFC survey and 
loan data. 
Estimated from 
AH FC survey and 
loan data. 
Estimated from 
AH FC survey and 
loan data. 
Estimated from 
AH FC loan data. 
Estimated from aggre-
gate historical data. 
Estimated from aggre-
gate historical data. 
Estimated from aggre-
gate historical data. 
Estimated from Muni-
cipality of Anchorage 




Average price 1980 
1986. 





torical cost of living 
data. 
Estimated from aggre-
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0:000617 
































































TABLE C.6. MACROS FOR MODEL USE 
MACRO FOR SIMULATING 
' ~ 
INOVAL Wi:O -i~22 81 0:3 B4 0~05;LKBINDVAL; 
PRINT SIMULATIONS START IN 1 MUST BY 1 4 
&READ &211SCENAR10 
PCMI:AK &2_PCMI,AK RMORTHFC &2_RMORTHFC PRIME &2_RPRIME ; 
EINDATA FI1HH AHFC87C_F! RBLDINDX 
RELAX; SIMALG 6AUSS;CONQPT STO  30; 
NEWOATA ALL,HH A:CP1~86 CFORCE 
FiiMH RBLDINDX; 
NEWDATA 1 -1 TO i 
NEWDATA 1 '1 TD 1987 
LKBINDATA;LKNEWDATA; 
FILE M & 
DELB DAT ' l 
~~ &2 &3 






&PRINT SIMULATIONS START I 1987 i AND MUST BY 1 4 
&END 
&READ &2l1SCENARIO ARCHIVE TO SEARCHi1 
&READ &311NAME FOR OUTPUT 
BlNDATA HH 
-
;1:MH AHFC87C_F::Kµ RBLDIND1 ~HF(37C R6LD~ 
8INDATA REMOVE,C JUNK_REMOVE:C; 
SIMULATE RELAX; 
NEWDATA ALL,HH A, 
FI:MH RBLDINDX; 
NEWDATA 1 1 TO 987 ,RMPR,R HPR,C; 
NEWDATA 1987 1 TO 




&DELETE &1 &2 &3 
i REMOVE,C; 
C-20 




1987 i TD 1987 
NEWOATA 1987 1TO 1 





&DELETE &1 &2 &3 
AND 
IN 1987 BV 1 4 
~HUSF; 
C-21 
CRDATA DSETS &3~ RANGE 1 TO 1 
:05 POP:12 PDP,i3 :14; 
DO PHH=SPAT@(&3_HH:AM,4)*1000; 
DO PPDANCPI=SPAT0(&2_PDANCPI,4); 
DELETE DATA ' ' 
DEDIT PRPRIME,4,1986 1; AOO TOP, 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
8 8 8 8 8 8 8 3 8 8 8 8 8 8 B 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
DEDIT PRMORTHFC,4ii986 1;AD0 TOP, 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
iO 10 10 iO 10 iO 10 10 10 10 10 iO 1 i i t i f 1 t i f i fO 













HOUSING MODEL REGRESSION OUTPUT 
PART D.1. REGRESSION EQUATIONS 
TWO-STAGE LEASTQUARES 
NDDEL NANE: AHFC878 












NOVAR = 5 
0,465 CRSG = 













NCOEF = 5 
0.405 Fl4/Jb) = 
0.629 CONO = 
NOINST = 8 
7.807 PROB}F = 







iO; LOGiHSAL.C/CFORCEJ = 03.0+D3.1tL06\RMPR.Cl+0TL06(RA.CPIRN)+D3.J 
{(CFORCE-CFDRCEf-4)}/CFORCE(-4}}+03,4t 
l06(RPCMiaAKl+Otl0G(RAHFC1ST} 
TJOB = 29 NUVAR = 4
RANGE~ 19E:O 1 TO i 987 i 
RS1 =
Ci. SER = {1,517 
SSR = 6.682 OWH)) = 
NA RSTUDENT = NA 
DFFITS = NA 
COEF ESTIMATE STER 




NCOff = 4 
0.599 F(3/25l = 
0,3M CON.[l = 
NDINST = 8 
i4.945 PROB>F = 






RANGE: 1977 i TO 1987 1 
o. SER= 0.245 
NA RSTUDENT = NA 
-- --..,. r:c~::c~.:-· -c:A,;;,:~ .. k~ .o:.~_: - . ' ---
Part D.l. (continued) 
TWO-STAGE LEAST QUARES 
NODEL NAME: AHFC87B 





















NOVAR = 5 
0.506 CRSG = 








TWO-STAGE LEAST QUARES 
NOOEL NAME: AHFC878 
NCOEF = 5 
0.451 F!4/36l = 
1.767 COND= 
NOINST = 8 
9.209 PROB>F = 







RANGE: 1977 1 T0¥_1987 1 
O. SER= 0.646 
NA RSTUDENT = NA 
12 : LOG!HUMFl = S2.0+S2.2tL06(RA.CPIRNl+S2.3tL06(MLSOAYSl+S2.4tl06(RBLDINDXl+S2.5tl0G(RPRINEl 
NOVAR = 5 
0.605 CRS@ = 






-17.708 8. 734 
2.278 0.725 
NCOEF = 5 
0.562 F(4/36l = 
1.965 COND = 
NOINST = 8 
13.812 PROB>F = 










RANGE: 1977 1 TO 1987 1
SER= 1,039 
RSTUDENT = NA 
Part D.l. (continued) 
TWO-STAGE LEAST QUARES 
MODEL NAME: AHFC87B 

















NOVAR = 3 
0,356 CRSQ = 
0.807 OW(Ol = 
NA 
NCOEF = 3 
0.314 F(2/31l = 
1.617 COND = 
NOINST = 8 
8.569 PROB>F = 
193,033 MAX:HAT = 
ESTIMATE STER TSTAT PROB>:T: 
-5.558 2.08 -2.671 0.012 
1.799 0.473 3.806 0. 
-0.005 0.001 -3.835 o. 
TWO-STAGE LEAST QUARES 
MODEL NAME: AHFC87B 
RANGE: 1978 4 TO 19~7 i 
0.001 SER= 0.161 
NA RSTUDENT = NA 
17 : LOG(HLIS.C/CFORCE(-4ll = S5.0+S5.11LOG(ERMPR.Cl+S5.61(CFORCE-CFORCE(-4J/CFORCE(-4ll 
NOVAR = 3 
0.887 CRSG = 






NCOEF = 3 
0.873 F!2/17l =
1.68 CONO = 
NOINST = 8 
66.398 PROB}F = 










RANGE: 1982 TO 1987 1
0. SER = 0.202 
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Part D.1. (continued) 
TWO-STAGE LEAST QUARES 
NODEL NANE: AHFC87B 










NOVAR = 4 
0.886 CRSG = 







MDDEL NAME: AHFCB78 
MPR.Rt-11 
NOB= 41 NOVAR = 3 
RANGE: 1977 i TO 1987 i 
0. 35 CRSti =
0: SER = 0:277 
SSR = 2,922 DW(Ol = 
NA RSTUDENT = NA 
DFFITS = NA 
COEF ESTIMATE STER 











NCOEF = 4 
0.877 F(J/371 =
1.228 COND = 
NOINST = 8 
95.771 PROB}F = 






NCOEF = 3 










NOINST = 8 
10:248 PROB}F = 





RANGE: 1977 1 TO .,1987 1 
0. SER= O.H9 
NA RSTUDENT = NA 
Part D.l. (continued) 
MODEL NAME: AHFC87B 
NOP.= 20 NDVAR = 2
RANGE~ i L TO 
0:093 SER= 0,294 
SSR =
NA RSTUOENT = NA 
DFFITS = NA 
COEF ESTIMATE STER 
W2. 0.833 
TWO-STAGE LEAST QUARES 
NOOEL NAME:· AHFC87B 
4(:7 
t lV/ 
NCOEF = 2 
21 OSi CO?{D = 
Ti·T ! T 
i~iril 
-9.ii2 
4 ! , : 
l sOOJ 
NOINST = 8 
2.905 MAX:HAT = 
o, 
0.114 











NOVAR = 5 
0.887 CRSQ = 













NCOEF = 5 
0.874 F(4/361 = 
1.014 COND = 
NOINST = 8 
70.54 PROB>F = 
784.709 NAX:HAT = 
TSTAT PROB}:T: 








RANGE: 1977 1 TO 1987 1
SER= 0.036 
RSTUDENT = NA 
Part D.1. (continued) 
ORDINARY LEAST QUARES 
HODEL NAME: AHFC87B 
24 : MLSDAYS = EO+EitMALI.R/MSAL:R 
NDB = 50 
i TO 
RSti = 
NOVAR = 2 
0.81 CRSQ = 
0, SER= 12.963 
SSR = 8065,72 DW(Ol = 
O,i87 RSTUDENT = 2:979 




COEF ESTIMATE STER 
NCOEF = 2 




1 r 902 
i :292 
D-7 
PART D.2. REGRESSION OUTPUT 
LOGIT ESTIMATION 1 




LOGIT ESTIMATION RESULTS 
THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS TENURE 
VARIABLE LOGIT STANDARD 
NAME ESTIMATE ERROR 







HCOSTAa -0.8373E-03 0.3383E-03 -2.475 
HHSIZE 0 .1150 
HHTYPE 0.8553 





MIG75 1. 279 
RETIRED -0 .1146 
AUXILIARY STATISTICS. 
LOG LIKELIHOOD 
SUM OF' SQUAR!m RR8TOUALS 
DEGREES OF FREimOM 
0.1989 0.5781 
0.4818 1. 775 
0.9115E-05 6.469 
0.3010 0.6151 
0.1373E-01 3 .477 










GOODNESS OF FIT STATISTICS. 
a 
LIKELIHOOD RATIO INDEX 



































THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS TENURE 
VARIABLE LOGIT STANDARD T-
NAME ESTIMATE ERROR STATISTIC 
Bl -5,294 0.7516 -7.043 
HCOSTBSb -0.1693E-02 0. 4868E--03 -3.478 
HHSIZE -0.6355E-01 0.1767 -0. 3596 
HHTYPE 1.233 0.4546 2. 712 


















SUM OF SQUARED RESIDUALS 












GOODNESS OF FIT STATISTICS. 
b 
LIKELIHOOD RATIO INDEX 
LIKELIHOOD RATIO STATISTIC 
value rent 
























LOGIT ESTIMATION RESULTS 
THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS TENURE 















SUM OF SQUARED RESIDUALS 







0.1802 1. 276 
0. 7712E-02 4.616 
0.2083 0.3847 
0.2307 -2.809 
0.16 77 7.841 
0.5357 -0.8174 
AT CONVERGENCE 





GOODNESS OF FIT STATISTICS. 
LIKELIHOOD RATIO INDEX 
LIKELIHOOD RATIO STATISTIC 
----------



















DATA SOURCES: ISER Alaska Economic Survey, June 1987; U.S. Census 
of 1980, Public Use Sample, Anchorage. 
D-11 














THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS TENURE 












RETIRED -0 .6117 
AUXILIARY STATISTICS, 
LOG LIKELIHOOD 
SUM OF SQUARED RESIDUALS 



















GOODNESS OF FIT STATISTICS. 
b 
LIKELIHOOD RATIO INDEX 
LIKELIHOOD RATIO STATISTIC 
value rent 
-------


















DATA SOURCES: ISER Alaska Economic Survey, June 1987; U. S, Census 
of 1980, Public Use Sample, Anchorage. 
D-12 














THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS TENURE 










NAME ESTIMATE ERROR STATISTIC 
Bl 10. 73 2.516 4. 265 
HCOSTAa -0.1847E-02 0. 2710E-03 -6.814 
SCOSTc -0.3326E-01 0.5695E-02 -5.840 
HHSIZE 0.1660E-01 0.8923E-01 0.1860 
HHTYPE 0.4295 0.2296 1.871 
HHINCOME 0.4965E-04 0.5051E-05 9.829 
SEX 0.8236E-Ol 0.1857 0.4434 
AGE 0.3139E-Ol 0.7866E-02 3.991 
SINGLE -0.2572E-01 0.2128 -0.1209 
DIVWID -0.2605 0.2406 -1.082 
MIG75 1.133 0.1731 6.543 
RETIRED -0. 3113 0.5487 -0.5674 
AUXILIARY STATISTICS. AT CONVERGENCE AT ZERO 
LOG LIKELIHOOD -509.9 -741.7 
SUM OF SQUARED RESIDUALS 1670. 1591. 
DEGREES OF FREEDOM 1058. 1070. 
PERCENT CORRECTLY PREDICTED 77 .30 50.00 
GOODNESS OF FIT STATISTICS. ABOUT ZERO 
LIKELIHOOD RATIO INDEX 0.3125 
LIKELIHOOD RATIO STATISTIC 463.6 
a actual payment C standard value 
estimated payment standard rent 
DATA SOURCES: ISER Alaska Economic Survey, June 1987; U.S. Census 
of 1980, Public Use Sample, Anchorage. 
D-13 
Part D.2. (continued) 
LOGIT ESTIMATION 1 DATA SUMMARY 
THE ALTERNATIVES AND THEIR FREQUENCIES ARE -
ALTERNATIVE FREQUENCY PERCENT FREQUENCY PERCENT 
LABEL OF CASES CHOSEN 
DEF'AULT 1117. 
SELL 1117. 
LOGIT ESTIMATION RESULTS 
************************* 
THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS STATUS 
VARIABLE LOGIT STANDARD 
NAME ESTIMATE ERROR 
Bl -21.13 2.200 
FBK -0.2208 0.1905 
co 0.4845 0.2518 









TOTF'AM 0.8669E-01 0.8339E-01 1.040 
413.0 
704.0 
AGEl 0.8280E-03 0.1443E-01 0. 5739E--01 
AGE2 --0. 8363E-02 
SPOUSE 0.3731 
LOGINC 0.2154 
LOGASS -0. 2713 
LOGLIAB 0. 8641E--Ol 
HOF 0.8663 
PAM -1. 899 




SUM OF SQUARED RESIDUALS 
















GOODNESS OF FIT STATISTICS. 
LIKELIHOOD RATIO INDEX 
LIKELIHOOD RATIO STATISTIC 













Part D.2. (continued) 
LOGIT ESTIMATION 2 DATA SUMMARY 
THE ALTERNATIVES AND THEIR FREQUENCIES ARE -
ALTERNATIVE FREQUENCY PERCENT FREQUENCY PERCENT 
LABEL OF CASES CHOSEN 
DEFAULT 1117. 100.0 
SELL 1117. 100.0 
LOGIT ESTIMATION RESULTS 
************************* 
THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS STATUS 
VARIABLE LOGIT STANDARD T-
NAME ESTIMATE ERROR STATISTIC 
Bl -22.23 2.265 -9.817 
FBK -0.2707 0.1931 -1.402 
co 0. 5971 0.2560 2.332 
MH 0. 8611 0.2975 2.895 
TOTFAM 0.6673E-01 0.8439E-01 0.7906 
AGEl 0.3202E-02 0.1461E-01 0.2192 
AGE2 -0.1175E-01 0 .1811E-01 -0.6488 
SPOUSE 0.5168 0.6138 0.8419 
LOGINC 0. 2106 0.3432 0.6136 
LOGASS -0.3325 0.1492 -2.229 
LOGLIAB 0. 8696E-01 0.6663E-01 1.305 
HOF 0.8454 0.3976 2.127 
PAM -1.863 0.8210 -2.270 
PERIOD -0.1436E-01 0.5953E-02 -2.413 
EQUITY -0.2855E-04 0.6256E-05 -4.564 
PMLSDAYS 0.1848 0.1698E-01 10.89 
AUXILIARY STATISTICS. AT CONVERGENCE 
LOG LIKELIHOOD 
SUM OF SQUARED RESIDUALS 
DEGREES OF FREEDOM 
PERCENT CORRECTLY PREDICTED 
GOODNESS OF FIT STATISTICS. 
LIKELIHOOD RATIO INDEX 
LIKELIHOOD RATIO STATISTIC 



















Part D.2. (continued) 
LOGIT ESTIMATION 3 DATA SUMMARY 
THE ALTERNATIVES AND THEIR FREQUENCIES ARE -
ALTERNATIVE FREQUENCY PERCENT FREQUENCY PERCENT 
LABEL OF' CASES CHOSEN 
DEFAULT 1117. 
SELL 1117. 
LOGIT ESTIMATION RESULTS 
************************* 
THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS STATUS 
VARIABLE LOGIT STANDARD 
NAME ESTIMATE ERROR 
Bl -21.36 2.223 
FBK -0.2256 0.1909 
co 0.4858 0.2521 









TOTFAM 0.8749E-Ol 0.8343E-01 1.049 
413.0 
]OL1. 0 





LOGLIAB 0 .8779E-Ol 







SUM OF SQUARED RESIDUALS 
DEGREES OF FREEDOM 
0.1797E-01 -0.4641 















GOODNESS OF FIT STATISTICS. 
LIKELIHOOD RATIO INDEX 
LIKELIHOOD RATIO STATISTIC 













Part D.2. (continued) 
LOGIT ESTIMATION 4 DATA SUMMARY 
THE ALTERNATIVES AND THEIR FREQUENCIES ARE -
ALTERNATIVE FREQUENCY PERCENT F'REQUENCY PERCENT 
LABEL OF CASES CHOSEN 
DEFAULT 1117. 100.0 
SELL 1117. 100.0 
LOGIT ESTIMATION RESULTS 
************************* 
THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS STATUS 
VARIABLE LOGIT STANDARD 
NAME ESTIMATE ERROR 
Bl -22.38 2.281 
FBK -0.2731 0.1933 
co 0.5955 0.2562 
MH 0.8482 0.2987 
TOTFAM 0.6803E-01 0.8443E-01 
AGEl 0.2585E-02 0.1465E-01 
AGE2 -0.1161E-Ol 0.1813E-01 
SPOUSE 0. 509'• 0.6145 
LOGINC 0.2214 0.3441 
LOGASS -0.3344 0.1494 
LOGLIAB 0. 8789E--Ol 0.6685E-01 
HOF 0.8426 0.3979 
PAM -1.866 0.8216 
PERIOD -0.1400E-Ol 0.5981E-02 
ABEPER -0.3062E-Ol 0.4692E-01 
EQUITY -0.2862E-04 0. 6262E--05 




















AUXILIARY STATISTICS. AT CONVERGENCE 
LOG LIKELIHOOD 
SUM OF SQUARED RESIDUALS 
DEGREES OF FREEDOM 
PERCENT CORRECTLY PREDICTED 
GOODNESS OF FIT STATISTICS. 
LIKELIHOOD RATIO INDEX 
LIKELIHOOD RATIO STATISTIC 



















Part D.2. (continued) 
LOGIT ESTIMATION 1 











LOGIT ESTIMATION RESULTS 
************************* 
THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS STATUS 
VARIABLE LOGIT STANDARD T-
NAME ESTIMATE ERROR STAUSTIC 
Bl -19.00 2.002 -9.493 
FBK -0.1521 0.1867 -0.8146 
TOTF'AM 0.6491E-01 0.8135E-Ol 0.7979 
AGEl 0.3183E-02 0.1431E-01 0.2224 
AGE2 -0. 7992E-02 0.1779E-01 -0. 41191 










LOGINC -0. 2064E--01 0.3259 -0.6334E-01 
LOGASS -0. 2872 
LOGLIAB 0.9122E-01 
HOF 0.7259 





SUM OF SQUARED RESIDUALS 













GOODNESS OF FIT STATISTICS. 
LIKELIHOOD RATIO INDEX 
LIKELIHOOD RATIO STATISTIC 










Part D.2. (continued) 
LOGIT ESTIMATION 2 











LOGIT ESTIMATION RESULTS 
************************* 
THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS STATUS 
VARIABLE LOGIT STANDARD 
NAME ESTIMATE ERROR 
Bl --19.59 2.043 
FBK -0 .1796 0.1881 
TOTI<'AM 0.4608E-01 0.8231E-01 
AGEl 0.5119E-02 0.1Ll47E-01 
AGE2 -0 .1026E--01 0.1792E-Ol 
SPOUSE 0.4122 0.6041 
LOGINC -0.4963E-Ol 0.3258 
LOGASS --0. 3333 0 .1471 
LOGLIAB 0.9120E-01 0.6623E-Ol 
HOF o. 7077 0. 3715 
PAM -2.093 0.8222 
PERIOD -0 .1077E-Ol 0.5901E-02 
EQUITY -0. 3805E-Olt 0. 6111E-05 

















AUXILIARY STATISTICS. AT CONVERGENCE 
LOG LIKELIHOOD 
SUM OF SQUARED RESIDUALS 
DEGREES OF FREEDOM 
PERCENT CORRECTLY PREDICTED 
GOODNESS OF FIT STATISTICS. 
LIKELIHOOD RATIO INDEX 
LIKELIHOOD RATIO STATISTIC 























Part D.2. (continued) 
LOGIT ESTIMATION 3 
















































































SUM OF SQUARED RESIDUALS 
DEGREES OF' FREEDOM 
PERCENT CORRECTLY PREDICTED 
GOODNESS OF FIT STATISTICS. 
LIKELIHOOD RATIO INDEX 























Part D.2. (continued) 
LOGIT ESTIMATION 4 











LOGIT ESTIMATION RESULTS 
************************* 
THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS STATUS 
VARIABLE LOGIT STANDARD T-
NAME ESTIMATE ERROR STATISTIC 
Bl -19.81 2.067 -9.584 
FBK -0.1858 0.1886 -0.9853 
TOTJ.i'AM 0.4763E-01 0.8238E-01 0.5781 
AGEl 0.4300E-02 0.1452E-01 0. 2961 
AGE2 -0.1014E-01 0.1794E-Ol -0.5652 










LOGINC -0.3122E-01 0. 3271 -0.9544E-01 
LOGASS -0.3356 
LOGLIAB 0.9304E-01 








SUM OF SQUARED RESIDUALS 
DEGREES OF FREEDOM 




0.5928E-02 -1. 745 
0.4761E-01 -0.8418 
0. 6112E-05 -6.220 
0.1625E-01 10.69 
AT CONVERGENCE 





GOODNESS OF FIT STATISTICS. 
LIKELIHOOD RATIO INDEX 
LIKELIHOOD RATIO STATISTIC 










Part D.2. (continued) 
LOGIT ESTIMATION 1 
THE ALTERNATIVES AND THEIR FREQUENCIES ARE -




LOGIT ESTIMATION RESULTS 
************************* 












































































AUXILIARY STATISTICS. AT CONVERGENCE 
LOG LIKELIHOOD 
SUM OF SQUARED RESIDUALS 
DEGREES OF FREEDOM 
PERCENT CORRECTLY PREDICTED 
GOODNESS OF FIT STATISTICS. 
LIKELIHOOD RATIO INDEX 
LIKELIHOOD RATIO STATISTIC 






















Part D.2. (continued) 
LOGIT ESTIMATION 2 













THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS STATUS 
VARIABLE LOGIT STANDARD T-
NAME ESTIMATE ERROR STATISTIC 
Bl -2.069 0.3880 -5.333 
FBK -0.8281E-02 0.7254E-01 -0.1142 
co 0.2519 0.9593E-01 2.626 
MH 0.3433 0.1103 3.113 
TOTF'AM 0.3769E-Ol 0.3478E-Ol 1.084 






















SUM OF SQUARED RESIDUALS 






0. 2011 2.452 
0.2470E-02 6.997 
0.2043E-05 -2.317 
0. 5097E--02 3.595 
AT CONVERGENCE 





GOODNESS OF FIT STATISTICS. 
LIKELIHOOD RATIO INDEX 
LIKELIHOOD RATIO STATISTIC 










Part D.2. (continued) 
LOGIT ESTIMATION 3 











LOGIT ESTIMATION RESULTS 
************************* 








































































SUM OF SQUARED RESIDUALS 
DEGREES OF FREEDOM 
PERCENT CORRECTLY PREDICTED 
GOODNESS OF FIT STATISTICS. 
LIKELIHOOD RATIO INDEX 































Part D.2. (continued) 
LOGIT ESTIMATION 4 









LOGIT ESTIMATION RESULTS 
************************* 




















































AUXILIARY STATISTICS. AT CONVERGENCE 
LOG LIKELIHOOD 
SUM OF SQUARED RESIDUALS 
DEGREES OF FREEDOM 
PERCENT CORRECTLY PREDICTED 
GOODNESS OF FIT STATISTICS. 
LIKELIHOOD RATIO INDEX 
LIKELIHOOD RATIO STATISTIC 























Part D.2. (continued) 
LOGIT ESTIMATION 5 











LOGIT ESTIMATION RESULTS 
************************* 
THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS STATUS 
VARIABLE LOGIT STANDARD 
NAME ESTIMATE ERROR 
Bl -0.7074 0.3407 
FBK -0.1204E-01 0. 7196E--01 
TOTFAM 0.2020E-01 0.3397E-01 
AGEl -0.1758E-01 0.5533E-02 
AGE2 -0.9229E-03 0.6954E-02 
SPOUSE -0 .1125 0.2335 
LOGINC -0.7527E-01 0.1234 
LOGASS -0 .1161 0.5180E-01 
LOGLIAB 0.5183E-01 0.2561E-01 
HOF -0.1822 0.1409 
PAM 0.4084 0.1984 
ABEPER 0.1647 0.4307E-01 
EQUITY -0.1230E-05 0.1694E-05 

















AUXILIARY STATISTICS. AT CONVERGENCE 
LOG LIKELIHOOD 
SUM OF SQUARED RESIDUALS 
DEGREES OF FREEDOM 
PERCENT CORRECTLY PREDICTED 
GOODNESS OF FIT STATISTICS. 
LIKELIHOOD RATIO INDEX 
LIKELIHOOD RATIO STATISTIC 























Part D.2. (continued) 
LOGIT ESTIMATION 6 










THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS STATUS 
VARIABLE LOGIT STANDARD T-
NAME ESTIMATE ERROR STATISTIC 










FBK -0.3724E-02 0. 7218E-01 -0.5159E-01 
TOTF'AM 0.3058E-01 0.3411E-01 0. 8966 
AGEl -0.1844E-01 0.5536E-02 -3.332 
AGE2 0.5150E-04 0.6937E-02 0. 7424E-02 
SPOUSE -0.1600 0.2332 -0.6860 
LOGINC -0.2105E-Ol 0.1239 -0.1699 
LOGASS -0.8095E-Ol 0.5224E-01 -1.550 
LOGLIAB 0.5551E-Ol 0.2589E-01 2.144 
HOF -0.1018 0.1415 -0. 7196 
PAM 0.4184 0.1989 2.104 
PERIOD 0.1790E-Ol 0.2474E-02 7.238 
EQUITY -0.6862E-05 0.2028E-05 -3.383 
PDFORCE 0.1880E-01 0.5089E-02 3.695 
AUXILIARY STATISTICS. AT CONVERGENCE AT ZERO 
LOG LIKELIHOOD -2801. -5282. 
SUM OF SQUARED RESIDUALS 7629. 7620. 
DEGREES OF FREEDOM 7606. 7620. 
PERCENT CORRECTLY PREDICTED 87.62 50.00 
GOODNESS OF FIT STATISTICS. ABOUT ZERO 
LIKELIHOOD RATIO INDEX 0.4697 
LIKELIHOOD RATIO STATISTIC 4962. 
SOURCE: AHFC borrower file, 1980-1987 
D-27 
Part D.2. (continued) 
LOGIT ESTIMATION 7 













THE DEPENDENT VARTARLE rs STATUS 
VARIABLE LOGIT STANDARD T-
NAME ESTIMATE ERROR STATISTIC 


























SUM OF SQUARED RESIDUALS 




















GOOONESS OF FIT STATISTICS. 
LIKELIHOOD RATIO INDEX 
LIKELIHOOD AA'rIO STATISTIC 










Part D.2. (continued) 
LOGIT ESTIMATION 8 











LOGIT ESTIMATION RESULTS 
************************* 
THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS STATUS 
VARIABLE LOGIT STANDARD 
NAME ES'l'IMATE ERROR 
Bl -0. 7158 0.3398 
FBK -0 .1718E-01 0. 7187E--01 
TOTFAM 0.1997E-01 0.3391E-01 
AGEl -0.1732E-01 0.5518E-02 
AGE2 -0.1190E-02 0.6939E-02 
SPOUSE -0.1064 0.2329 
LOGINC -0.6591E-01 0.1233 
LOGASS -0.1153 0.5166E-01 
LOGLIAB 0.5168E-01 0.2562E-01 
HOF -0.1807 0.1407 
PAM 0.4020 0.1982 
EQUITY -0.1159E-05 0.1688E-05 
















AUXILIARY STATISTICS. AT CONVERGENCE 
LOG LIKELIHOOD 
SUM OF SQUARED RESIDUALS 
DEGREES OF FREEDOM 
PERCENT CORRECTLY PREDICTED 
GOODNESS OF FIT STATISTICS. 
LIKELIHOOD RATIO INDEX 
LIKELIHOOD RATIO STATISTIC 























Part D.2. (continued) 
LOGIT ESTIMATION 9 













THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS STATUS 
VARIABLE LOGIT STANDARD T-
NAME ESTIMATE ERROR STATISTIC 




























SUM OF SQUARED RESIDUALS 
DEGREES OF FREEDOM 
0.9524E-01 2.583 
0.1152 2.207 
0.3454E-01 0. 7757 





0. 2581E--01 1.819 
0.1498 -1.435 
0.2004 2.406 
0. 4319E--01 3.997 
0.2825E-05 1.382 
0.1987E-04 -4. 477 
0.4832E-02 1.897 
AT CONVERGENCE 





GOODNESS OF FIT STATISTICS. 
LIKELIHOOD RATIO INDEX 
LIKELIHOOD RATIO STATISTIC 










Part D.2. (continued) 
LOGIT ESTIMATION 10 













THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS STATUS 
VARIABLE LOGIT STANDARD T-
NAME ESTIMATE ERROR STATISTIC 
Bl -2.333 0.3970 -5.878 
FBK 0.3027E-01 0.7318E-01 0.4136 
co 0.1584 0. 9686E-01 1.635 
MH 0.8656E-01 0 .1170 0. 1398 
TOTFAM 0.4253E-Ol 0.3474E-01 1.224 























SUM OF SQUARED RESIDUALS 
DEGREES OF FREEDOM 
0.2338 -0.6190 
0.1329 0. 7008 




0.3109E-02 8. 775 
0.3987E-05 -4.854 
0.1976E-04 -4.053 
0.5565E-02 5. 780 
AT CONVERGENCE 





GOODNESS OF FIT STATISTICS. 
LIKELIHOOD RATIO INDEX 
LIKELIHOOD RATIO STATISTIC 










Part D.2. (continued) 
LOGIT ESTIMATION 11 













THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS STATUS 
VARIABLE LOGIT STANDARD T-
NAME ESTIMATE ERROR STATISTIC 
Bl -2.294 0. 3977 -5.768 
FBK 0.3265E-Ol 0.7322E-01 0.4459 
co 0.1590 0. 9692E-01 1.641 
MH 0.1079 0.1174 0.9191 
TOTF'AM 0.4116E-Ol 0.3478E-01 1.184 










AGE2 -0.2102E-04 0.6930E-02 -0.3034E-02 
SPOUSE -0.1484 
LOGINC 0.8552E-01 








PDFORCE 0. 3196E-01 
AUXILIARY STATISTICS. 
LOG LIKELIHOOD 
SUM OF SQUARED RESIDUALS 










0 .1978E-OL1 -4 .112 
0.5574E-02 5.734 
AT CONVERGENCE 





GOODNESS OF FIT STATISTICS. 
LIKELIHOOD RATIO INDEX 
LIKELIHOOD RATIO STATISTIC 










Part D.2. (continued) 
LOGlT ESTIMATION 12 













THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS STATUS 
VARIABLE LOGIT STANDARD T-
NAME ESTIMATE ERROR STATISTIC 














AGEl -0 .1871E-01 
AGE2 -0.1477E-02 






CAPGAIN 0. 34l11E-OS 




SUM OF SQUARED RESIDUALS 
DEGREES OF FREEDOM 
0.9513E-01 2.617 
0.1150 2.050 





0. 5015E--01 -1.933 
0.2582E-Ol 1.819 




0. 4811E-02 1.687 
AT CONVERGENCE 





GOODNESS OF FIT STATISTICS. 
LIKELIHOOD RATIO INDEX 
LIKELIHOOD RATIO STATISTIC 










Part D.2. (continued) 
LOGIT ESTIMATION 13 DATA SUMMARY 

















LOGIT ESTIMATION RESULTS 
************************* 





































































AUXILIARY STATISTICS. AT CONVERGENCE 
LOG LIKELIHOOD 
SUM OF SQUARED RESIDUALS 
DEGREES OF FREEDOM 
PERCENT CORRECTLY PREDICTED 
GOODNESS OF FIT STATISTICS. 
LIKELIHOOD RATIO INDEX 
LIKELIHOOD RATIO STATISTIC 














Part D.2. (continued) 
LOGIT ESTIMATION 14 













THE ORPENDENT VARIABLE IS STATUS 
VARIABLE LOGIT STANDARD T-
NAME ESTIMATE ERROR STATISTIC 
Bl -2.200 0.3706 -5.937 
FBK 0.2947E-Ol 0.7262E-01 0.4058 
TOTFAM 0.3344E-Ol 0.3413E-01 0.9800 























SUM OF SQUARED RESIDUALS 
DEGREES OF FREEDOM 
0.2332 -0.7533 
0.1255 0.6123 














GOODNESS OF FIT STATISTICS. 
LIKELIHOOD RATIO INDEX 
LIKELIHOOD RATIO STATISTIC 










Part D.2. (continued) 
LOGIT ESTIMATION 15 











THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS STATUS 
VARIABLE LOGIT STANDARD T-
NAME ESTIMATE ERROR STATISTIC 
Bl --2 .137 0.3720 -5.744 
FBK 0.3335E-Ol 0.7268E-01 0.4589 
TOTFAM 0.3264E-Ol 0.3416E-Ol 0.9555 










AGE2 0.2615E-03 0.6948E-02 0.3764E-01 
SPOUSE -0 .1775 
LOGINC 0.6100E-Ol 











SUM OF SQUARED RESIDUALS 
DEGREES OF FREEDOM 
0.2336 -0.7595 
0.1258 0.4848 
0.5034E-Ol -1. 528 
0.2588E-01 2.019 
0.1430 -0.8850 
0 .1996 2.371 
0.4385E-01 2.569 








PERCENT CORRECTLY PREDICTED 87.61 
GOODNESS OF FIT STATISTICS. 
LIKELIHOOD RATIO INDEX 
LIKELIHOOD RATIO STATISTIC 










Part D.2. (continued) 
LOGIT ESTIMATION 16 













THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS STATUS 
VARIABLE LOGIT STANDARD T-
NAME F.S'l'TMATE ERROR STATISTIC 




















CAPGAIN 0. 7.?.17E-05 
LOSS -0.9947E-04 
PDFORCE 0. 8778E-02 
AUXILIARY STATISTICS. 
LOG LIKELIHOOD 
SUM OF SQUARED RESIDUALS 







0.2568E-01 1. 795 




0. 4 7 98E--02 1.830 
AT CONVERGENCE 





GOODNESS OF FIT STATISTICS. 
LIKELIHOOD RATIO INDEX 
LIKELIHOOD RATIO STATISTIC 
SOURCE: AHF'C borrower file, 1980-1987 
D-37 
ABOUT ZERO 
0.4672 
4935. 
AT ZERO 
-5282. 
7620. 
7620. 
50.00 
